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ABSTRACT 
 
The present thesis was dedicated to examining individuals’ performance on a low-
level reaching task conducted under social-interactive conditions. In this paradigm 
named Social Inhibition of Return (social IOR) two individuals, sitting opposite each 
other take turns to respond to targets appearing on either side of a visual display. 
Typical results reveal that reaction times are longer when responses are directed to 
where the co-actor just responded. Despite being fairly simple, this task is 
intriguing to examine as it potentially incorporates features of both an inhibition of 
return (IOR) effect and, a joint-action phenomenon, due to its interactive nature. 
Indeed, the results of the standard social IOR paradigm where participants sit 
opposite are consistent with both explanations as the potential involvement of 
attentional inhibition and/or action co-representation cannot be disentangled. The 
present work examined the causes and properties of this intriguing effect over the 
course of four empirical chapters. First, Chapter 2 revealed that social IOR 
possesses a number of properties, characteristic of traditional IOR. Second, Chapter 
3 convincingly demonstrated that action co-representation does not seem to 
contribute to the phenomenon. Furthermore, Chapter 4 confirmed these findings by 
revealing that social IOR does not depend on the socialness of the co-actor. Finally, 
Chapter 5 showed that it could even bias a range of free choice decisions which 
revealed another novel property of the effect.  Taken together these findings were 
interpreted as mostly consistent with a low-level inhibitory account as opposed to a 
theory, advocating an involvement of action imitation/co-representation in the 
effect. The present work had a number of theoretical and methodological 
implications for the better understanding of social IOR. In more general terms, it 
also contributed to the quickly developing, alternative literature to the action co-
representation account, advocating a bottom-up basis of some joint-action effects.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
‘Inhibitory processes associated with selective attention are not confined to a single nervous 
system … these processes cross nervous systems during conditions where a performer 
observes another person engage in goal-directed reaching’ 
(Hayes, Hansen & Elliott, 2010, p. 303) 
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1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
As outlined in the Abstract, the present thesis explored an effect standing at 
the boundaries of attentional orienting/inhibition of return on one side and joint-
action/action co-representation on another. To understand better why and how 
these two separate branches of literature relate to the social IOR effect, the present 
General Introduction succinctly outlines their foundation, key principles and 
suspected neural mechanisms through which these operate. Following a bottom to 
top logic, the review commences with an introduction into the human visual 
attentional system and the basic inhibition of return effect. Then it continues with a 
thorough description of social IOR, as the name of the phenomenon suggests an 
involvement of inhibitory effects. Finally, the General Introduction ends with a 
review of joint-action with a particular focus on the action co-representation 
account which has been used to explain an identical effect to social IOR.  
1.1 The Visual Attentional System and Social Cues  
 
Attention optimizes the processing resources of the individual by enhancing 
the information of interest at a given moment and inhibiting the stimuli, identified 
as task-irrelevant at that time (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004). Thus, if 
one can prioritise the processing of the relevant information on a task and 
completely ignore all irrelevant information, they are said to have perfect 
attentional selection. However, in reality, the attentional system is far from perfect 
not only because of the extreme abundance and complexity of the environment but 
also because individuals have limited processing resources (Lavie et al., 2004) due 
to which the attentional system is susceptible to numerous factors within and 
outside the individual.  
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The latter explains why the first attentional models have been predominantly 
concerned with identifying the stage at which attention influences the selection of 
perceptual information – before or after it has received full processing (Broadbent, 
1958; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman, 1969). However, more recent work has 
suggested that rather than being viewed as a singular process attention is 
multifaceted, having several loci of selection (Chun & Wolfe, 2005). For example, 
attention could be deployed over space and time; however, most research has been 
dedicated to examining the workings of spatial visual attention, predominantly how 
spatial orienting occurs. Orienting is one of the three aspects1 of the human 
attentional system, identified by Posner and Peterson (1990). Orienting has been 
defined as ‘the aligning of attention with a source of sensory input or an internal 
semantic structure stored in memory’ (Posner, 1980, p.4). 
Moreover, such an alignment in spatial attention can occur either with the 
overt motion of the eyes, a process termed overt attention or without any change 
in one’s gaze (covert attention; Helmholtz, 1866; 1911). Covert attention at a 
location has been found to facilitate saccades2 and target identification at that 
location (Kowler, Anderson, Dosher & Blaser, 1995). Additionally, it seems to 
precede eye movements and thus is useful at monitoring the environment and 
guiding eye gaze. Moreover, while eye movements can be directed only to a single 
location at a time, covert attention can be deployed to more than one location 
simultaneously (LaBerge & Brown, 1989). Despite that, human and non-human 
neuropsychological studies have demonstrated that very similar cortical structures 
subserve both types of orienting (Corbetta et al., 1998; Nobre, Gitelman, Dias & 
                                                          
1 The other two being: executive control which monitors selection and resolves conflict; and 
alerting which is concerned with achieving and maintaining a vigilant state (Fan, 
McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum & Posner, 2005; Posner & Peterson, 1990). 
2 Saccades are rapid, ballistic movements of the eyes that abruptly change their point of 
fixation and can range in amplitude from small (e.g., while reading) to much larger 
movements (e.g., gazing; Purves et al., 2001).  
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Mesulam, 2000). For example, the frontal eye field (FEF) which is the main neural 
correlate of eye movement behaviour has also been found to be active in covert 
attentional selection (e.g., Thompson, Biscoe & Sato, 2005). Thus, some have 
suggested that there might be no need for a dissociation between overt and covert 
attentional orienting processes (e.g., Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola & Umiltfi, 1987). 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, instead of constructing an accurate 
representation of the world, the human attentional system interprets the incoming 
sensory input according to its behavioural relevance to the individual (Treue, 2001). 
In support, the neural activity of areas, previously considered to be purely sensory, 
such as the primary visual cortex (V1) have been found to be attention-modulated 
(e.g., Brefczynski & DeYoe, 1999; Gandhi, Heeger & Boynton, 1999; Silver, Ress & 
Heeger, 2005). Thus, in the context of spatial attention, the process of mapping the 
visual input from the retina to the cerebral visual areas (retinotopic activation) 
relies on how much attention has been deployed in that particular region. Moreover, 
in terms of behavioural relevance, other two ways in which attention could be 
oriented are endogenously, based on internal information coming from the 
individual’s goals, prior knowledge and assumptions and exogenously, based on 
external information such as the (sudden) appearance of a possibly relevant 
stimulus (Jonides, 1981). In the first case, the deployment of attentional resources 
is said to occur in a top-down, voluntary fashion as it is internally guided. An 
example of the latter would be following a central arrow, pointing at the location 
where an upcoming target is going to appear. Exogenous orienting, on the other 
hand, is thought to occur automatically, in a bottom-up manner. Thus, the latter is 
normally studied in cueing paradigms where a sudden change in the periphery 
(e.g., a light flash) is found to produce a response time advantage if one needs to 
subsequently act at that particular area (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984). The next 
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subsection in the review has been dedicated to explaining attentional cueing 
paradigms in more detail.    
Finally, the visual attentional system seems to be highly influenced by human 
features, especially, the other’s eyes (the head area in general; Kuhn & Land, 
2006; Langton & Bruce, 2000; Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, Leekam & Benson, 2008) 
and hands (e.g., Flanagan, Brodeur & Burack, 2015; Hu et al., 2013; Langton & 
Bruce, 2000). First, lab studies have demonstrated that participants exhibit a 
preference for these human features since such images easily attract attention, 
especially when depicting human eyes (Kuhn, Tatler & Cole, 2009; Pelphrey et al., 
2002). Furthermore, research has also indicated that the other’s gaze direction 
orients attention, similarly to other endogenous cues (e.g., Flanagan et al., 2015; 
Linnell, Caparos, de Fockert & Davidoff, 2013). Thus, participants reflexively turn 
their look at the direction of where the others’ eyes are pointing, an effect known 
as gaze cueing (Driver et al., 1999). As gaze cueing has produced vast research 
interest, there is still an ongoing debate whether others’ eye direction has a special 
orienting status. Some argue that gaze leads to an indistinguishable cueing effect 
to non-biological directional cues (arrows; Kuhn & Kingston, 2009) whereas others 
have identified differences between gaze cueing and cueing from other anatomical 
organs (tongues; Downing, Dodds & Bray, 2004). However, importantly, even the 
proponents of the latter account (e.g., Downing et al., 2004) advocate that gaze 
produces automatic attentional shifts.  
1.1.1 The Attentional Cueing Paradigm 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, endogenous and exogenous spatial 
attention are usually studied in attentional cueing paradigms, the most famous of 
which has been devised by Posner and colleagues (Posner, Nissen & Ogden, 1978; 
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Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984). In a series of experiments in their seminal 
paper Posner and Cohen (1984) identified several of the key features of attentional 
orienting by employing a simple covert orienting paradigm (eye movements were 
monitored).  
In the basic paradigm participants fixate on a centrally presented box 
displayed along with two peripheral boxes, one to its left and the other – to its 
right. Then, one of the two peripheral boxes illuminates at random, followed by a 
delay ranging from 0 to 500 ms and the presentation of a target, which is normally 
presented at the center (60% of the time) but could also appear in either the left 
(10%) or the right (10%) box. Additionally, in 20% of the time no target appears 
(catch trials). Participants are instructed to make a fast response as soon as they 
detect the target. As targets are most likely to appear at the center of the display, 
participants’ attention is assumed to be guided back to the central box after they 
have looked at one of the peripheral boxes. In the simpler and most widely used 
version of the paradigm, however, instead of manipulating target probability, after 
one of the peripheral cues has been presented, the central box simply illuminates to 
direct attention to the center of the display (Cohen, 1981).  
Posner and Cohen’s (1984) results revealed that participants were quicker to 
respond to the side that was validly cued as compared to the uncued side. 
Moreover, they performed the same experiment with a central cue in the form of a 
left or right-pointing arrow which either correctly guided attention to the location of 
the target (valid cue) or it directed it to the opposite location of where the target 
was going to appear (invalid cue). As in the exogenous version of the paradigm, 
participants in the arrow experiment were quicker to make a response where the 
cue correctly predicted the target location (Posner & Cohen, 1984). Furthermore, in 
the exogenous condition this facilitatory effect was found to be rather short-lived 
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(less than 300 ms). The latter provides evidence that visual spatial orienting occurs 
before the eyes have had the chance to move to the area of interest (an interval 
shorter than 300 ms is not long enough for attention to be deployed overtly; 
Posner, 1980). However, according to Posner and Cohen (1984) the eyes can move 
to the cued location to improve acuity. Importantly, the RT facilitation did not seem 
to depend on the probability of the valid trials. For example, even when the cue 
was valid in only 10% of the time a strong RT facilitatory effect occurred as long as 
the participants’ attention was summoned to the central box after they had 
observed the peripheral illumination (Cohen, 1981).  
Moreover, in the same research Posner and Cohen (1984) unexpectedly 
identified another property of spatial attentional orienting. When the cue to target 
delay (stimulus onset asynchronicity; SOA) in their exogenous condition was more 
than 300 ms, instead of improving target detection, valid cues impeded it, resulting 
in increased RTs. Posner and Cohen (1984) termed the effect inhibition of return 
(IOR) and suggested that the source of the effect was the capture of attention by 
the peripheral cue and the subsequent inhibition to return it to that location, as 
attention has been removed from it (participants focus their attention back to the 
center). Thus according to the most popular explanation for IOR, the inhibitory 
effect occurs at the early stages of perceptual/attentional processing, resulting in 
increased RTs and an impaired signal detection at that location (Chica & Lupiáñez, 
2009; Prime & Ward, 2004). However, neither in Posner and Cohen’s (1984) nor in 
any other early papers (e.g., Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan & Sciolto, 1989) was IOR 
identified in the endogenous cueing condition even during very long SOAs (1250 
ms). Moreover, the effect was found to occur automatically, ‘without the need for 
any deliberate strategy on the part of the subject’ (Posner & Cohen, 1984, p.537). 
Thus, it occurred even without target probability manipulation (Cohen, 1981). 
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Finally, Posner and Cohen (1984) found that although producing a comparable 
effect, overt orienting was generally found to increase the magnitude of IOR.  Other 
properties of the IOR effect will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section. 
Overall, early findings from attentional cueing paradigms suggested that both 
central and peripheral cues can improve target detection (Posner, 1980; Posner et 
al., 1978; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Rafal et al., 1989). Moreover, while RT facilitation 
and inhibition occur in both covert and overt attentional orienting, their magnitude 
is larger when the eyes can move to the area of interest (Posner & Cohen, 1984).  
1.1.2 Inhibition of Return: Important Properties 
 
Since the discovery of IOR there have been many studies exploring its 
properties and neural basis. The present section presents a brief summary of some 
of the key features of the phenomenon while the following subsection outlines what 
is known about its neural basis. 
First, although classically demonstrated to be tagged to spatial locations, IOR 
has also been found to occur with objects (Abrams & Dobkin, 1994; Tipper, Driver 
& Weaver, 1991; 1994). Thus, when attention had been previously cued to a 
moving object, participants inhibited the new location of where the object moved to 
later (Tipper et al., 1991). Similarly, when a location within one of two stationary 
objects had been cued, participants were slower to respond to an uncued location 
within the cued object as compared to an uncued location in the uncued object 
(Weger, Abrams, Law & Pratt, 2008). Moreover, visual search tasks also suggest 
that IOR could be object-based. In one such study, for example, participants had to 
search for a character (Waldo/ the wizard from ‘Where’s Waldo?’) in a complex 
visual scene (Klein & MacInnes, 1999). Then during search, a probe was presented 
either in the visual area of participants’ preceding fixation or at a new location, the 
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difference between which revealed an IOR effect. However, the effect disappeared if 
the visual array was removed when the probe was introduced, suggesting that IOR 
is tagged to objects (Klein & MacInnes, 1999).   
Furthermore, contrary to what had been identified in the early papers on the 
effect, subsequent research challenged the idea that IOR occurs only with 
exogenous stimuli and that it could be used as a measure of exogenous orienting 
(Theeuwes & Godijn, 2002). In fact, recent research has demonstrated IOR with 
endogenous cues, such as arrows or gaze cues (e.g., Flanagan et al., 2015; Taylor 
& Klein, 2000; Weger et al., 2008). Thus, for example, Weger and colleagues 
(2008) reported an object-based IOR with both central arrows and word cues. 
However, the effect was present only when a sufficient time was allowed for 
attention to disengage from the cued object3 (SOA: 1700 ms). Moreover, in their 
word cue experiment, Weger et al. (2008) encouraged the reorienting of attention 
to a different location after cueing by instructing participants to follow the motion of 
a rotating object. It was concluded that the latter might be the reason why IOR had 
not been identified in previous studies using endogenous cues as the reorienting of 
attention is vital for the IOR effect to occur. 
Finally, there is evidence that the effect is fairly robust and does not depend 
on the socialness of the central cue or peripheral target (Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; 
Flanagan et al., 2015). For instance, in a very recent study, children with Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD)4 and typically-developing controls had to detect either a 
                                                          
3 Endogenous orienting is more slow-moving as compared to exogenous orienting. Thus, 
more time is usually needed for attention to disengage from a location/object and to 
reorient to another when guided endogenously (Theeuwes, Godijn & Pratt, 2004; Wolfe, 
Alvarez & Horowitz, 2000). 
4 ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder, characterised by a triad of impairments, among 
which are a deficit in the social domain, abnormal emotional responses and motor behaviour 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; 
Frith, 2003). 
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social (human face) or a non-social target (mixed face) on the basis of a social (a 
pointing hand) or a non-social cue (arrow) in a variant of Posner and Cohen’s 
paradigm (Flanagan et al., 2015). Despite the fact that ASD individuals have a 
general difficulty orienting to social stimuli (Dawson et al., 2004), results revealed 
no difference between the groups and even a tendency for a stronger IOR effect in 
the ASD group as these children took longer to respond to invalid trials. Moreover, 
in the long SOA condition (650 ms) ASD children were even quicker to orient to the 
pointing hand as compared to the TD controls  which reveals the robustness of the 
Posner and Cohen’s paradigm in general (Flanagan et al., 2015). 
1.1.2.1 Neural Correlates     
There is still a debate concerning the precise mechanisms of the effect. As 
mentioned earlier, followers of the initial account of IOR suggest that the observed 
slowing down is generated in the early perceptuo-attentional stages, prior to 
response initiation (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Chica & Lupiáñez, 2009; Prime & Ward, 
2004). Alternatively, others have suggested that instead, the peripheral cue 
produces an automatic activation of an eye movement to the cued location and 
what is inhibited is this oculomotor movement (Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan & Sciolto, 
1989; Taylor & Klein, 1994). Finally, although not without debate, it is generally 
accepted that IOR affects the attention-perceptual stages of early processing but 
also has an oculomotor component, so that the magnitude of the effect increases 
when eye movements are allowed (Kingston & Pratt; 1999; Taylor & Klein, 2000). 
Additionally, ERP studies overall advocate a perceptuo-attentional locus of the 
effect with inhibition occurring only in the pre-motor stages of the IOR task. Thus, 
the phenomenon is known to be associated with early sensory ERP components, 
such as P1 and/or N1. First, the occipital P1 is the earliest sensory ERP component 
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peaking at around 100 ms after the onset of a visual stimulus, so a reduction in the 
signal is interpreted as a sign of inhibition (Luck et al., 1994). However, although a 
number of studies have reported a reduction in the amplitude of P1 in covert IOR 
tasks (Prime & Ward, 2004, 2006; van der Lubbe, Vogel, & Postma, 2005; Wascher 
& Tipper, 2004, Satel et al., 2013), some have found that this does not apply to 
overt IOR (Satel et al., 2013; Satel, Hilchey, Wang, Reiss & Klein, 2014). 
Furthermore, the N1 component is usually detected 150–200 ms post-stimulus with 
a greater peak for validly cued trials, than invalidly cued ones. Thus, IOR ERP 
studies normally report an enhancement in N1 (a larger peak in signal for valid 
trials) which is why it is one of the markers of IOR (e.g., McDonald, Ward & Kiehl, 
1999; Wascher & Tipper, 2004). Moreover, ERP studies have also examined 
whether IOR has a motor component by measuring the amplitude of the lateralized 
readiness potential signal (LRP; Prime & Ward, 2004, 2006). LRP is associated with 
motor selection and motor preparation. Prime and Ward’s (2004, 2006) findings 
have revealed that while IOR seems to produce a delay in pre-motor behaviour 
such as motor preparation, it does not have an effect on the LRPs, tagged to the 
motor response.  
Finally, neuroimaging studies on IOR normally present a slightly different 
picture as compared to ERP studies, as they identify the involvement of motor 
areas in the effect. Thus, research has revealed that the potential neural correlates 
of spatial IOR could be found in a dorsal frontoparietal network in the brain which 
includes the frontal eye field (FEF) and the superior parietal cortex (SPC; Chen,Wei 
& Zhou, 2006; Lepsien & Pollmann, 2002; Mayer, Seidenberg, Dorflinger & Rao, 
2004; Ro, Farne & Chang, 2003). This is not surprising as, as mentioned before the 
FEF has been implicated in both overt and covert shifting of attention (Corbetta et 
al., 1998). At the same time the SPC is part of a dorsal frontoparietal system for 
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directing spatial attention or action, known to be activated by spatial attentional 
tasks only (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Moreover, there is evidence that this dorsal 
frontoparietal network might maintain the inhibitory bias against returning to an 
already cued location, once attention has been disengaged from the location. For 
instance, data from a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study where either 
the function of the participants’ FEF or SPC were disrupted via TMS, two outcomes 
were found depending on when the stimulation took place (Ro et al., 2003). When 
TMS was applied so that it followed the presentation of the cue but also appeared 
shortly before the occurrence of the target (the inhibitory bias had already formed), 
IOR was no longer present. However, the IOR effect was not disrupted if the 
stimulation occurred very shortly after the cue (the inhibitory bias had still not 
formed; Ro et al., 2003). Moreover, several studies have reported an involvement 
of the the superior colliculus (SC) in the effect (e.g. Posner et al., 1985; Rafal et 
al., 1989; Sereno, Briand, Amador, & Szapiel, 2006). The SC is a midbrain 
structure, believed to be involved in the orienting and programming of the eye 
movements (Schiller, 1977). Consistent with this Sereno et al. (2006) reported the 
case of a patient with a damaged SC who did not experience IOR. The latter 
presents evidence that IOR is likely to have an oculomotor component. 
Thus, studies looking at the neural basis of the effect have reported evidence 
for both an attentional and oculomotor component of IOR. 
1.1.3 Social Inhibition of Return 
 
However, although predominantly studied in single-participant conditions, a 
variant of the Posner and Cohen’s (1984) paradigm has recently been employed in 
joint-action settings. First, Welsh et al. (2005) examined what effect would another 
person have if sat opposite the participant in the standard IOR paradigm. In this 
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study two co-actors sitting opposite each other responded to targets, appearing 
either at the left or the right location of a flat display located between them. 
Importantly, in the within-participant IOR trials (measuring standard IOR), the 
target could either occur at the ‘same’ (repeated) or a different (novel) location, in 
respect to the co-actor’s own previous response. However, additionally, the two co-
actors also took turns to respond to targets, so that co-actor A responded to either 
the same or the different location as a function of co-actor B’s previous response. 
The latter was the measure of between-participant IOR as it reflects the idea that 
the IOR effect might transfer between individuals. Moreover, once a response had 
been made in this task, participants were required to return their hand to a ‘home’ 
position located in front of them (See Fig 1.1). Thus, if the two co-actors in the task 
were named co-actor A and co-actor B, respectively, they completed an 
‘AABBAABB…’ sequence of events, measuring both within- and between-participant 
IOR. Remarkably, Welsh et al.’s (2005) results revealed both the well-known 
within-participant IOR in which participants were slower to return to a location they 
had previously responded to, as well as a significant between-participant IOR. Thus, 
co-actors were also slower to execute reaching responses to targets located where 
the other participant had just responded (Welsh et al., 2005). Therefore, the 
between-participant IOR effect is measured by the difference in RT (response time; 
referring to the interval between target onset and target response) when 
participants act on a location their partner responded to on the previous trial (same 
location) and RT when acting on a new location, to which the partner did not 
respond to on a previous trial (different location).  
 Other authors refer to the effect as Social Inhibition of Return (social IOR; 
Skarratt, Cole & Kingstone, 2010) which would be the term used in the present 
thesis. Importantly, another variant of the paradigm measures only the social IOR 
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effect, in which co-actor A and co-actor B simply alternate single responses, 
resulting in a sequence such as  ‘ABABAB…’ (e.g., Atkinson, Simpson, Skarratt & 
Cole, 2014; Reid, Wong, Pratt, Morgan & Welsh, 2013; Skarratt et al., 2010). 
Importantly, this second variant of the paradigm was employed in all experiments, 
reported in the present thesis. 
  
Fig 1.1 An illustration of a standard condition of the social IOR paradigm. Panel A 
presents a topographical view of the set-up in which one person is reaching to their 
right where the target has illuminated. Panel B illustrates the co-actors’ view of the 
apparatus. 
 
Two accounts advocate that social IOR relies either partially or fully on 
inhibitory effects – Welsh et al.’s and Cole et al.’s.  
First, Welsh and collaborators explain the social IOR effect as being the result 
of inhibitory effects combined with action co-representation via the mirror neuron 
system (Hayes, Hansen & Elliott, 2010; Welsh, et al., 2005; Welsh, Lyons, Weeks, 
Anson, Chua, et al., 2007; Welsh, McDougall & Weeks, 2009a; Welsh, Ray, Weeks, 
Dewey, Elliott, 2009b; Welsh, Manzone & McDougall, 2014). Moreover, Welsh et al. 
submits that the observation of an individual reaching to a location is processed 
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through the action observation (understanding) network of the brain (the mirror 
neuron system; MNS; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; See Sections 1.2.1 & 1.2.2). 
The latter leads to the formation of observation-evoked response codes in the 
observer. Then, in line with the well-established perception-action link (See Section 
1.2.1), Welsh et al. suggests that if observing an action and executing it are 
essentially the same process, then seeing another person acting on a location, 
would be conceived in the same way as if one performed the action themselves. 
Thus, back to the social IOR paradigm, when an observer is required to respond to 
the same location as their co-actor, the representation of the observed action is 
essentially treated as if the action has been one’s own. Then due to the already 
explained property of the attentional system to inhibit ‘old information’, participants 
take longer to respond to the same location (i.e., social IOR is observed). In 
support, consistent with recent findings that the MNS codes for the endpoint goal of 
an observed action, rather than the action per se (See Section 1.2.2), both Welsh 
et al. (2007, 2009) and Skarratt et al. (2010) found that social IOR occurred even 
when only a part of the partner’s response was visible. This was interpreted as 
evidence that the MNS subserves social IOR by inferring the end goal of the action 
the observer has partially seen. Further, Welsh et al. (2009b) found that social IOR 
did not occur if individuals had a dysfunctional MNS, like high-functioning ASD 
participants. Finally, Welsh and colleagues have proposed that social IOR is likely to 
be a mechanism with an evolutionary significance. By inhibiting attention away 
from a region already investigated by someone else, individuals optimise their 
search behaviour. Moreover, Welsh et al. (2007, 2009a, 2009b) suggested that 
such a mechanism dates back to the hunter-gatherer times of human evolution 
where using an efficient search strategy to provide one’s food and shelter and 
escape predators was key for one’s survival. Taken together, according to Welsh et 
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al. social IOR stems from inhibition of acting to a location, already investigated by 
someone else.  
However, an alternative IOR-based account of social IOR has also been 
recently proposed (Cole, Skarratt, Billing, 2012; Skarratt, Cole & Kuhn, 2012; 
Atkinson et al., 2014). According to this view, social IOR is an identical effect to 
IOR. Thus, similar to the peripheral cues in Posner and Cohen’s (1984) paradigm, 
witnessing an attention-capturing event in the periphery, being it the partner’s 
target illumination and/or their reaching response, cues the observer’s attention to 
that location. Then because the SOA is longer than 300 ms, as in classic IOR, 
participants experience inhibition of return to the previously cued location. Thus, it 
is possible that instead of inhibiting the representation of an observed action (as 
proposed by Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009 a, b), co-actors experience social IOR 
because of an inhibitory effect to the target location, which has just been cued by 
their partner. In this view, especially in the partial viewing condition, the partner’s 
arm reach/eye gaze serve as a central cue that shifts the observer’s attention to 
the location of their response. As mentioned in Section 1.1.2 there is evidence that 
classic IOR can be elicited by central cues (e.g., Flanagan et al., 2015; Taylor & 
Klein, 2000; Weger et al., 2008) and that arm/hand cues shift attention in the 
same way as pointing arrows do (See end of Section 1.1). Thus, unlike Welsh et al. 
this account undermines the socialness of the partner and predicts that any 
sufficiently salient event, appearing at the periphery, being it social or not can 
produce social IOR. Moreover, this account proposes that the effect is likely to be 
subserved by perceptuo-attentional and/or oculomotor processes like classic IOR 
and thus does not predict an involvement of the MNS. In support, a recent 
behavioural study suggested that social IOR is modulated by the perceptual 
characteristics of the stimuli (Atkinson et al., 2014). Furthermore, in a series of 
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experiments Cole et al. (2012) had participant pairs respond to the target location 
either by executing exactly the same actions (e.g. touching the target) or executing 
very similar actions which differed in terms of their end-point goal (touching the 
target vs pretending to grip it). Results revealed that social IOR was not modulated 
by the end-point goal of the action as its size did not differ in the two conditions. To 
reiterate, according to Cole and colleagues social IOR is an IOR effect that simply 
occurs in the presence of another person whose actions/target illuminations act as 
the peripheral cues in Posner and Cohen’s (1984) paradigm.  
Thus, according to both Welsh et al.’s (2005, 2007, 2009, 2014) and Cole et 
al.’s (2010; Atkinson et al., 2014) accounts, inhibitory effects give rise to social IOR 
(although, only partially, according to Welsh et al.). The next section starts by 
giving a brief overview of joint-action. Then at the end it introduces a variant of the 
movement congruency effect which very much resembles the described above 
social IOR procedure and which is often explained with action co-representation.   
1.2 Joint Action  
 
The recent years have seen a considerable growth in joint-action research. 
This trend has been predominantly driven by the intuitive notion that studies of 
social interaction must represent more adequately the complexity of human 
interpersonal cognition and action. Moreover, coordination seems to be a universal 
concept since it is found in both the animate and the inanimate world. For example, 
some spectacular examples of coordination can be found in nature like the 
synchronous mass flashing of fireflies (Buck & Buck, 1976, Otte & Smiley, 1977) or 
the flawless unison between fish in a school, making them look like parts of a single 
organism (Partridge, 1982). Furthermore, in physics, pendulum clocks, hung side 
by side begin to synchronise so that their oscillations coincide perfectly, a 
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phenomenon first described as the ‘sympathy of two clocks’ (Pikovsky, Rosenblum 
& Kurths, 2001). 
With respect to humans, joint-action research lies in-between the 
experimental psychology tradition and the anthropological study of distributed 
cognition according to which in many respects individuals in the same task 
environment function as one cognitive unit (Hutchins, 1995). Thus, its perceptual, 
cognitive and motor properties have been studied by neuroscientists, cognitive and 
ecological psychologists (Knoblich, Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011). Results have shown 
that, in general, individuals in joint-action conditions change their behaviour and 
perform differently as compared to when alone. For instance, the sole belief that 
one is competing against or collaborating with an unseen other influences one’s 
gaze rate frequency, as well as their memory for previously presented stimuli 
(Richardson, Street, Tan, Kirkham, Hoover & Cavanaugh, 2012). Furthermore, the 
presence of another person has also been found to influence one’s perception of 
spatial relations (Tversky & Hard, 2009), one’s focus of attention (Böckler, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012; Frischen, Loach & Tipper, 2009; Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley Scott, 2010) and visuospatial skills such as object-
mental rotation (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that social interaction has profound effects on individuals’ perception and 
cognition.  
Joint-action could be defined as ‘…any form of social interaction whereby two 
or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a 
change in the environment’ (Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006, p. 70). As this 
broad definition suggests, it can exist in different forms involving different levels of 
analyses. According to Knoblich et al. (2011) one can distinguish between emergent 
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and planned joint acts. As its name suggests, emergent coordination is based on 
the actors’ perception and happens spontaneously, driven by motor and perceptual 
cues that both actors recognise. Examples of such type of joint-action are all 
instances of ‘joint-action for entertainment’ where individuals unconsciously 
synchronise with one another, such as an audience clapping together (Néda, 
Ravasz, Brechet, Vicsek & Barabási, 2000). Emergent coordination also involves 
cases of perception-action matching when what is seen is directly matched onto the 
observer’s own motor system, especially when the observer has enough expertise 
in the action (e.g., a professional dancer watching a dance; Cross, Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2006). Finally, emergent coordination can also be based on object-
affordances (when the two actors have the same repertoire) or on action 
simulation. Knoblich et al. (2011) distinguishes the latter from coordination, based 
on a perception-action match, since action simulation can also help the observer 
infer the outcome of the action (Hamilton, Wolpert & Frith, 2004). Planned 
coordination, on the other hand, has been defined to occur when ‘agents’ behavior 
is driven by representations that specify the desired outcomes of joint action and 
the agent’s own part in achieving these outcomes’ (Knoblich et al., 2011, p. 62). 
Research has shown that when individuals in planned coordination share task 
representations, they cannot help but form a representation of both their own task 
and their partner’s task even when explicitly instructed to ignore it (Atmaca, 
Sebanz, Prinz & Knoblich, 2008; Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003). The second 
instance of planned coordination, as defined by Knoblich et al. (2011) is when 
actors form joint perceptions. Examples of the latter are instances of an agent co-
representing the other’s perspective (Samson et al., 2010) or trying to infer what 
the other can perceive when visual information is limited (Shintel & Keysar, 2009). 
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1.2.1 Action Co-Representation 
 
Such instances of conscious and unconscious synchronization between 
individuals are commonly explained by ideomotorically-inspired action accounts, 
advocating an intimate perceptuo-motor link (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852; Prinz, 1997). One of them 
is the Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001). In its essence TEC has 
been postulated on three key assumptions – cognitive representations are 
composites of feature codes; feature codes prime each other based on the distal 
aspects of events and lastly, perception and action are virtually the same (Hommel 
et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009). First, TEC assumes that the many perceptual and 
action features of perceived and intended to-be-executed events, respectively, are 
represented as separate codes in the brain (e.g., colour, direction, response 
speed), forming a feature map. Moreover, in TEC terminology, these cognitive 
structures are called ‘event codes’ and represent composites of different features, 
created via integration. Therefore, in this process, feature codes are constantly 
compared to each other or confused with one another, based on their level of 
similarity. Second, it is assumed that the latter priming happens on the basis of 
goal-directed representations of events (i.e., distal-coding level; information that is 
relevant to the individual; Hommel, 2009).  Finally, according to Hommel et al. 
(2001), ‘intentionality renders perception and action-planning inherently similar and 
functionally equivalent’ (p. 904). Thus, irrespective of their role, both stimulus 
(perception) and response codes (action) are formed and represented in the same 
medium. 
The significant role that this perception-action link plays in joint-action was 
first proposed by Sebanz, Knoblich and Prinz (2003) as an explanation for the 
discovery that the classical Simon effect (Simon, 1990) transferred between 
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individuals, a phenomenon they called the ‘Social Simon Effect’ (SSE). The basic 
Simon paradigm is a two-choice spatial compatibility task in which a single 
participant is required to respond to two colours (e.g., blue and green) by pressing 
one of two buttons, corresponding to the correct colour (one to the left, one to the 
right). For example, the participant needs to press the left button every time they 
see a green stimulus, appearing either to the left or right side of the screen. Typical 
results reveal that RTs are shorter when the response button and the colour-
presentation side spatially coincide, even though the spatial features are irrelevant 
to the task (in fact, the task is to ignore them). In its social variant, two 
participants, seated side by side, had to operate one of the two buttons in response 
to one of the two colours (Sebanz et al., 2003). Results indicated that a Simon 
effect arose again – participants were slower when their target colour appeared on 
their partner’s response side. However, the effect disappeared in the single-
participant version, when a single participant operated only one of the buttons 
(Hommel, 1996). As mentioned above, the basic Simon effect is assumed to occur 
because of spatial compatibility effects between the spatial stimulus locations and 
the spatial response locations, either as a result of direct association (e.g., 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) or because of a distal overlap between the 
event codes (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Since the 
effect occurs both when a single individual operates the two responses and when 
these are distributed between two individuals, Sebanz et al. (2003) interpreted the 
finding of a SSE in their joint-action condition as evidence that participants were 
co-representing their partner’s actions and stimulus-response rules, so that they 
experienced interference similar to the one in the single-person condition.  
Since its proposal, the action co-representation account has gained 
considerable popularity and has been advocated by several different research 
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groups (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2006; Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich & Sebanz, 2010; 
Liepelt, Cramon & Brass, 2008; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager & Prinz, 2000; Tsai 
& Brass, 2007; Ondobaka, Newman-Norlund, de Lange & Bekkering, 2013; 
Ondobaka, de Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers & Bekkering, 2012). Thus, the 
properties of this so called ‘direct matching’ in the brain (Liepelt et al., 2008; Tsai & 
Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Hung & Tzeng, 2008) have been extensively researched. 
Firstly, research has advocated that action co-representation is automatic, 
effortless and unintentional (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Liepelt et al., 2008; Sebanz 
et al., 2006) and that in fact it occurs even when it is more feasible to ignore what 
the other is doing (Atmaca, et al., 2008; Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz & Wascher, 2006). 
In support, there is evidence that the observation of a movement-incongruent 
action interferes with one’s movement execution performance (e.g., Kilner, 
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Liepelt et al., 2008). However, action co-
representation seems to be biologically tuned and therefore movement kinematics 
do not seem to be mapped onto the observer’s motor system when the observed 
action is performed by an inanimate agent such as a robot (Kilner et al., 2003), a 
wooden hand (Tsai & Brass, 2007) or a computer (Tsai et al., 2008). Newer 
accounts have added to the idea that action co-representation is effortless by 
proposing that tracking other’s beliefs is also an automatic process (van der Wel, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014). Finally, the extent to which the observed action is 
represented has been found to be influenced by higher-order factors such as the 
co-actors’ affect and type of affiliation with their task-partner during the interaction 
(Kuhbandner, Pekrun & Maier, 2010; Hommel, Colzato & van den Wildenberg, 
2009, respectively). Thus, in line with previous findings that positive affect 
encourages, while negative affect decreases the spread of activation (Gasper & 
Clore, 2002; Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2007), positive affect induction has been 
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reported to result in a full-blown SSE, while negative affect – in no SSE 
(Kuhbandner et al., 2010). Similarly, in line with previous research that liking 
decreases the self-other distinction (Aron, Aron, Tudor & Nelson, 1991), the SSE 
has been found to occur only when a positive relationship between the two co-
actors existed (Hommel et al., 2009).  
1.2.2 Neural Correlates 
 
The suspected neural correlates of action co-representation is a collection of 
frontoparietal cells, found, more specifically, in the human parietal lobe, the 
premotor cortex and the caudal part of the inferior frontal gyrus (Jeannerod, Arbib, 
Rizzolatti & Sakata, 1995; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This network known as the 
mirror neuron system (MNS) has been reported to become active both in response 
to observing an agent perform an action and when an agent executes an action 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 
1996; Umiltà et al., 2001). Unlike the limbic mirror system, involved in the 
recognition of affective behaviour, the frontoparietal network is believed to be a 
mechanism for the recognition of voluntary behaviour (Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 
2009). Several studies aimed to shed light on the functional organisation of the 
mirror mechanism. One of them examined participants’ motor activation response 
while observing either transitive (object-related) or intransitive (non-object related) 
acts, performed either with the actor’s mouth, hand or foot (Buccino et al., 2001). 
Results revealed that both types of acts activated different parts of the ventral 
premotor region, so that mouth actions were represented more ventrally, foot 
movements – more dorsally while manual acts had an intermediate position. 
Importantly, the identified pattern coincides with the pattern of the classical motor 
representation of different effectors (Penfield & Rasmussen, 1952). In addition, it 
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was found that transitive actions activated areas of the posterior parietal lobe, too, 
also in a somatototopic vain (Buccino et al., 2001; Binkofski & Buccino, 2006). 
Moreover, other research evidence suggested that motor acts in the human parietal 
lobe are also classified in terms of their behavioural significance so that acts, 
directed to the self (e.g., grasping) are represented more ventrally while outward-
directed acts (e.g., pushing) appear more dorsally (Jastorff, Begliomini, Fabbri-
Destro, Rizzolatti & Orban, 2010).Thus, in terms of its functional organisation, the 
action observation network seems to use different, somatotopically organized 
frontoparietal circuits not only during action execution but also during action 
observation. 
Moreover, related to the previous point, the MNS has been known to subserve 
direct action imitation (e.g., passive observation of actions triggered an identical 
pattern of motor activation in the brain to when these were performed; Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Pavesi & Rizzolatti, 1995). However, recent evidence has started to 
suggest that it can also infer and predict action goals. In fact, research has 
confirmed that actions are often planned in terms of their goals. For example, in a 
motion-tracking study, Eastough and Edwards (2007) found that participants’ end-
goal (whether an object of a different mass had to be lifted, reached for or grasped) 
modulated participants’ action kinematics. Going back to mirror neurons, research 
with macaques showed that the monkey mirror neuron area F5 discharged even 
when no visual information about the action had been provided (e.g., the monkey 
inferred the action; Kohler, Keysers, Umilta, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2002; 
Umiltà et al., 2001). Moreover, a very recent human study, investigating the effect 
of conceptual expectations on motor activation, also supported this view 
(Ondobaka, de Lange, Wittmann, Frith & Bekkering, 2015). Activation during action 
observation was found only when the object, used by the actor, matched the 
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observer’s expectation at a conceptual level. For example, when a rose (but not a 
pair of headphones) was moved to the nose in the anticipation of smelling. 
Furthermore, a support for the involvement of the mirror mechanism in goal 
processing can also be obtained from the Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
literature. Recently, several neuropsychological studies have suggested that ASD 
abnormalities could stem from a dysfunction in their mirror mechanism (Williams, 
Whiten, Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001; Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro & Cattaneo, 2009). 
In one of these studies, unlike typically-developing children whose MNS was active 
during the grasping and reaching stages of a grasping-for-eating action, children 
with ASD showed activation in their mouth-opening muscles only during the last, 
bringing-to-the-mouth stage (Cattaneo, Fabbri-Destro & Boria, 2007). At the same 
time, the motor activation in typically-developing children demonstrated intention 
prediction properties since it was active during the object grasping and reaching 
stages preceding an eating movement (the action led to the end-goal) but not a 
placing movement (the action was goal-incongruent). Thus, recent research on the 
mirror mechanism seems to confirm the importance of action intention 
understanding for action perception.  
1.2.3 Criticism 
 
Despite influential, the action co-representation account has been challenged 
by alternative approaches, often providing a simpler explanation for the findings of 
some joint action studies and for those that do not agree with the predictions of the 
theory, advocated by Sebanz et al. (2003, 2006).  
One of these is an account, adopting a more lower-level approach to explain 
the observed partner-related interference, characteristic of the SSE. For example, 
Dolk et al. (2011, 2013) submits that instead of stemming from action co-
36 
 
 
representation, the SSE is likely to result from referential coding effects (Dolk et 
al., 2011; Dolk, Hommel, Prinz & Liepelt, 2013; Guagnano, Rusconi & Umiltà, 
2010). Essentially, this account suggests that participants in the SSE paradigm are 
simply using the partner as a reference point to which they start associating the 
respective response (left or right). Thus, the partner does not need to be of a social 
nature to ensure that the effect occurs, in fact, both the joint and the social Simon 
effect are predicted to occur with any object or event, salient enough to serve as a 
reference point. In support, in a series of experiments, where instead of another 
co-actor, an inanimate object (e.g., a Japanese waving cat, a clock or a 
metronome) was positioned next to the participant, participants still experienced a 
SSE-like effect (Dolk et al., 2013). Similarly, the effect occurred even when no 
online visual or auditory information about the other co-actor was present (Vlainic, 
Liepelt, Colzato, Prinz & Hommel, 2010) or when a sense of separation between the 
co-actor’s hand and the hand of their partner was induced (Dolk et al., 2011). 
Moreover, a very recent study (Stenzel et al., 2014) suggested that rather than 
depending on the co-actor’s sense of intentionality (strictly linked to biological 
partners), the SSE depends on agency5 (could be applied to both biological and 
non-biological objects; Pickering, 1995). Clearly, these results do not agree with 
the action co-representation account, as the SSE does not seem to depend on the 
availability of a biological co-actor who takes turns with the participant (Dolk et al., 
2013; Vlainic et al., 2010), nor it depends on the integration of the other co-actor’s 
perspective, as the effect was found smaller in this condition (Dolk et al., 2011). 
Still, it should be noted that Dolk et al. (2013) acknowledge that social interaction 
in this paradigm might contribute to the effect, as the presence of a biological 
partner has been found to result in a more pronounced SSE.  
                                                          
5
 whether one could determine the causal source of an action/event 
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A somewhat related approach to explaining the SSE has been put forward by 
Liepelt and colleagues (Liepelt, Wenke & Fischer, 2013; Liepelt, Wenke, Fischer & 
Prinz, 2011; Wenke, Holländer, Atmaca, Liepelt, Baess & Prinz, 2011). They argue 
that instead of resulting from the co-representation of the other’s stimulus-
response rules and action plans as proposed by Sebanz and colleagues (2003, 
2006), the SSE depends on low level feature integration based on the requirements 
of the previous trials (Liepelt et al., 2013). Since the effect has only been examined 
as a function of the match or mismatch between the spatial stimulus attributes and 
the required response, it has been assumed that the same co-representation 
processes take place in the social and the standard Simon task, which have been 
thought to be functionally different from their single-person variant where one 
participant is in charge of only one response button. However, transitions from trial 
to trial in the Simon effect contain information about whether the response location 
has been repeated or not, whether a response to a previous trial was necessary (go 
trial) or not (nogo trial) and the co-actor’s body position (sitting either to the left or 
right handside; Liepelt et al., 2011). Thus, to examine the contribution of low-level 
mechanisms to the SSE, Liepelt et al. (2011) compared the social and the single-
participant variant of the Simon effect in terms of their trial-to-trial sequential 
dependencies (i.e., the effect of compatibility, e.g., compatible-compatible vs 
compatible-incompatible) and go/no-go requirements between two sequential 
trials). In both conditions, results revealed a Simon-like effect following compatible 
trials and sequential modulation, which was stronger for trials with a no-go/go 
transition than for go/go transition. These results were interpreted as indicative of 
the role that low-level binding (inhibitory effects) plays in the SSE. Moreover, 
alternatively to co-representing the other’s stimulus-response rules, it was 
concluded that the more pronounced sequential modulation in the social variant of 
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the task and the overall bigger Simon effect after compatible trials, could be due to 
the presence of another person which transforms the go/no-go distinction into a 
between-person distinction (mine or your turn) and thus, further increases the 
inhibitory effects in this condition (Liepelt et al., 2011; 2013).  
Finally, the interpersonal coordination dynamics approach has also challenged 
the ‘direct matching’ account. Instead of focusing on processes within an individual 
(i.e., how one processes perception and action), this approach examines how 
different components are coupled to ensure the coordination of effectors (e.g., arm; 
leg) coming from two separate individuals (Fine & Amazeen, 2011; Fine, Gibbons & 
Amazeen, 2013; Richardson, Campbell & Schmidt, 2009). Thus, instead of 
explaining interpersonal coordination with the idea that co-actors unintentionally 
and automatically access shared mental models, the vital component for such 
effects is thought to be the observation of another’s limb movements and the 
emergent motor coordination that follows from it. In support, Fine et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that their movement congruency effect emerged as a function of 
spatial congruency (where an effector was relative to the ground). However, it did 
not depend on anatomical incongruency (where an effector was relative to one’s 
body position) nor on whether different effectors were used which suggests that the 
‘interference effects in interpersonal coordination might not be the product of 
embodied simulation interference’ (Fine et al., 2013, p.1551). Moreover, research 
has suggested that intra- (within the same individual) and interpersonal (within two 
individuals) coordination seem to have very similar dynamics (Fine & Amazeen, 
2011). Thus, similarly to how the motor system ensures intrapersonal coordination 
in a bimanual task when an individual tries to draw two different figures with each 
hand, the interpersonal coordination between two separate effectors (coming from 
two different co-actors) during unequal kinematic requirements follows similar 
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dynamics (Fine et al., 2013). Thus, contrary to the proponents of the action co-
representation account, within this approach the interference observed in 
incongruent task trials is not indicative of ‘error’. Instead, it represents the attempt 
of the motor system to stabilize coordination performance which as in this condition 
can no longer be stabilized, requires compensatory changes to occur, resulting in 
the observed interference (Fine et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2009). 
1.2.4 The Movement Congruency Effect  
 
As mentioned above, the SSE has been predominantly used to test the action 
co-representation account and thus has been extensively studied in joint-action 
research. However, other paradigms based on congruency effects have also 
recently become an object of interest in joint-action (e.g., Ainley, Brass & Tsakiris, 
2014; Brass et al., 2000; Fine et al., 2011, 2013; Liepelt et al., 2008; Ondobaka et 
al., 2012, 2013; Santiago & Lakens, 2014; van Schie, van Waterschoot & 
Bekkering, 2008). In the basic procedure of a congruency paradigm, a participant 
observes a simple action (e.g., a model lifting their index finger) after which 
depending on the type of condition they are required to either execute a congruent 
(e.g., lifting their index finger) or an incongruent action (e.g., lifting their middle 
finger). Typical results indicate that RTs are shorter when the observed and the 
required actions overlap (congruent condition) and longer when these do not 
(incongruent condition). Such findings are normally interpreted in line with the 
action co-representation account and are taken as a measure of one’s ability to 
inhibit imitation (Brass et al., 2000).   
More specifically, congruency tasks can also vary as a function of the overlap 
between the co-actors’ kinematics on a trial (movement congruency; e.g., a left 
movement) and whether the two co-actors have the same or a different conceptual 
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goal (goal congruency; e.g., reaching to grab a cup of coffee; Ondobaka et al., 
2012, 2013; Pacherie, 2008). Such a task has been employed by Ondobaka et al. 
(2012, 2013) who used a card-selection paradigm where a participant and a 
confederate sat opposite each other. Both co-actors alternated responses either to 
the left or the right handside of a touch screen while the participant either adopted 
the same conceptual goal as the confederate or not (i.e., reaching for the lower or 
the higher card). Results indicated that when participants had the same goal, a 
movement congruency effect occurred.  
As mentioned earlier in the Introduction, movement goals are thought to rely 
on a direct perceptuo-motor mapping between the end-goal location and the 
observed movement kinematics (e.g., van Schie et al., 2008). Thus, a congruency 
effect is believed to occur because of automatic mapping of what has been 
observed to the individual’s own movement representations in their MNS (e.g., 
Buccino et al., 2001; Fadiga et al., 1995). Therefore, in this account, quicker 
responses to congruent trials are the result of imitation while slower responses to 
incongruent trials occur due interference (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013). However, 
these results are also consistent with the findings of the social IOR effect (See 
Section 1.1.2). In other words, as co-actors sit opposite, target location and target 
handside can never coincide (See Fig 1.1). Thus, instead of saying that one is 
quicker to reach to the same handside as their partner, one might simply be slower 
to respond to the same location to which their partner has previously responded. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
 
It follows from the above literature review that an identical experimental 
paradigm has been researched and cited in both the attentional and joint-action 
literature. However, researchers from the two disciplines have a very different 
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understanding of why the effect is observed, which is also reflected in the two 
different terms used to refer to it – social IOR and a movement-congruency effect, 
respectively. There is also an ‘in-between account’ arguing that the phenomenon 
occurs because of a combination between action co-representation and inhibitory 
processes (Welsh et al.).  Moreover, with a few exceptions, (e.g., Atkinson et al., 
2014; Welsh et al., 2014), authors do not normally acknowledge in their research 
the alternative explanation of the present effect. The current thesis aimed to 
reconcile this discrepancy in interpretation, by providing a detailed exploration of 
the causes and properties of the current phenomenon, in light with the predictions 
of the three theories.  
First, Chapter 2 examined the extent to which social IOR could be identified as 
an attentional effect and more specifically whether it ‘behaves’ as traditional IOR. 
The magnitude of the effect was tested under a series of perceptuo-temporal 
manipulations, known to either modulate traditional IOR or to have no effect on it. 
Thus, Experiment 1 examined the time course of the present effect, Experiment 2 – 
whether it is modulated by perceptual load and the final Experiment 3 – whether it 
is affected by trait anxiety. Based on previous research on the characteristics of 
traditional IOR, it was expected that if social IOR is similar, it should be found in 
the range between 300 ms and 3000 ms (e.g., Castel, Chasteen, Scialfa & Pratt, 
2003; Castel, Pratt, Chasteen & Scialfa, 2005), should occur only when perceptual 
load is low (e.g., Liu, Fan & Zhou, 2014) and should not be affected by trait anxiety 
(e.g., Pérez Dueñas, Acosta & Lupiáñez, 2009). Chapter 2, however, did not 
directly test the impact of ‘the action factor’ on social IOR.  
The latter was done in the following Chapter 3. Experiment 4 investigated 
whether a kinematic mismatch between the observed and the required actions 
would influence the phenomenon. Experiment 5  looked at whether the observation 
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of a biological action is even required for the effect to occur, or simply having 
attention shifted to a target location is sufficient. Finally, through a novel 
modification of the paradigm, Experiment 6 distinguished between the effects of 
action congruency and target location to evaluate the plausibility of each of the 
three proposed theories and consequently, the causes of social IOR. Recall that 
previous joint-action work suggested that action observation leads to automatic 
activation of motor representations in the observer (Brass et al., 2001; Buccino et 
al., 2001; Ondobaka et al., 2012; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005) and that quicker 
responses to congruent trials in the movement congruency effect are the result of 
imitation while slower responses to incongruent trials occur due interference 
(Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013). Thus, it was hypothesised that if social IOR is 
indeed based on movement congruency, it should be reduced or abolished during a 
kinematic mismatch, as well as when the co-actor’s action could not be observed. 
Moreover, a significant effect of action congruency should emerge in the last 
experiment.    
Further, Chapter 4 investigated the degree of socialness of the effect.  First, in 
two different variants, Experiment 7 tested whether the social relationship between 
the two co-actors would modulate the magnitude of social IOR, as it has been 
demonstrated for another joint-action effect, the SSE (e.g., Hommel et al., 2009). 
Based on the findings of Hommel et al. (2009) that a positive relationship between 
the two co-actors facilitates, while a negative one prevents the integration of the 
other’s task rules and action plans, it was expected that if social IOR is indeed 
based on representation of action, a greater effect will emerge if participants 
perform with their romantic partner than with a stranger. Moreover, the effect will 
be reduced (or even abolished) if the relationship between the two co-actors is 
negative as compared to a positive one. Finally, in Experiments 8 and 9 participants 
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performed the task without a co-actor to examine whether the presence of another 
person was even necessary to induce social IOR. In line with the assumption that 
the observation of actions generates an internal replica in the observer (Buccino et 
al., 2001; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005), it was predicted that if indeed based on 
action co-representation, social IOR should not occur under such conditions.  
Finally, Chapter 5 explored whether the effect could spread to higher-order 
processes and influence a range of free choice decisions, as basic IOR is known to 
have such an effect (e.g., Posner et al., 1985). In Experiment 10 participants had 
to make a simple choice – to decide which one of two flashing targets they 
preferred.  Experiment 11 required a more involved decision as participants had to 
choose between two  similar consumer products. In Experiment 12 they decided 
between two faces, however, here a relative decision was required – to respond to 
the face that would be considered the most (or least) physically attractive by the 
majority of people. In the last Experiment 13 each co-actor judged the 
attractiveness of faces with a confederate, who evenly distributed her responses 
between the two target locations. Based on the single previous study that found 
that social IOR could bias simple free choices (Reid et al., 2013), such a bias was 
expected to occur in Experiment 11. Although the effect of social IOR on more 
complex choices had not been explored before, it was predicted that if the 
phenomenon is robust enough, it should influence even these decisions. 
The results of nine of the experiments in the present thesis have been 
published (or are due to be published) in articles in peer-reviewed journals. The list 
of these follows below. However, for the purposes of the present thesis, all 
empirical chapters have been fully rewritten to ensure that the experiments in each 
chapter are thematically organised and that each chapter follows smoothly from the 
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previous one. The author has collected the data for all experiments reported in the 
thesis. 
 
Doneva, S., Atkinson, M., Skaratt, P. & Cole, G. (resubmitted after a minor 
revision). Action or attention in social inhibition of return? Psychological Research. 
(Experiment 1, Chapter 2; Experiment 5, Chapter 3; Experiment 7b, Chapter 4). 
 
Cole, G.G., Wright, D., Doneva, S.P. & Skarratt, P.A. (2015). When Your Decisions 
Are Not (Quite) Your Own: Action Observation Influences Free Choices. PLoS ONE 
10(5): e0127766. (Experiments 10, 11, 12 & 13, Chapter 5). 
 
Doneva, S.P. & Cole, G.G. (2014). The Role of Attention in a Joint-Action Effect. 
PLoS ONE 9(3): e91336. (Experiment 4, Chapter 3; Experiment 9, Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 SOCIAL IOR AND IOR 
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The main goal of Chapter 2 was to determine if social IOR and basic IOR share 
some characteristics in common. Recall from Section 1.1.2.1 in the General 
Introduction that classic IOR is known to be an attentional effect with an 
oculomotor component (Kingston & Pratt; 1999; Taylor & Klein, 2000). Moreover, 
behavioural studies suggested that IOR is rather robust as it occurs both with the 
classically known peripheral cues (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984) but also, as 
identified in more recent papers (e.g., Weger et al., 2008), with central ones. 
Additionally, IOR is tagged to both spatial locations and objects (e.g., Tipper et al., 
1991) and it does not seem to be modulated by social factors, as the effect is found 
even in populations, known to demonstrate abnormalities in the social domain, such 
as ASD individuals (Flanagan et al., 2015; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & 
Tonge, 2008).  
Furthermore, several papers have suggested that apart from sharing a similar 
name with IOR, the social IOR effect bears other resemblance to classic IOR. For 
example, in a series of correlation analyses, high, significant correlations between 
the two effects emerged, suggesting that social IOR and IOR are of a similar 
magnitude (Welsh et al., 2009a). Moreover, importantly, both effects seem to arise 
in the perceptuo-attentional stages, prior to response initiation. In support, social 
IOR has been found present only in reaction time (RT) but not in movement time 
(MT) data (e.g., Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005; Welsh et al., 2009a). As 
RT is either reflected in the duration between target onset and ‘home’ button 
release (See Fig 2.2 and Section 1.1.3) or it marks the interval between target 
onset and response completion6, it always contains a measure of the stimulus 
                                                          
6 Depending on the authors, one of the two measures of RT is used, however, in either case 
RT data includes the premotor attentional component. In the first case it involves the 
perceptuo-attentional stage only, while in the second – it is a compound of the perceptuo-
attentional stage and the response execution stage of the action.  
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perceptuo-attentional processing. At the same time, MT refers to the final motoric 
stage of response processing (as it is the duration between the ‘home’ button 
release and response completion; see Skarratt et al., 2010). Therefore, Welsh et 
al.’s (2009a) results were in line with what is already known about classic IOR. 
Moreover, recently, Atkinson et al. (2014) showed that social IOR was influenced by 
the perceptual demands of the task and the visual configuration of the targets. 
Taking these together with the lack of an agreement on the theoretical explanation 
of what causes the effect (See Section 1.1.3), the present Chapter 2 focused on 
testing the attentional nature of social IOR by examining how a series of spatio-
temporal factors and a particular personality factor (known to influence attentional 
selection) affect the manifestation of the effect.  As the influence of none of the 
present three factors had been examined in previous research on social IOR, the 
findings were interpreted in line with what is known about classic IOR and the 
human visual attentional system, in general. Below is a brief outline of the rationale 
of each experiment, and what results would be expected if similarly to basic IOR, 
social IOR has an attentional basis.    
First, Experiment 1 assessed the time course of the social IOR effect. Previous 
studies examining the temporal characteristics of classic IOR have suggested that 
when the ‘traditional’ IOR procedure is employed, IOR has a limited time course. 
Thus, when uninformative, simple cues such as flashing lights are used, the 
inhibitory effect usually disappears when the cue-target interval (known as the 
stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) is beyond 3000 ms (e.g., Castel et al., 2003, 
2005; see Samuel & Kat, 2003 for a meta-analysis). As far as the social IOR effect 
is concerned, up to the author’s knowledge there has not been another study 
specifically examining how long the effect lasts. However, an overview of the 
literature on social IOR would suggest that the effect is generally considered a 
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short-term one. For example, in an identical paradigm to the one used in the 
present Experiment 1, Skarratt et al. (2010) tested social IOR only in trials with 
short SOAs (1200ms – 1654 ms) since their first experiment demonstrated a lack of 
even classic IOR at a longer SOA (2400 ms). Moreover, other authors have also 
only tested the effect by using a short SOA design (e.g., 1300ms–1700ms in 
Atkinson et al., 2014; 1244–1620 ms in Hayes et al., 2010; 1390–1663 ms in 
Welsh et al., 2005). Considering previous research on social IOR, together with 
what is expected for standard IOR, where simple stimuli are used, it was 
hypothesised that if social IOR is indeed an attentional effect, it should disappear 
when a cue-target interval greater than 3000 ms is employed.  
Experiment 2 examined whether social IOR has another property, 
characteristic of an attentional effect. More specifically, it tested whether it is 
modulated by perceptual load. Previous research on basic IOR, studying the effect 
in the context of other classic visual paradigms has suggested that IOR occurs in 
early visual processing (e.g., Fuentes, 1999; Visser & Barnes, 2009; Wright & 
Richard, 1996). Thus, consistent with the notion that it is a visual search facilitator, 
IOR is triggered even by multiple irrelevant events presented at the same spatial 
location, either in succession (Visser & Barnes, 2009) or simultaneously7 (Wright & 
Richard, 1996). However, in these IOR studies, perceptual load was manipulated at 
the ‘cue’, rather than the ‘target stage’. Predications about how perceptual load at 
the target stage would influence IOR can be made based on the load theory of 
selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004). 
According to it, perceptual selection is one of the two mechanisms subserving 
                                                          
7 The latter suggests that IOR does not stem from an oculomotor inhibition alone, as eye 
movements can be programmed and executed at only a single location at a time (Eriksen & 
Yeh, 1985). 
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selective attention. In brief, when perceptual load increases, attention becomes 
more focused and individuals are better able to identify targets and ignore 
distractors because their perceptual capacity is being exhausted (Lavie et al., 2004; 
Maylor & Lavie, 1998). Thus, consistent with the latter, IOR should extinguish as 
perceptual load becomes high since participants should be able to identify the 
target quickly, irrespective of what location has been previously cued. Indeed, a 
very recent study reported exactly this finding. Liu et al. (2014) combined IOR with 
a flanker task so that the target letter (‘M’ or ‘N’) appeared at one of four 
previously cued locations (each marked by a squared box; See Fig 2.1). Together 
with the target, a distractor letter which could either be compatible with the target 
(e.g., ‘M’ when the target is ‘M’ as in the low perceptual load condition on Fig 2.1) 
or incompatible (e.g., ‘M’ when the target is ‘N’ as in the high perceptual condition 
on Fig 2.1) was displayed in the periphery, either below or above the target. In 
their low perceptual load condition the target was presented with the other three 
empty location boxes, each containing a small circle inside. In the high perceptual 
load condition, however, the target was displayed together with the three boxes, 
containing a different combination of target and distractor letters (e.g., ‘N’, ‘M’, ‘N’ 
as in Fig 2.1). Liu et al. (2014) found IOR only in the low perceptual load and that it 
disappeared in the high perceptual load condition. Thus, it was predicted that if the 
present social IOR effect is indeed an IOR-like phenomenon, perceptual load should 
modulate social IOR in a similar fashion.    
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Fig 2.1 An illustration of the IOR procedure in Liu et al. (2014). 
 
Finally, further to Experiment 2, Experiment 3 tested the attentional nature of 
social IOR by assessing whether the effect is modulated by another factor, known 
to influence attentional selection – trait anxiety (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 1998; 
Eriksen & Hoffman, 1973; Fox, 1993). Trait anxiety is a stable personality 
characteristic, often described as an increased tendency to experience tension, 
nervousness and worry in response to perceived stressors. It significantly correlates 
with state anxiety which is the temporary emotional state of experiencing these 
feelings (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). Eysenck et al. (2007) reported that individuals 
high in trait anxiety immediately detect threatening information and focus on it 
even when it needs to be ignored, whereas threatening stimuli do not seem to 
disrupt the performance of low-trait anxious individuals. Furthermore, trait anxiety 
is also known to affect the selective processing of non-threatening information, 
although the precise direction of this effect is less clear. Interestingly, classic IOR is 
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one of the few attentional phenomena that trait anxiety seems to have no effect on. 
For example, an IOR study using word cues with a different valance (positive, 
negative or neutral), reported no difference in the magnitude of the effect between 
the high and low-trait anxious group when stimuli were either neutral (e.g., ‘patio’) 
or had a positive valence (e.g., ‘optimism’ Pérez Dueñas et al., 2009; the full list of 
words could be found in Pérez Dueñas, Acosta, Megías & Lupiáñez, 2010). However, 
when the cues were negative (‘fright’), only the low-trait anxious group exhibited 
IOR. Moreover, similar findings have been reported when schematic facial 
expressions served as cues (Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002). Fox et al. (2002) found 
that ‘angry’ face cues reduced the magnitude of classic IOR in both their high and 
low-trait anxious group. However, if participants’ state anxiety was also high, the 
angry face abolished the IOR effect in the high-trait anxious group but it did not 
affect the performance of the low-trait anxious group. Importantly, no such 
difference was present when attention was cued by the neutral face. The findings of 
both studies have been interpreted to suggest that IOR is reduced by cues with a 
negative valence as high-trait anxious individuals focus on ‘the threat’ and cannot 
disengage and respond quickly to the uncued IOR locations. Taking into account 
that neutral stimuli are used in the social IOR paradigm, if social IOR relies on a 
similar mechanism to classic IOR, a null effect is predicted. Thus, no difference in 
the magnitude of the effect should occur as a function of trait anxiety. 
Taken together, Chapter 2 aimed to assess the extent to which social IOR 
could be identified as an attentional effect. A series of perceptuo-temporal 
manipulations, known to either modulate classic IOR or to have no effect on it,  was 
used to determine whether social IOR ‘behaves’ similarly to IOR. To reiterate, if 
social IOR is indeed similar to IOR, it was hypothesised that the effect should be 
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relatively short-lasting (not present beyond 3000 ms), should occur only under low 
perceptual load and its magnitude should not be influenced by trait anxiety. 
2.1 Experiment 1 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose of Experiment 1 was to 
examine the time course of social IOR. To do this, the task was performed under 
four different SOA conditions (1200 ms, 2400 ms, 3600 ms and 4800 ms). 
Moreover, what had been identified as ‘the strictest test of socially-induced IOR’ by 
earlier research on the effect, was used in all experiments in Chapter 2 (Skarratt et 
al., 2010, p.49).  Based on Skarratt et al. (2010) and Welsh et al. (2005, 2007), 
participants could not see the flashing of the other person’s targets, nor their actual 
response to the target. This was done as these authors have argued that if 
participants can see each other’s targets, then within-person IOR will almost 
inevitably be induced. Thus, in Experiment 1 physical barriers were used to restrict 
the participants’ view to a central strip of their partners’ eyes and hand when it was 
resting on the ‘home’ button (See Fig 2.2).  
Taking into account previous findings suggesting that traditional IOR has a 
limited duration of up to 3000 ms after the presentation of the cue (Castel et al., 
2003, 2005; Samuel & Kat, 2003), it was hypothesised that if social IOR is a similar 
effect, it should occur during short SOA conditions but not when the SOA is greater 
than 3000 ms.  
Method 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 24 (2 male; 22 female) participants aged between 18 
and 22 (M = 18.71 years, SD = 0.91 years) took part. All were first-year 
psychology undergraduates at the University of Essex who participated in exchange 
53 
 
 
for course credits. All were right-handed and naïve to the purposes of the study. 
Ethical approval from the ethics committee of the University of Essex was obtained 
prior to commencing of all three experiments. All participants gave their informed 
consent to take part in this research. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 The stimuli were displayed on a 19.5-inch LCD touch-screen monitor built flat 
into a table, raised 740 mm from the floor. Participants sat facing one another and 
the distance between their chests and their ‘home’ buttons was approximately 240 
mm (See Fig 2.2). All stimuli were presented against a uniform white background 
(74.6 cd/m2). The 4 stimulus locations were denoted by 4 black squares which 
acted as ‘placeholders’, and remained present for the entire trial duration. Two 
placeholders (1 to the left, 1 to the right), located at a distance of 160 mm from 
the black fixation cross and protruding 50 mm to the left and to the right of the 
screen midline were displayed in front of each participant. The distance between 
the left and the right placeholder was 320 mm. Each square had an area of 19.6 
mm2. Additionally, the squares were placed within a light-grey area, covering 200 
mm2 of the screen. On each trial, one of the black squares illuminated for 100 ms 
by turning white (74.6 cd/m2). Participants made their responses by releasing the 
‘home’ button and touching the square that illuminated. A RM Pentium PC custom 
software was used for the stimulus generation and the recording of the responses.  
Finally, since the experiment was carried out under restricted viewing 
conditions, two physical barriers were introduced which restricted each participant’s 
view of their partner to a visible gap of 145 mm (see Fig 2.2). 
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Fig 2.2 A schematic representation of the standard condition in the social IOR 
paradigm used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Panel A presents a topographical view 
whereas Panel B illustrates the participant’s view of the apparatus as the partner’s 
targets are occluded. 
Design and Procedure 
      The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 4 (SOA: 1200 ms, 
2400 ms, 3600 ms and 4800 ms) fully within-participants design. A response to a 
position located on the same side to which the partner had responded on a previous 
trial is referred to as ‘same’ whereas a novel location (which had not been 
responded to by the partner) is referred to as ‘different’. The dependent variable in 
all experiments was the time that elapsed between target presentation and the 
screen touch (response time, RT).  
Participant pairs were tested individually in a quiet cubicle with no external 
windows. The experimenter verbally explained the instructions after which she 
demonstrated the procedure. One participant’s initial response triggered the target 
sequence in which each participant pair alternated single responses. 
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Participants were instructed to keep the home buttons pressed until a 
response was needed, while at the same time fixating at the cross in the centre of 
the screen. Then they were required to reach out with their right hand and touch 
the target location. Although the duration of a trial varied slightly depending on 
individual differences in response speed, participants took between 500 and 700 ms 
to complete a response. Thus, the SOA (referring to the interval between target 
onset of Participant A and target onset of Participant B) was approximately: 1200 
ms when the inter-trial interval (ITI) was 350 ms, 2400 ms (ITI: 1550 ms), 3600 
ms (ITI: 2750) or 4800 ms (ITI: 3950 ms, See Fig 2.3; Panel A). The four SOA 
conditions were blocked and their presentation order was counterbalanced. Each 
block consisted of 209 trials, 104 per participant. This generated a total of 836 
trials. The first trial of each block was not analysed since no response preceded it. 
Participants undertook one practice session consisting of 21 trials which had the 
same SOA as the first experimental condition they completed. Participants were 
told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
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Fig 2.3 Panel A illustrates the procedure in the present social IOR experiment. 
Panel B presents the procedure used in traditional IOR experiments.   
 
                     
Results and Discussion 
 
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis. Mean RTs (see Fig 2.4) were computed as a function of target 
location (same, different) and SOA (1200 ms, 2400 ms, 3600 ms and 4800 ms) 
and were entered into a 2 x 4 fully-within participants ANOVA. The main effect of 
SOA was significant (F (3, 69) = 58.17, p < .001, partial eta sq = .717). The main 
effect of target location was also significant, confirming the presence of social IOR 
(F (1, 23) = 7.91, p < .01, partial eta sq = .256). Importantly, the SOA x target 
location interaction was also significant (F (3, 69) = 3.26, p < .027, partial eta sq = 
.124) indicating that social IOR was modulated by SOA. Planned comparisons 
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showed that social IOR occurred only when the SOA was 1200 ms (t (23) = 2.74, p 
< .012, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .0125). In all other SOA conditions, the 
difference between RT to the two location types was nonsignificant (all ps > .498).  
 
Fig 2.4 Mean RTs as a function of SOA and target location with respect to a 
partner’s target. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that social IOR was modulated by SOA and 
occurred only during the shortest duration. In other words, social IOR seems to 
extinguish somewhere between 1200 ms and 2400 ms. This result is consistent 
with what is known about the temporal duration of within-person IOR when simple 
stimuli are used and cues are uninformative (e.g., Castel et al., 2003, 2005; 
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Samuel & Kat, 2003). However, while some IOR studies have demonstrated IOR to 
last up to 3000 ms, the current social IOR effect was no longer present in the 2400 
ms SOA condition. This might have possibly resulted from the present task being 
performed under restricted viewing conditions. Finally, although no other studies 
have directly examined the time course of social IOR, the present results support 
previous studies on the effect where short SOAs are normally employed (Atkinson 
et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2010; Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005).  
2.2 Experiment 2  
 
 Experiment 2 manipulated the degree of perceptual load in the task. Thus, 
according to the level of perceptual load, participants were presented with a 
different number of stimuli at the ‘target stage’ (See Fig 2.5). Based on Lavie et 
al.’s (2004) load theory of selective attention and cognitive control and Liu et al.’s 
(2014) finding that classic IOR disappears during high perceptual load, it was 
hypothesised that if social IOR is similar to basic IOR, the social IOR effect should 
disappear or at least be reduced as perceptual load increases.  
As in Experiment 1, the task was performed under restricted visual conditions 
(See Fig 2.2).  
Method 
Participants 
 
A volunteer sample of 41 (11 male; 30 female) participants aged between 18 
and 28 (M = 19.91 years, SD = 1.80 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Essex, were right-handed and were naïve 
to the purposes of the study. They either received a course credit or £3 for their 
participation. 
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was as reported in Experiment 1. There were three perceptual 
load conditions. The stimuli in the low perceptual load were identical to the ones 
used in Experiment 1 (Fig 2.5, Panel A). In the medium load condition four squares 
were presented on each side, and in the high load condition there were six squares 
on each side (See Fig 2.5, Panels B & C). The placeholders in the medium load 
condition were located 145 mm from the fixation cross and protruded 70 mm to the 
left and 70 mm to the right of the display midline. The placeholders in the high load 
condition were also located 145 mm from fixation and protruded 92.5 mm to the 
left and to the right. They were presented on the same vertical line and were 
displayed against light-grey background, covering 652.5 mm2 of the screen in the 
medium load and 832.5 mm2 in the high load, respectively. Each placeholder had 
an area of 19.6 mm2 and when a target, it flashed by turning white (74.6 cd/m2). 
All stimuli were presented against a uniform white background (74.6 cd/m2). As in 
Experiment 1, all conditions were performed with physical barriers to prevent 
targets being seen on a partner’s trial. 
 
 
Fig 2.5 An illustration of the stimuli used in the three load conditions of Experiment 
2. 
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Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 3 (perceptual load: 
low, medium, high) fully within-participants design. The procedure was identical to 
that reported in Experiment 1 with the difference that all trials in all blocks had a 
SOA of approximately 1200 ms. In the three load conditions, only one target was 
presented at a time for 100 ms so that when it was the participant’s turn, one of 
the placeholders either to the left or to the right, turned white while the other 
remained black. The target was equally likely to occur at any of the placeholder 
locations in the medium and the high perceptual load. The presentation order of the 
three experimental conditions, blocked according to perceptual load, was 
counterbalanced. As in Experiment 1, participants first watched a demonstration by 
the experimenter. This was followed by a practice session consisting of 21 trials 
where the perceptual load was the same as the first experimental condition they 
completed. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Five participants were excluded from further analysis because they failed to 
fully press the home button when completing a response which resulted in delays in 
the presentation of subsequent targets. The data of the remaining 36 participants 
was used after RT outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were 
removed. 
Mean RTs were computed as a function of target location (same, different) and 
perceptual load condition (low, medium or high) and entered into a 2 x 3 fully-
within participants ANOVA (See Fig 2.6). The main effect of perceptual load was 
significant (F (2, 70) = 10.88, p < .001, partial eta sq = .237). Planned 
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comparisons revealed that participants were faster in the low load condition as 
compared to the medium (t (35) = 4.43, p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = 
.0016) and the high (t (35) = 2.80, p < .008, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .0016). 
However, there was no significant difference between the medium and the high 
perceptual load (p > .12). The main effect of target location was not significant (p > 
.06) but there was a significant location x load interaction (F (2, 70) = 5.42, p < 
.006, partial eta sq = .134) indicating that social IOR was modulated by perceptual 
load. Follow-up comparisons showed that social IOR occurred only when perceptual 
load was low (t (35) = 4.29, p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .016). 
Importantly, the effect disappeared in the medium (p > .06, Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha = .016) and high perceptual load conditions (p >.296, Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha = .016). 
 
Fig 2.6 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of perceptual load and target 
location. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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The findings of Experiment 2 demonstrated that social IOR is modulated by 
perceptual load since the effect occurred only when perceptual load was low. These 
results are in line with what would be expected for classic IOR (Liu et al., 2014). 
They could be explained with the load theory of selective attention and cognitive 
control which proposes that high perceptual load focuses selective attention and 
reduces distractor interference (Lavie et al., 2004). Thus, what is likely to have 
happened in Experiment 2 is that when the number of stimuli, presented along with 
the target increased, participants naturally became more efficient at identifying the 
flashing target (Lavie et al., 2004). This improved attentional selection ability then 
in turn, must have overridden the inhibition to the previously cued location, 
resulting in no RT difference between cued and uncued locations in the medium and 
high perceptual load.  
2.3 Experiment 3 
 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine whether social IOR is modulated 
by trait anxiety. Recall from the Introduction of Chapter 2 that trait anxiety does 
not influence classic IOR when the task is performed with neutral stimuli (Fox et al., 
2002; Pérez Dueñas et al., 2009). Thus, as the stimuli in the social IOR paradigm 
do not have any emotional valence, it was hypothesised that if social IOR is based 
on the same mechanisms that give rise to IOR, trait anxiety should not have any 
modulating effect on it (i.e., there should be no difference in social IOR between 
the two groups). Moreover, to assess whether the present experiment was sensitive 
enough to generate an effect known to be influenced by anxiety, we introduced an 
additional variable. Therefore, one of the blocks was performed with physical 
barriers between participants (see Fig 2.2) whereas the other was performed with 
no barriers. Research has shown that anxiety makes individuals more sensitive to 
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evaluation from others (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). At the same time, Eysenck 
et al.’s (2007) attentional control theory assumes that anxiety impairs cognitive 
control, resulting in inefficient performance as these individuals often engage in 
compensatory strategies, such as enhanced effort to achieve standard performance.  
Thus, in line with the latter it was expected that the high-trait anxious group would 
generally be slower on the RT task (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
However, these participants would also be motivated to improve their performance 
(i.e., by becoming quicker) when their partner could monitor their responses (no 
barrier condition). 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A volunteer sample of 54 (8 male; 46 female) participants aged between 18 
and 30 (M = 19.57 years, SD = 2.55 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were first-year psychology undergraduates at the University of Essex who 
participated in exchange for course credits. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
The same stimuli and apparatus were used as those described in Experiment 
1. Participants’ trait anxiety was measured by Spielberger’s State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI, Speilberger et al., 1983; state anxiety was also measured for 
control purposes). STAI has been used extensively in research and has been 
reported to have good validity and reliability (Elwood, Wolitzky-Taylor, & Olatunji, 
2012; Spielberger et al., 1983). Its standard version was administered where state 
anxiety was assessed by 20 items, evaluating the respondents’ feelings at that 
moment and trait anxiety was assessed by 20 items, evaluating how respondents 
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generally felt. Each participant was given a score from 20 to 80 for each anxiety 
measure. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 (viewing 
condition: barrier, no-barrier) x 2 (trait anxiety: low, high) mixed design. 
Participants completed 2 experimental blocks of 209 trials – one with a barrier and 
one without. The presentation order of these 2 experimental conditions was 
counterbalanced. As reported previously, before completing the experimental 
blocks, participants first watched a demonstration by the experimenter. Then they 
undertook one practice session consisting of 21 trials either with a barrier or 
without, depending on the first experimental condition completed. Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. STAI was always 
administered after the social IOR task, starting with the state-anxiety 
questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 36.22 (SD = 9.32; normative score 
in college students is 37.62, SD = 10.99; Spielberger et al., 1983). Mean trait 
anxiety was 42.98 (SD = 9.87; normative score in college students is 39.35, SD = 
9.67). As expected trait- and state anxiety significantly correlated (r = 0.403, p < 
.003). A median split on participants’ trait anxiety scores was performed to classify 
participants as belonging to either the ‘low’ or the ‘high’ trait anxiety group. 
Outliers were removed from further analysis using the same criterion as described 
previously. Mean RTs were analysed with a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA where 
target location (same, different) and viewing condition (barrier, no-barrier) were 
entered as within-participants factors, and trait anxiety (low, high) as a between-
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participants factor. The main effect of target location was significant (F (1, 52) = 
45.64, p < .001, partial eta sq = .467), suggesting that regardless of trait anxiety 
and viewing condition, participants exhibited social IOR (See Fig 2.7). However, 
neither the main effect of viewing condition nor trait anxiety reached significance 
(ps > .187) but there was a significant interaction between viewing condition and 
trait anxiety (F (1, 52) = 4.69, p < .035, partial eta sq = .083, Fig 2.8). The post-
hoc analyses revealed a significant simple effect of viewing condition within the trait 
anxiety group (t (26) = 2.72, p < .011, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025). Thus, 
the high-trait anxious individuals were quicker when there was no barrier. No other 
significant effects were found. 
Additionally, in order to generate a greater distinction between the two anxiety 
groups, the analysis was repeated with the bottom and the top quartiles of the trait 
anxiety scores (instead of a median split). Again a significant social IOR emerged (F 
(1, 29) = 18.45, p < .001, partial eta sq = .389). However, although the same 
trend in the viewing condition x trait anxiety interaction appeared, it did not reach 
significance (F (1, 29) = 0.44, p > .51), perhaps due to the smaller sample size (N 
= 31). Finally, only a significant social IOR was found (F (1, 52) = 44.53, p < .001, 
partial eta sq = .461) when state anxiety instead of trait anxiety served as a 
between-participants factor in the analysis.  
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Fig 2.7 Social IOR in the low and the high-trait anxiety group. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Fig 2.8 Mean RTs of the low and the high-trait anxious individuals to localise 
targets as a function of viewing condition. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean. 
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The results of Experiment 3 indicated that social IOR was not modulated by 
trait anxiety. The present findings are consistent with Fox et al. (2002) and Pérez 
Dueñas et al. (2009) who also found that trait anxiety did not modulate the 
magnitude of classic IOR when neutral cues where used. Moreover, although the 
present findings have been based on a null effect, it seems that the anxiety 
assessment had been successful as trait anxiety influenced general performance on 
the task as a function of viewing condition. Thus, the present results showed that 
trait anxiety impaired performance on the task, resulting in longer latencies for the 
high-trait anxious group. The latter is in line with previous findings and the 
attentional control theory suggesting that  individuals high in trait anxiety are 
generally slower on RT tasks as compared to low-trait anxious individuals  (Eysenck 
et al., 2007). Moreover, the finding that the difference in RT between the two 
groups disappeared when the barrier was removed is in line with previous research 
showing that high-trait anxious individuals often compensate for their decreased 
efficiency with increased effort (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007).  
2.4 General Discussion 
 
Chapter 2 assessed whether social IOR possessed properties, characteristic of 
an attentional effect, and more specifically, classic IOR. It was found that social IOR 
is short-lived; it is modulated by one of the mechanisms of selective attention 
(perceptual load) and is not influenced by trait anxiety.  These findings are in line 
with an attentional explanation of the effect, according to which social IOR is based 
on inhibition of return. Provided below is a detailed discussion of the findings of 
each experiment and an explanation of how these fit with the attentional literature. 
First, the observed temporal interval of the effect agrees with what is known 
about classic IOR. As mentioned in the Introduction, several studies have 
suggested that classic IOR lasts for up to 3000 ms (e.g., Castel et al., 2003, 2005; 
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Samuel & Kat, 2003). Moreover, the type of stimuli and procedure in the present 
Experiment 1 concurred with the conditions under which IOR is normally 
characterised by this relatively short time-course8. In contrast, although several 
papers have reported that IOR can have a much longer time course, this has been 
explained as the result of modifications to the original paradigm. For example, 
when instead of flashing lights, more engaging stimuli, such as human faces were 
used, IOR was found to last exceptionally longer (up to 13 min; Tipper, Grison & 
Kessler, 2003). This is probably due to the more engaging stimuli producing a 
stable memory representation which can be easily reinstated even after a long 
delay (Tipper et al., 2003). Finally, the result of longer general RTs as a function of 
SOA is also predicted by the attentional literature. Previous research has 
established that the longer the SOA in a block, the more difficult it is to estimate 
when the response signal will occur, resulting in progressively delayed RTs as a 
function of block SOA (Klemmer, 1956; Rolke and Hofmann, 2007). For instance, 
Rolke and Hofmann (2007) found that RTs were shorter for blocks with short SOAs 
(e.g., 800 ms) compared to blocks with long SOAs (e.g., 2000 ms). This probably 
occurs as the time between the cue and target allows top-down temporal 
preparation to develop, but as time is prolonged this judgement becomes less 
accurate.  
Moreover, the results of Experiment 2 also agree with what is known about 
basic IOR. As recently found by Liu et al. (2014), IOR is also present during low 
perceptual load conditions but disappears under high perceptual load. Moreover, 
the finding that social IOR was somewhat reduced as perceptual load increased 
(medium load) and despite non-significant, this tendency was reversed during high 
                                                          
8
 According to Wilson, Castel and Pratt (2006) these include: simple stimuli such as dots, 
circles or squares that serve as cues and targets; cues are uninformative and merely 
observed (not responded to); and the experiment follows the traditional Posner and Cohen 
(1984) cue-target procedure. 
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perceptual load (See Fig 2.6) is also consistent with Liu et al. (2014). In their high 
perceptual load condition, a very similar reversal of IOR was identified. As 
explained in the Introduction, these results are most likely due to the ‘focusing’ 
effect that high perceptual load has on visual selective attention (Lavie et al., 
2004). Thus, what is likely to have happened is that the increase in the number of 
stimuli in the medium and high perceptual load improved attentional selection 
(leading to more efficient responses and reduced RTs). This, in turn abolished the 
RT difference between the cued and the uncued location, resulting in a 
disappearance of the social IOR effect.  Additionally, the finding that participants 
were slower in their general RT to respond to targets in those two conditions (as 
compared to the low perceptual load) is also in line with the selective attention 
research. This effect has been widely reported in different attentional paradigms 
where a target and a distractor are presented and the number of items around the 
target is varied (e.g., Caparos & Linnell, 2009; de Fockert, Caparos, Linnell & 
Davidoff, 2011; Macdonald & Lavie, 2008). Finally, evidence from a recent social 
IOR study also proposed that social IOR was modulated by the perceptual 
properties of the stimuli, used in the task (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014). For instance, 
Atkinson et al. (2014) found that similarly to basic IOR, social IOR was both 
location- and object-based as the effect disappeared unless the two targets on a 
particular hand-side had been grouped in an object (such as the grey rectangular 
shapes in all experiments in the present chapter, See Fig 2.2). Moreover, in a 
subsequent experiment in the same paper it was found that social IOR disappeared 
when the perceptual demands of the task increased. Thus, when participants had to 
discriminate between two targets, instead of performing the usual simple 
localization response, no social IOR effect occurred.  
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Lastly, the finding of Experiment 3 that trait anxiety did not modulate the 
magnitude of the phenomenon also agrees with what would be expected, provided 
that social IOR is an IOR-like effect. As previously reported for IOR tasks with 
neutral stimuli (Fox et al., 2002; Pérez Dueñas et al., 2009), Experiment 3 did not 
identify any difference in social IOR between the present high- and low-trait 
anxious groups (See Fig 2.7). Moreover, although these findings have been based 
on a null effect, the poorer performance of the high-trait anxious group (marked by 
longer general response latencies) as a function of viewing condition was in line 
with previous findings that anxiety negatively affects RT performance (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007).  Additionally, the observed improvement in 
general response speed is supported by theories conceptualizing cognitive effort as 
an incentive, usually ‘triggered as a result of the subjects' detection of performance 
errors or of a declining reward rate’ (Sarter, Gehring & Kozak, 2006, p. 146). Thus, 
taking into account that anxiety makes individuals more vigilant to threat (Fox et 
al., 2002; Pérez Dueñas et al., 2009) and especially sensitive to judgement by 
others (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), it is very likely that in the no barrier 
condition, these participants had a higher incentive to compensate for their slower 
reaction time with increased effort. This is supported by previous research on 
anxiety and reading efficiency where high-trait anxious individuals were identified 
to endorse in compensatory strategies. More specifically, to achieve as good 
performance as the low-trait anxious group, high-trait anxious individuals either 
looked back at the previously read text or read the test aloud to improve 
concentration (e.g., Calvo & Castillo, 1995; Calvo & Eysenck, 1996).   
Taken together, the present findings fit best with an IOR account of the effect 
in which social IOR is based on inhibition to return attention to an area, explored by 
another individual (Cole et al.). As described in Section 1.1.3 of the General 
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Introduction, according to Cole et al. social IOR is similar to the effect observed in 
Posner and Cohen’s (1984) classic paradigm. Thus, the partner’s arm reach/eye 
gaze must have served as central cues that shifted the observer’s attention to the 
location of their response. Then, as it happens in the classic IOR paradigm, 
witnessing an attention-capturing event in the periphery, being it the partner’s 
target illumination and/or their reaching response, cued the observer’s attention to 
that location. Moreover, because of the SOAs being longer than 300 ms, 
participants experienced inhibition to return attention to the previously cued 
location and were consequently slower to initiate an action there. Indeed, as 
described in detail in the above paragraphs, the present findings strongly suggest 
that the effect of interest possesses a number of properties, characteristic of classic 
IOR. The only finding that does not completely agree with the IOR literature is that 
in Experiment 1, social IOR extinguished before 2400 ms. Still, although reported to 
potentially last for up to 3000 ms, classic IOR has been found to be most stable in 
the interval between 300 ms and 1600 ms (See Samuel & Kat, 2003 for a meta-
analysis). To speculate, another reason why the effect disappeared before 3000 ms 
might have been the presence of a barrier. This might have reduced the saliency of 
the central cues which were in fact the partner’s eye movements and hand 
responses. In support, there is evidence that the magnitude of social IOR 
sometimes increases when partners have a full vision of the paradigm (e.g., Welsh 
et al., 2007). 
However, the present findings do not challenge the other two accounts of the 
effect – Ondobaka et al.’s (2012, 2013) according to which social IOR is due to 
movement congruency (See Section 1.2.4) and Welsh et al.’s (2007, 2009, Welsh, 
Manzone & McDougall, 2014) according to which  it is based on action inhibition 
(Section 1.1.3). This is because the effect of action was not directly manipulated in 
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the present chapter and thus the contribution of action co-representation to the 
effect cannot be presently determined. Moreover, although the findings of 
Experiments 2 and 3 concur with what is known about the effect of trait anxiety on 
classic IOR, it is unclear what influence perceptual load and trait anxiety have on 
action co-representation, as up to the author’s knowledge no such research has 
been performed up to date.  Still, in a broader sense some aspects of the present 
findings do not concur with Ondobaka et al.’s and Welsh et al.’s accounts. For 
example, it is unlikely that a system that has adapted to interpret and represent 
observed actions will be unable to function when the temporal gap between the 
observed and the required action exceeds 2000 ms (indeed there is evidence that 
the MNS is involved in delayed imitation which can last for much longer; e.g., 
Paukner, Ferrari & Suomi, 2011). Moreover, as the two co-actors’ actions were kept 
constant in all experiments and the effect appeared/disappeared as a function of a 
change in either the temporal or perceptual characteristics of the task, it can be 
speculated that the observed effect can occur independently of action co-
representation. Still, the latter is not enough to disregard Ondobaka et al.’s (2012, 
2013) and Welsh et al.’s (2007, 2009, 2014) accounts. Thus, the following Chapter 
3 aimed to overcome the limitations of the present chapter by directly testing the 
contribution of action to the social IOR effect.  
Finally, the present results have important theoretical implications for the 
better understanding of social IOR. First, the present chapter presented three 
original experiments testing three different characteristics of social IOR, not 
previously researched. Moreover, by comparing the results to what is already 
known about classic IOR, the present findings demonstrated that there is ground to 
propose that social IOR and IOR rely on similar mechanisms and that social IOR 
might indeed be an attentional effect. To speculate, the present research might 
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help reconcile some results concerning the effect in special populations. For 
example, Welsh et al. (2009b) reported that ASD individuals do not exhibit social 
IOR. At the same time, such participants have been found to demonstrate the basic 
IOR effect (Rinehart et al., 2008). The present research might explain this 
discrepancy. If the proposed interpretation of the effect is true, social IOR might 
not occur in this group because the social nature of the cue makes it difficult for the 
ASD group to orient attention to the partner and their responses9. Thus, a situation 
similar to the medium and the high perceptual load conditions of Experiment 2 
might be occurring – a processing preference might be given to the most significant 
event occurring at the moment. In support, even able ASD individuals show a 
highly abnormal pattern of visual scanning, such as fixating faces to a much lesser 
extent than controls, reduced attention to the eye-region and a tendency to focus 
on non-essential facial parts, like the earlobes (e.g., Dalton, 2005; Klin, Jones, 
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Riby & Hancock, 2008).  
In sum, the findings of Chapter 2 suggested that social IOR and basic IOR 
share some similarities in terms of their perceptuo-temporal properties. Three 
experiments demonstrated that similarly to classic IOR, the present effect has a 
comparably short time course; it is modulated by perceptual load but not by trait 
anxiety when the task is performed with neutral stimuli. Although the present 
findings seem to better fit with an IOR explanation of the effect, they do not, by 
any means, rule out an alternative explanation of the effect, based on action co-
representation. Therefore, in a series of three experiments the following Chapter 3 
directly tested the contribution of action co-representation to the social IOR effect.  
 
  
                                                          
9 ASD individuals are known to exhibit a strong preference for objects to people. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 IS SOCIAL IOR DUE TO ACTION CO-REPRESENTATION? 
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The dominant paradigm in cognitive research is the testing of individuals on 
tasks performed in isolation. In the archetypal experiment, a lone individual 
performs a required task in front of a computerized display, from which the 
experimenter can examine aspects of the individual’s perceptual, attentional, 
memory, or executive abilities. However, during the past decade a number of 
researchers have begun to examine how cognition operates when a person acts 
jointly with another individual. One finding is that the presence of others can 
influence how attention is selectively allocated across a visual display (Böckler et 
al., 2012; Frischen et al., 2009; Tversky & Hard, 2009). For example, when 
participants are asked to respond to a target, whilst ignoring simultaneously 
appearing distractors, their egocentric frame of reference can shift to an allocentric 
one if the task is performed jointly with another individual (Frischen et al., 2009).  
Joint action work is often placed within the context of theories that link 
mechanisms representing perception and action, one of which being the theory of 
event coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001). In essence, the TEC suggests that 
perceived events (perception) and intended to-be-executed events (action) share a 
common representational domain. As such, irrespective of their role, both stimulus 
and response codes are formed and represented in the same medium as cognitive 
structures, called ‘event codes’. Event codes are said to prime each other in 
accordance to an overlap on an abstract distal-coding level, implying these are 
formed on the basis of goal-directed representations of the events. ‘According to 
TEC, intentionality renders perception and action-planning inherently similar and 
functionally equivalent’ (Hommel et al., 2001, p. 904). Thus, anticipating a 
perceptual event, perceiving it, planning the event or executing it are assumed to 
result in a similar activation in the motor system.  
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The theory has been used as an explanation for one of the most notable joint-
action effects, namely the joint Simon effect (or social Simon effect (SSE); Sebanz 
et al., 2003). In the basic paradigm, co-actors sit adjacent to one another and each 
has a single target they are required to respond to. One participant responds with 
their left hand, the other with their right. For example, co-actor A may respond only 
to the appearance of a blue stimulus by pressing a left key, whereas co-actor B 
presses a right key whenever a green stimulus is presented. Furthermore, targets 
can appear either to the left or right hand side of the display. Results indicate that 
although the position of the targets is irrelevant, co-actors are generally quicker to 
respond to stimuli appearing on the side associated with their response button 
(e.g., left key press for a blue stimulus appearing to the left) and are slower 
whenever their target appears on the partner’s side (Sebanz et al., 2003, Hommel 
et al., 2009). Importantly, this effect is present only when the task is performed 
jointly with another individual, or alone where the person makes both responses 
(i.e., Simon & Rudell, 1967), but not when a lone participant responds to just one 
of the two stimuli (Hommel, 1996). In the terminology of TEC, the standard (lone) 
Simon effect occurs because agents automatically form binding codes between the 
relevant stimulus features (i.e., colour) and the irrelevant but corresponding 
stimulus features (i.e., location). Consequently, when these coincide a facilitation 
effect, translated into shorter RT, occurs whereas a stimulus-response mismatch 
results in an interference and longer RT (Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel et al., 
2009). Following this logic, Sebanz and colleagues (2003, Sebanz et al., 2006) 
argued that when acting jointly on a task, co-actors represent each other’s 
stimulus-response maps and therefore experience interference whenever these are 
violated. This suggests that co-actors represent and integrate each other’s 
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perspective (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2006; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009, Obhi & Sebanz, 
2011).  
As mentioned in the General Introduction, action co-representation 
mechanisms have also been invoked to explain the present social IOR effect 
(Sections 1.1.3 & 1.2.4). To recap, in this paradigm two co-actors sit facing each 
other and take turns to respond to targets appearing on a flat display located 
between them. Once a response has been made, the actor is required to return 
their hand to a resting position in front of them (see Fig 3.1). Typical results reveal 
that RTs to initiate a response are longer when reaching to the same location as the 
co-actor’s previous response. Or to put it another way, RTs are shorter when 
reaching to a different location (which involves reaching to two opposite sides of 
the display; See Fig 3.1). Although several studies have now examined various 
characteristics and properties of the effect, it is not yet clear why it occurs. Indeed, 
different authors, have assumed that the effect is due to a particular mechanism. 
As explained previously, Welsh and colleagues and Skarratt et al. (2010)/Cole et al. 
refer to it as ‘between-person inhibition of return’ and ‘social inhibition of return 
(sIOR)’ respectively, suggesting that it reflects the visuomotor inhibition that 
follows an attention-capturing event. By contrast, Ondobaka et al. (2012, 2013) 
proposed that social IOR was due to congruency of observed and performed action, 
i.e., imitation.  
By investigating the direct effect of action co-representation on social IOR, the 
present Chapter 3 tested the three explanations that have been posited to explain 
its basis. These three theories, described below, are referred to as the action-
location account (Hayes et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009), the 
movement congruency account (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013), and the attentional 
shift hypothesis (Cole et al., 2012; Atkinson et al., 2014). One should note that 
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although fundamentally different from each other, there are similarities amongst 
the three theories. For instance, both the Welsh et al.’s and Ondobaka et al.’s 
theories incorporate the action-perception models described earlier in which an 
observed action is said to be represented both by perceptual mechanisms and 
action mechanisms. However, in contrast to Welsh et al.’s explanation, the location 
of response is not important in the Ondobaka et al.’s account. Furthermore, the 
theories of Welsh et al. and Cole et al. are both concerned with inhibitory 
mechanisms (i.e., IOR) whereas the Ondobaka et al.’s explanation is not. Although 
previously described in Section 1.1.3 of the General Introduction, for the purposes 
of the present chapter, each of the three accounts is again presented below.  
First, Welsh and collaborators (and others, e.g., Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) 
argued that the effect is caused by the linking of mechanisms underlying action co-
representation and inhibition. With respect to the former, Welsh et al. (2007, 
p.955) suggested ‘that between-person IOR results from an understanding of the 
other person’s response’. Furthermore, Welsh et al. (2007) posited the mirror 
neuron system (MNS, Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) as a mediating mechanism. The 
MNS is often referred to as the action observation system of the brain, known to 
become active both during action execution and when the same action is observed. 
As Welsh et al. (2007, p.955) stated, ‘We hypothesize that the activation of the 
mirror neuron system during the observation of the response mimicked the activity 
associated with the actual response’. The second and complimentary aspect of their 
account concerns inhibition and specifically IOR. It is now well-established that 
humans are slower to act upon a stimulus presented at a recently attended location 
(i.e., Posner & Cohen, 1984). Thus when an observer sees another individual attend 
to a location, this initiates IOR in the observer. Put simply, Welsh et al.’s account 
suggests that when co-actor A reaches to location X, co-actor B’s perceptual 
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mechanisms ‘perceive’ it as if co-actor B has performed the action themselves, 
which activates an inhibitory response to that location.  
The second account, advocated by Ondobaka et al. (2012, 2013), places the 
present effect within the context of mechanisms that represent congruency of 
movement. In addition to inhibiting an action, observing a biological movement can 
also facilitate the same movement in the observer. For example, participants are 
quicker to execute a finger (Brass et al., 2001) or an arm movement (Kilner et al., 
2003) compatible with the one observed (Kilner et al., 2003, see also Liepelt et al., 
2008). With respect to the present phenomenon, Ondobaka et al. argued that when 
a participant reaches out to, say, their right (because the target appeared on the 
right) this facilitates a rightward reach in the observer (i.e., co-actor) when she is 
then required to reach to her right on the next trial. In other words, the action is 
facilitated when, within an egocentric framework, it is congruent with the one just 
seen (See Section 1.2.4 for more detail).  
Finally, the third explanation argues that the effect occurs solely as a result of 
mechanisms associated with attentional orienting and resultant IOR (Cole et al., 
2012). As explained in detail in Chapter 2, the classic IOR phenomenon is normally 
studied in paradigms where a peripheral cue is presented to a lone observer, 
followed by a delay longer than approximately 300 ms and a target that appears 
with equal probability at either the cued or the uncued location (Posner & Cohen, 
1984; Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1989). Results typically show that 
participants are slower to respond to cued targets. In other words, after an initial 
capture of attention by the cue, inhibition follows. Thus, it is possible that instead of 
representing an observed action social IOR occurs because a co-actor’s arm 
movement (and/or target onset) shifts the observer’s attention to one side of the 
display. In effect, the partner’s arm reach serves an identical role to the peripheral 
80 
 
 
cue in Posner and Cohen’s classic study (1984); that is, it provides a transient 
event that draws an observer’s attention to a region of space. Furthermore, the fact 
that the phenomenon is still observed when only the initial portion of the arm 
movement can be seen (see Welsh et al., 2007 and Skarratt et al., 2010) does not 
negate the attentional shift hypothesis; occluding the peripheral ‘transients’ 
generated by a reaching action renders the initial (seen) movement as a ‘central’ 
cue, and classical IOR is now known to be induced with central cues (e.g., Cole, 
Smith & Atkinson, 2015; Taylor & Klein, 2000; Weger et al., 2008). Indeed, 
Skarratt et al. (2010) reported that seeing a co-actor’s eye gaze only, was 
sufficient to generate social IOR (Skarratt et al., 2010)10.  
The main aim of the present Chapter 3 was to assess the extent to which 
action co-representation contributes to the social IOR effect. Thus, Experiment 4 
investigated whether the phenomenon is affected if there is a kinematic mismatch 
between the action that is observed and the one that needs to be performed. 
Experiment 5 examined the consequences of having attention shifted to a location 
in the absence of an observed action (i.e., so that no imitation or action co-
representation could occur). Finally, Experiment 6 attempted to isolate the effects 
of action congruency and target location to directly test which of the three accounts 
of social IOR provides the most plausible explanation of the phenomenon. 
Importantly, for consistency, the term ‘social IOR’, instead of ‘movement 
congruency’ was used throughout the chapter to refer to the observed effect. As 
previously explained, actions to the ‘same’ location are always ‘movement 
incongruent’ as in this condition participants need to reach to two different hand-
sides of the display (e.g., Co-actor 1 (C1) goes to the right, Co-actor 2 (C2) goes to 
                                                          
10 Debate surrounds the degree to which IOR is due to inhibition of attention as opposed to 
motor processes. However, most authors agree that an initial shift of attention occurs in 
order to induce IOR. 
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the left; See Fig 3.1). At the same time, actions to the ‘different’ location are 
always ‘movement congruent’ as in this condition participants need to execute 
movements to the same hand-side of the display (e.g., C1 goes to the right, C2 
goes to their right). Furthermore, in contrast with the distinction sometimes made 
in the joint-action literature between ‘action congruency’ and ‘movement 
congruency’ (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013, 2015), these two terms have been used 
interchangeably in this chapter. This is so as action intention was not modulated in 
any of the present three experiments (i.e., action congruency is usually used to 
represent action intention (whether the goal of the action differs or not in respect to 
that of the other co-actor) while movement congruency is used to refer to the exact 
direction of the movement; Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013, 2015).  
 
3.1 Experiment 4 
  
The action co-representation account proposes that co-actors in joint-action 
tasks ‘form shared representations of tasks quasi automatically’ and that ‘the 
other’s task ... [is] … represented in a functionally equivalent way to one’s own’ 
(Sebanz et al., 2006, p.72). As mentioned in the Introduction, this is thought to be 
subserved by the MNS which has been found to be active both during action 
execution and action observation in humans and monkeys (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). It follows therefore that if the two co-actors use different parts of their body 
to respond, no movement congruency effect (i.e., social IOR) should be observed 
because different actions are being performed. In other words, a movement 
congruency effect should not occur if the observed and the required actions 
mismatch not only visually but also kinesthetically. Indeed, research on action co-
representation suggests that some actions are only simulated when the two co-
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actors are similar enough (e.g., Avenanti, Sirigu & Aglioti, 2010; Hommel et al., 
2009).  
Experiment 4 employed the standard social IOR/arm movement congruency 
paradigm described earlier in which participants reached with their hand/arm to the 
target location. For consistency, instead of ‘movement congruency’, the term ‘social 
IOR’ was used throughout the chapter to refer to the effect of interest. As 
previously explained, actions to the ‘same’ location were always ‘movement 
incongruent’  as in this condition participants needed to reach to two different  
hand-sides of the display while actions to the ‘different’ location were always 
‘movement congruent’ as in this condition participants needed to execute 
movements to the same hand-side of the display (See Fig 3.1). Importantly, in this 
experiment, on half of the trials, the confederate-co-actor that participants 
alternated responses with used her hand/arm to make the responses while on the 
other half she responded with her foot/ leg. 
 
Method 
 Ethics Statement 
Ethical approval from the ethics committee of the University of Essex was 
obtained prior to commencement of all experiments. All participants gave their 
written informed consent to take part in this research. 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 21 (9 male; 12 female) participants aged between 20 
and 45 (M = 25.38 years, SD = 7.05 years) took part. All of them were students at 
the University of Essex who participated in exchange for £4. All were right-handed 
and were naïve to the purposes of the study.  
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were displayed on a 19.5-inch LCD touch-screen monitor built flat 
into a table, raised 74 cm from the floor. They were presented against a uniform 
white background (74.6 cd/m2). The two co-actors sat facing one another such that 
the distance between their chests and their ‘home buttons’ was approximately 160 
mm (See Fig 3.1). In the foot condition, the confederate sat on a chair raised 58 
cm from the floor, whereas participants in all conditions and the confederate in the 
hand condition were seated at a height of approximately 44 cm. The four stimulus 
locations were denoted by 4 black squares (19.6 mm2 each) which acted as 
‘placeholders’, and remained present for the entire trial duration. Two placeholders 
(1 to the left, 1 to the right), located at a distance of 160 mm from the black 
fixation cross and protruding 50 mm to the left and to the right of the screen 
midline were displayed in front of each participant. The distance between the left 
and the right placeholder was 320 mm. The squares were placed within a light-grey 
area, covering 200 mm2 of the screen. On each trial, one of them illuminated by 
turning white (74.6 cd/m2). Participants made their responses by releasing the 
‘home’ button and touching the square that had illuminated. A RM Pentium PC 
custom software was used for the stimulus generation and the recording of the 
responses.  
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Fig 3.1 An illustration of the standard condition of the social IOR/movement 
congruency paradigm used in Experiment 4. In the figure shown, one of the co-
actors is reaching to their right where the target has illuminated. 
 
Design and Procedure 
     The experiment employed a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 
(effector: hand, foot) fully within-participants design. The dependent variable in all 
three experiments in this chapter was the time that elapsed between the target 
presentation and the target (i.e., screen) being touched (RT).  
All participants were tested individually and performed the task with the same 
confederate who was also the author. The confederate always sat in the same 
position relative to the workspace (See Fig 3.1). She verbally explained the 
instructions after which she performed a short demonstration of the procedure, 
consisting of a practice session of 21 trials. The confederate’s initial response 
triggered the target sequence in which co-actors alternated single responses. They 
were instructed to keep the home buttons pressed until a response was needed 
whilst at the same time fixating the cross in the centre of the screen. Then 
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participants were required to reach out with their right hand and touch the target 
location, which illuminated for 100 ms. All trials had an inter-trial interval of 350 ms 
and a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of approximately 1200 ms. Participants 
performed two experimental blocks of 209 trials (i.e., 104 per participant plus the 
first trial which was not analysed since no response preceded it). They always used 
their right hand to make the responses. However, in one of the blocks the 
confederate responded with her right hand whereas in the other – with her right 
foot (the block order was counterbalanced across participants). Regardless of which 
limb was used by the confederate, both the confederate and participant had a full 
view of each other and each other’s targets and responses (See Fig 3.1). 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Results and Discussion 
 
RT outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed prior 
to the formal analyses. Mean RTs were computed as a function of target location 
(same, different) and effector (hand, foot) and entered into a 2 x 2 fully-within 
participants ANOVA (See Fig 3.2). The main effect of effector was significant (F (1, 
20) = 30.92, p < .001, partial eta sq = .607). Thus, overall, participants were 
slower when the confederate responded with her foot as compared to the standard 
hand condition. The main effect of target location was also significant (F (1, 20) = 
17.75, p < .001, partial eta sq = .470), suggesting that social IOR was observed. 
Finally, there was no reliable target location x effector interaction (F (1, 20) = 3.89, 
p > .06, partial eta sq = .163). However, to test whether social IOR was present in 
both conditions, follow-up comparisons were carried out. These analyses confirmed 
that participants exhibited the effect in both the hand (t (1, 20) = 4.94, p < .001, 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) and the foot (t (1, 20) = 2.54, p < .02, 
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Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) condition. No difference in within-participants’ 
variability in RT across conditions was found (Fs (1, 20) > 0.57, ps > .307). 
Additionally, significant positive correlations emerged between the participants’ and 
the confederate’s responses in all four social IOR-effector combinations (different 
location, hands: r (19) = .53, p< .013; same location, hands: r (19) = .46, p< 
.035; different location, feet: r (19) = .54, p< .011; same location, feet: r (19) = 
.61, p< .003).  
 
Fig 3.2 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of effector and social 
IOR/movement congruency in Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean. 
 
First, the results of Experiment 4 are consistent with the general finding of 
previous work employing the same movement congruency/social IOR paradigm – 
participants were slower to repeat the location their confederate-co-actor 
responded to on a previous trial (e.g., Cole et al., 2012; Ondobaka et al., 2012; 
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Welsh et al., 2005). However, this effect occurred even when participants used a 
different effector to that used by their partner. This finding is not in line with the 
action co-representation account according to which action observation leads to 
automatic activation of motor representations in the observer (Brass et al., 2001; 
Buccino et al., 2001; Ondobaka et al., 2012; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005). This taken 
together with research showing that the human ventral premotor cortex is 
somatotopically organised (i.e., different sectors become active during the 
observation of hand and foot movements, e.g., Buccino et al., 2001) challenges the 
explanation advocated by Ondobaka et al. (2012, 2013, 2015) that the observed 
effect is due to movement/action congruency.  
Finally, the significant main effect of effector can be accounted for by the fact 
that the confederate was slower in the foot condition and this affected the 
participants’ overall response tempo. Moreover, the significant relationships 
between participants’ and confederate’s responses reveal that participants, at some 
level, must have been taking into account their task-partner and their actions. In 
support, observing biological movements carried out by another individual has been 
reported to bias one’s perception of timing (Kaneko & Murakami, 2009; Watanabe, 
2008). For example, Kaneko and Murakami (2009) found that the speed of a 
stimulus was a significant predictor of how participants perceived observed motion 
so that the apparent duration proportionally increased with the speed logarithm. 
3.2 Experiment 5 
 
Experiment 5 further tested whether a direct match between the observed and 
the performed actions is needed for the present social IOR effect to occur. Recall 
from the Introduction that Welsh et al.’s account posits that co-actors inhibit 
actions via the MNS, whilst Ondobaka et al. suggests that the effect is due to 
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congruency of actions. Thus, action co-representation is central to both of these 
theories. By contrast, Cole et al. (2012) proposes that actions are epiphenomenal: 
in this context, they merely happen to shift attention. 
 It follows therefore, that if the actions performed by a co-actor are different 
to that of the participant, and furthermore, cannot be seen by the participant, then 
no imitation or action co-representation should occur. Therefore in one block of 
trials in the present Experiment 5, the participant made a reaching response to a 
target (i.e., performed the standard task) whilst their confederate-co-actor 
operated a physical arrow that merely pointed to the target rather than reach to it. 
Moreover, all actions in these trials performed by the confederate-co-actor were 
occluded by a barrier (the ‘non-visible’ condition). In a second block, both co-actors 
performed the standard task in which they both reached out to the target.  
Critically therefore, in the non-visible condition participant’s attention could be 
shifted to a target location without the co-actor having made a reaching response 
to it. The action accounts of Welsh et al. and Ondobaka et al. predict that social IOR 
should be reduced, if not abolished, when actions cannot be seen. The Cole et al.’s 
account by contrast predicts that the effect should occur because the arrow and/or 
targets act as an attentional cue. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A volunteer sample of 24 (6 male; 18 female) participants aged between 18 
and 25 took part in the study. They received a course credit for their participation. 
All were undergraduates at the University of Essex, right-handed and naïve to the 
purposes of the study.  
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
Stimuli were presented on a 22” LCD monitor built into a table positioned 
between the two co-actors and had a Keytec touch-screen placed over it. The 
participants sat across the table so that they were facing one another and the 
distance between their chests and their ‘home buttons’ was approximately 240 mm. 
A black square measuring 10 mm in diameter (0.3 cd/m2 measured on-screen) was 
presented in the centre of the display against a uniform white background (67.3 
cd/m2) and acted as a fixation point. Two other squares of the same size and 
luminance were presented to the left and right of the display area (see Fig 3.3). 
The target was the rapid onset then offset (i.e., a flash) of one of these squares. 
Participants made a response by moving their hand from the home button and 
touching the target square. One co-actor served as the naïve participant whilst the 
other was a confederate (the author). On half of the trials a barrier was located 
such that it occluded all hand/arm movements made by the confederate co-actor. A 
wooden arrow was located at the base of this barrier operated by the co-actor. An 
RM Pentium PC running custom software controlled the stimulus generation and 
recording of responses. 
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Fig 3.3 The equipment used in Experiment  5. The confederate co-actor operated 
one end of the wooden arrow. No actions could be seen by the participant. 
 
Design and Procedure  
 
We employed a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 (visibility: visible, non-
visible) fully within-participants design. The visibility factor referred to how visible 
was the co-actor’s action. Either could participants  see the co-actor’s action or it 
was fully occluded (See Fig 3.3). 
As before, participants’ task was to alternate responses with the confederate-
co-actor. The confederate always started first, after which it was the participant’s 
turn. When their target appeared, they simply reached out and touched it and then 
returned their hand to the ‘home’ button located in front of them. The target 
flashed for 100 msec. Three hundred and fifty ms elapsed between response 
completion and the next target occurring. Participants were asked to fixate the 
centre until they were required to make their response, during which they were 
instructed to fixate the target. They were also told that they should respond as 
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quickly and as accurately as possible. Furthermore, they were instructed to ignore 
their partner’s responses.  
In the ‘visible’ condition both the confederate-co-actor and the participant 
performed the same task. This was identical to the ‘hand’ condition, described in 
Experiment 4.  In the ‘non-visible’ condition by contrast, the confederate operated 
a wooden arrow behind a barrier, not allowing any visibility of her actions.  Thus, 
once a target appeared either to the left or the right on the confederate’s turn, she 
moved the arrow to the corresponding end of the apparatus to point at the target 
location. The confederate then returned the arrow to the mid position immediately 
after. The arrow also remained fixated on the central point for the entire duration of 
the trial. A custom program generated a random sequence for the presentation of 
the targets where no target appeared on the same side more than four times in 
succession. The target location factor was presented randomly within block whilst 
the visibility factor was blocked. Two blocks of trials were presented, each 
comprising 209 trials (104 participant trials together with 105 co-actor trials). 
 
Results and Discussion 
  
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis and accounted for 4.1% of responses. Fig 3.4 illustrates the mean 
RTs for the four conditions. An ANOVA with target location (same, different) and 
visibility (visible, non-visible) as within participant factors revealed significant main 
effects of target location, F(1, 23) = 86.3, p < 0.001, partial eta sq = .79, and 
visibility, F(1, 23) = 17.7, p < 0.001, partial eta sq =.44. The interaction was not, 
however, significant, F(1, 23) = 1.57, p > .22. Post-hoc analyses showed that the 
target location effect (i.e., social IOR) was present in both the visible and non-
visible conditions, t(23) = 7.8, p < 0.001, and t(23) = 8.0, p < 0.001, respectively. 
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Fig 3.4 Mean RTs for Experiment 5 as a function of visibility condition and target 
location. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
The first notable aspect of the results of Experiment 5 is that participants were 
slower to initiate a response to the same target location that their co-actor had just 
reached to (in the visible condition). This replicates the basic social IOR findings of 
Welsh et al. (2005; 2007) and Skarratt et al. (2010). Important, however, was the 
observation that the effect also occurred in the non-visible condition in which no co-
actor movements could be seen (and were different) but attentional cues were 
presented. Furthermore, the size of the effect was approximately the same in both 
visibility conditions. Overall, these data show that observing actions is not 
necessary for the effect to occur.  
These findings together with those of Experiment 4 challenge the notion that 
the basic phenomenon is due to mechanisms that represent actions. Rather, it 
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seems that as long as attention is shifted to a particular target location, inhibition of 
return occurs in the observer, thus generating the observed effect. 
3.3 Experiment 6 
 
Experiments 4 and 5 suggested that a direct match between the observed and 
the required-to-perform actions was not needed for the effect to occur. However, 
these experiments do not completely rule out action co-representation as a 
subserving mechanism of the effect. For example, although in the foot and the non-
visible condition, the observed and the required actions did not match 
kinematically, participants might have co-represented the partner’s action 
intention, instead (e.g., Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). For instance, to move to the 
right hand-side as opposed to how exactly the response was performed.  
The aim of the present Experiment 6, therefore, was to directly evaluate the 
contribution of the ‘action’ factor to the effect. Thus, Experiment 6 also tested 
which of the three theories outlined in the Introduction accounts best for the basis 
of social IOR. It should be noted that in the standard social IOR paradigm the 
effects of target location and movement congruency (action type) are confounded 
(Atkinson et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2010; Ondobaka et al., 
2012; Skarratt et al., 2010; Skarratt et al., 2012; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009b, 
etc.). This is because target location and action type can never coincide when co-
actors sit opposite. For example, when co-actors both move to the same target 
location, this always indicates that one of them has executed a leftward movement, 
whereas the other – a rightward one (See Fig 3.1). Thus, it follows that results are 
consistent with both Cole et al.’s and Welsh et al.’s IOR accounts and Ondobaka et 
al.’s action co-representation account.  
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In the author’s view, the only way to effectively isolate the effects of target 
location and movement/action type is to modify the paradigm so that participants 
sit offset, instead of opposite each other (See Fig 3.5). This would create two 
critical conditions that cannot be examined in the standard paradigm – testing the 
social IOR effect when the two co-actors either perform same or different actions.  
It should be noted that the present paradigm is unique in terms of distinguishing 
between these two effects. Even in the single previous research aiming to study 
these in isolation, co-actors sat next to each other, implying that opposite actions 
were executed towards the shared target in the middle, as well as to the two outer 
targets (Welsh et al., 2009; compare the two conditions, represented in Fig 3.5 
with a scenario where co-actors sit next to each other, sharing the middle target). 
 
 
 
Fig 3.5 An illustration of the social IOR paradigm used in Experiment 6. Block 1 
(A), Block 2 (B). Block 3 has not been illustrated as it involved participants sitting 
opposite each other as in the standard procedure. C1 refers to Co-Actor 1, while C2 
- to Co-Actor 2. 
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Fig 3.6 illustrates what is predicted by each of the three competing theories of 
the effect. According to Welsh’s action-location account there should be a 
significant main social IOR effect, as well as a significant main effect of action type 
with longer RTs in the movement congruent condition (Panel A). Welsh et al. 
(2009a) reported the latter in a very similar modification of the social IOR 
paradigm, where, however, participants sat side by side. Second, Cole et al.’s 
attentional shift hypothesis predicts a significant social IOR effect but no effect of 
action type (thus the two lines, representing action type should coincide; Panel B). 
Finally, Ondobaka et al.’s movement congruency account predicts no significant 
main effect of social IOR but only a significant movement congruency effect (Panel 
C).   
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Fig 3.6 The predictions of the three accounts of social IOR. (A) Welsh et al., (2007, 
2009); (B) Cole et al. (2012) and (C) Ondobaka et al. (2012). 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 24 (9 male; 15 female) participants aged between 18 
and 28 (M = 20.25 years, SD = 2.40 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Essex, were right-handed and naïve to 
the purposes of the study. They either received a course credit or £4 for their 
participation.  
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
The stimuli consisted of three plastic boxes, positioned centrally in a row at a 
distance of 500 mm between them (See Fig 3.5). Two white 20 mm x 20 mm 
fixation crosses (one for each participant) were located in between the boxes. Each 
box contained a response button and a light-emitting diode (LED). These served as 
a target and response button for each participant. Moreover, additional 2 boxes, 
equipped with a response button only, were placed at a distance of approximately 
240 mm from the participants’ chests (Fig 3.5). These served as ‘home buttons’ for 
the two co-actors. The distance between the centre of the home position and each 
of the two target boxes was 320 mm. All boxes (100mmx100mmx10mm) were 
placed on the wooden top of a table with dimensions (1400mm (L) x 70mm (W) x 
65mm (H)). PsycoPy software (Peirce, 2009; version 1.80.04) was used for the 
stimulus generation and the recording of the responses. 
Design  
 The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 (action type: 
same, different) fully within-participants design. Table 1 presents all the possible 
conditions, generated by the three experimental blocks. ‘Same target location’ 
referred to a condition where both co-actors moved to the same physical box on 
two consecutive trials. In contrast, ‘same action type’ referred to a condition where 
both co-actors executed the same movement (i.e., both making a leftward 
movement) on two consecutive trials within an egocentric framework.  
Moreover, recall that one of the accounts (Cole et al.’s) advocated that social 
IOR is similar to classic IOR. There is also evidence that inhibition in classic IOR can 
spread to hemifield side, instead of being tight to the exact physical location (e.g., 
Tassinari, Aglioti, Chelazzi, Marzi & Berlucchi, 1987; Tassinari, Aglioti, Chelazzi, 
Peru & Berlucchi, 1994; Berlucchi, Tassinari, Marzi & Di Stefano, 1989). Thus, to 
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test whether social IOR could also spread within the cued hemifield or it is strictly 
location-based, a condition was created (different action/different location 
condition) where on half of the trials the cue11 and target12 appeared in the same 
hemifield and on the other half – in different hemifields (See Table 1 and Fig 3.5 ). 
Still in all other conditions (same action/same location; same action/different 
location; different action/same location), location and hemifield coincided. Thus, 
when location was ‘same’ the cue and target emerged in the same location and 
hemifield but when location was ‘different’, cue and target occurred in different 
locations and different hemifields (See Fig 3.5 and Table 1).  
Procedure  
Two participants sat offset, so that there were two target locations and a 
home position in front of each participant. In Block 1 the pair was seated in such a 
way that the shared location in the middle was on their left and in Block 2 it was on 
their right (See Fig 3.5). In Block 3 participants sat opposite as in the basic social 
IOR paradigm (See Fig 3.1).The experimenter verbally explained the instructions 
after which she demonstrated the procedure.  
One participant’s initial response triggered the target sequence in which each 
participant pair alternated single responses. Participants were instructed to keep 
the home buttons pressed until a response was needed while at the same time 
fixating at the cross opposite them. Then depending on whose turn it was, one of 
the two LEDs in front of them illuminated for 100 ms after which they were required 
to make a response by reaching out and pressing the response button next to the 
LED that flashed. Once they had completed their turn, participants returned their 
                                                          
11
 In line with Cole et al. ‘the cue’ in the present paradigm refers to the response of the 
other participant that the co-actor passively observed on a previous trial.  
12
 In line with Cole et al., ‘the target’ in the present paradigm refers to the participant’s 
flashing LED when it is their turn to act.  
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hand on the home button. The SOA was approximately 1300 ms with an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of 350 ms. Each block consisted of 209 trials, 104 per participant. 
This generated a total of 627 trials. The first trial of each block was not included in 
the analysis since no response preceded it. Participants undertook one practice 
session consisting of 21 trials which was identical to the experimental condition 
they were about to complete. All participants had a full view of the other co-actor 
and their responses. 
 
Table 1 All experimental conditions in Blocks 1, 2 & 3 of Experiment 6. The trial 
conditions where the cue and target appeared in the same hemifield side have been 
printed in bold. 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis. Since Block 1 and Block 2 generated identical conditions, the data 
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from the following conditions (same action/same location; same action/different 
location; different action/different location) represented the average of these two 
blocks. Furthermore, the data from the different action/same location condition was 
taken from Block 3 since this condition was only present in this experimental block 
(See Table 1).  
Mean RTs were computed as a function of target location (same, different) and 
action type (same, different) and were entered into a 2 x 2 fully-within participants 
ANOVA (See Fig 3.7). The main effect of target location was significant (F (1, 23) = 
29.36, p < .001, partial eta sq = .561), confirming the presence of a social IOR 
effect. However, there was no significant main effect of action type (p > .62). 
Importantly, the target location x action type interaction was significant (F (1, 23) 
= 15.04, p > .001, partial eta sq = .395). Planned comparisons indicated that 
social IOR occurred only when co-actors executed the same actions (t (23) = 8.57, 
p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025). Although, the social IOR effect was 
not statistically significant when they made different actions (p > .46), descriptive 
statistics indicated that RTs were still longer when co-actors moved to the same 
location (M = 968.55; SD = 84.61) as compared to the different one (M = 959.93; 
SD = 64.88). Pearson’s correlation tests confirmed that RTs between the three 
experimental blocks were comparable (all ps < .001). Of a particular importance 
was the comparison between the same action/same location condition and the 
different action/same location condition since in both participants responded to the 
same physical location but these were also generated by different set-ups of the 
paradigm. The analysis revealed that RTs in these two conditions were highly 
correlated (r (23) = .73, p< .001).  
Importantly, to test whether the observed interaction was the result of social 
IOR spreading to hemifields, instead of being tight to the physical locations, an 
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additional analysis was performed. The RTs of every participant in the different 
action/different location condition were separated as a function of hemifield (same, 
different). Thus, for example, when in Block 1, C1 went to the right and C2 – to the 
left, both responses occurred in C2’s left hemifield (same hemifield). However, in 
contrast, if in Block 1, C1 went to the left and C2 – to their right, then as it could be 
seen from Fig 3.5, the cue occurred in C2’s left hemifield, however, C2 responded 
to a target in their right hemifield (different hemifields). Thus, this data from Blocks 
1 and 2 was collapsed together and submitted into a paired samples t test. The 
analysis yielded a highly significant effect of hemifield (t (23) = 4.00, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d =. 42, (95% confidence interval of the difference: lower = 14.4, upper = 
45.3), indicating that in the different action/different location condition co-actors 
made significantly slower responses when cue and target appeared on the same 
hemifield side (M = 981.01; SD = 71.96) as compared to the different one (M = 
951.15; SD = 70.27). 
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Fig 3.7 Mean RTs as a function of target location and action type in Experiment 6. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Experiment 6 examined the contribution of action co-representation to the 
effect and which of the three accounts stated in the Introduction provided the most 
plausible explanation of the phenomenon. This was done by disentangling the 
effects of target location and action congruency on the effect. On first glance, the 
present findings did not go in the exact direction, predicted by any of the three 
accounts (compare Fig 3.6 and Fig 3.7). However, a second look at the data 
suggests that these are mostly consistent with Cole et al.’s attentional shift 
hypothesis according to which social IOR is an attentional effect, similar to classic 
IOR. The general finding of Experiment 6 was that a significant social IOR effect 
emerged in the paradigm but no significant main effect of action congruency was 
present. This fits well with the predications of both the action-location account 
(Welsh et al.) and the attentional shift hypothesis (Cole et al.) and goes against 
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Ondobaka et al. who argues that the effect relies on action congruency. Still, the 
finding that social IOR occurred only in the ‘same action’ condition but not when co-
actors executed different actions, suggested that action congruency might modulate 
the magnitude of the present effect. However, the additional analysis examining the 
effect of hemifield side challenges the latter by suggesting that the observed 
interaction was likely to be driven by hemifield side being mixed in the different 
action/different location condition. The found effect of hemifield suggested that 
participants in social IOR might be in fact inhibiting the whole hemifield in which a 
cue appeared, instead of the exact physical location, which fits best with Cole et 
al.’s theory. Furthermore, even if one ignores this latter analysis, the present 
results are still not in line with Welsh et al.’s account that social IOR is due to the 
formation of observation-evoked response codes as the suspected modulation of 
the effect as a consequence of action type did not go in the direction, reported by 
Welsh et al. (2009a).  
All in all, taking into account the findings of Experiments 4 and 5, the present 
results seem to challenge the notion that social IOR is based on action congruency 
and are mostly consistent with Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis.   
 3.4 General Discussion 
 
As outlined in detail in the General Introduction, the general findings of the 
social IOR paradigm fit three alternative explanations. Recall that the slower 
responses to the ‘same’ location, characteristic of the effect  could either stem from 
movement congruency effects (Ondobaka et al.), from an IOR-like inhibition (Cole 
et al.) or from a mixture of the two (Welsh et al.). Following the findings of Chapter 
2 which demonstrated that social IOR and classic IOR share a number of 
similarities, the present Chapter 3 aimed to test the contribution of action co-
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representation to the social IOR effect. Thus, Chapter 3 not only assessed which of 
the three theories provides the most accurate explanation of the effect but also,  it 
indirectly evaluated which of the two terms (i.e., a movement congruency effect or 
social IOR) most appropriately describes the observed phenomenon and as a 
consequence should be used in the following chapters. First, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that the effect occurred even when the observed and the required-
to-perform actions were executed with different effectors. Further, Experiment 5 
showed that RTs to the same location were still longer (i.e., social IOR occurred) 
even when the co-actor’s actual action was fully occluded from view and was 
different from the one that the participant had to execute. Importantly, however, 
social IOR was observed when a participant’s attention was directed to the target 
location via an attentional cue. Finally, the notion that the type of action that co-
actors execute in the paradigm does not play any role in the effect, was supported 
by Experiment 6 where after disentangling the effects of action type and location 
type, only a significant social IOR effect was observed but no movement 
congruency effect emerged.   
Overall these findings do not support an account of the phenomenon based on 
action co-representation and thus they do not fit with the two theories advocating 
that social IOR is either solely (e.g., Ondobaka et al.) or partially based on the 
formation of  observation-evoked response codes (e.g., Welsh et al.). Indeed, there 
is evidence that action observation automatically generates an internal replica of 
that action in the observer’s motor system and that the movement of different 
effectors, such as hands and feet activate different regions of the human ventral 
premotor cortex (e.g., Binkofski & Buccino, 2006; Buccino et al., 2001). Moreover, 
a movement congruency effect is believed to occur because of automatic mapping 
of what has been observed to the individual’s own movement representations in 
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their MNS (e.g., Fadiga et al., 1995). Therefore, action co-representation should 
have been prevented when the observed and the required actions differed 
kinematically (Experiment 4) or when no action was observed (Experiment 5), so 
that no representation of a motoric movement could have been formed and 
integrated into the observer’s motor system. Moreover, the findings of Experiments 
4 and 5 are in line with previous work on the SSE suggesting that the effect might 
not be based on action co-representation. For example, Dolk et al. (2011) found 
that ‘emphasizing the difference between the two actions – or the related effectors 
– leads to a more pronounced SSE’ (p. 4), as opposed to when the integration of 
these two is facilitated (which should result in a bigger SSE if the effect indeed 
depends on co-representation of actions). Furthermore, the findings of the present 
Experiment 6 demonstrated even more categorically that social IOR might not rely 
on the co-representation (or imitation) of action. Thus, when the contribution of 
target location and action type were examined separately, action congruency was 
not found to have any effect on participants’ general RTs. In addition, the identified 
interaction between social IOR and movement congruency was not expected by 
either Welsh et al.’s or Ondobaka et al.’s accounts and therefore is unsupported by 
previous work. For instance, based on Welsh et al. (2009a), the action-location 
hypothesis predicts that co-actors should have in fact been slower to repeat the 
same action (e.g., ‘participants took longer to initiate a movement when that 
movement was in the same direction as the recently observed response than when 
the recently observed response was in a different direction’; Welsh et al., 2009, 
p.67). Moreover, the observed interaction was not predicted by the movement 
congruency account either, as according to it co-actors should have only been 
quicker to imitate an action, identical to the one observed (‘participants were faster 
in the movement-congruent trials than in the movement-incongruent trials’; 
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Ondobaka et al., 2012, p.33). Thus, it seems more plausible that the observed 
interaction was driven by the hemifield side of the cue and target being mixed in 
the different action/different location condition (See Table 1 and Experiment 6). 
Rather, the present findings suggest that the effect is due to IOR induced by 
an attentional shift. Specifically, when a co-actor reaches to a particular area on the 
screen, this shifts an observer’s attention there (Cole et al.’s attentional shift 
hypothesis). Attention is then shifted away from this ‘cued’ position to where the 
co-actor returns their hand. Visuomotor inhibition (i.e., IOR) is subsequently 
generated in the observer for the processing of stimuli that appear at the target 
location. In effect, an observed response acts in the same manner as any other 
visual cue that shifts attention and elicits IOR. Thus, according to Cole et al. the 
role of action is no different than any other sufficiently salient event in the 
paradigm as it only serves to shift the observer’s attention. Moreover, the findings 
of Experiment 6 suggested that the triggered visuomotor inhibition might even 
spread to the inhibited hemifield, instead of being tagged to the particular target 
location. This interpretation is in line with the literature on classic IOR 
demonstrating that the effect could transfer to different locations within the 
inhibited hemifield (e.g., Tassinari et al., 1987, 1994; Berlucchi et al., 1989; 
however, see Abrams & Pratt, 1996; Tipper, Weaver & Watson, 1996; Wright & 
Richard, 1996). The latter proposition, however, needs to be further researched. 
Additionally, the present findings are supported by other published work. For 
example, Skarratt et al. (2010) suggested that even very limited information about 
where the other co-actor was going to respond, was sufficient to generate the 
effect. More recently, Atkinson et al. (2014) found that the observation of the 
partner’s reaching was not necessary to produce social IOR and the effect occurred 
even when participants observed their co-actor merely pointing to the target 
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location (i.e., no reaching was performed). Thus, these suggest that social IOR is 
more similar to an attentional effect and more specifically, to classic IOR.  
The present work has theoretical implications as it also raises the possibility 
that previous work has underestimated the role that attentional orienting plays in 
joint action phenomena. This issue has thus far received little consideration. 
Indeed, it is common for action observation and joint action studies to make no 
reference to attentional orienting, or ‘attention’ at all, (e.g., Atmaca et al., 2008; 
Braun, Ortega, & Wolpert, 2011; Paulus & Moore, 2007; Vesper, van der Wel, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011), including articles that review the field (e.g., Galantucci 
& Sebanz, 2009). One exception was reported by Dolk et al. (2013). They showed 
that the SSE could occur even in the absence of a partner as long as a sufficiently 
salient event shifts attention to where the partner would normally respond. 
Although this shift is believed to initiate a different process to the one proposed for 
the present paradigm, i.e., a spatial coding of event features as opposed to IOR, 
attentional orienting is also central to Dolk et al.’s explanation. Indeed, Dolk, 
Hommel, Colzato, Schütz-Bosbach, Prinz and Liepelt (2014) have gone on to 
suggest that ‘neither the integration of another person nor the integration of 
another person’s action into one’s own action, task, or body representation is 
necessary for the [Joint Simon Effect] to occur’ (p.5). This is however, not to say 
that models advocating shared action representations exclude attentional processes 
initiated by an action performed by another individual. Nor do attentional models 
rule out the possibility that attentional attraction leads to co-representation. For 
instance, attention, along with perception and intention, is very much part of the 
TEC (Hommel et al., 2001). The issue however is whether action co-representation 
is required at all for some joint action effects. It does appear that it is not 
necessary for two such effects to occur, i.e., the SSE and social IOR. Still, it should 
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be noted that the latter does not by any means suggest that attention plays a role 
in, and/or explains all action observation effects. 
In sum, in a series of experiments Chapter 3 tested the contribution of action 
co-representation to the present effect. The results of Experiments 4 and 5 
suggested that social IOR is a robust phenomenon, not influenced by the extent to 
which the observed and the required actions matched. Thus, the magnitude of the 
effect stayed unchanged regardless of the type of response effectors used; whether 
the partner’s action was visible or whether it was identical to the one that had to be 
executed. Finally, Experiment 6 further supported the notion that action co-
representation does not seem to induce the present effect. These findings are best 
placed within Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis according to which, similarly 
to IOR, social IOR occurs as a consequence of the co-actors’ attention being shifted 
by a sufficiently salient event in the paradigm. Still, to further assess the 
robustness of the present effect and to more confidently rule out the action co-
representation account as an explanation of the phenomenon, one should also test 
the socialness of the effect as the extent to which co-actors integrate the other’s 
perspective in other joint-action effects has been known to vary depending on 
social factors. Thus, the following Chapter 4 explored how the presence or absence 
of a biological co-actor influenced the magnitude of the social IOR effect.    
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 HOW SOCIAL IS SOCIAL IOR? 
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As outlined in detail in Section 1.2 of the General Introduction, joint-action 
work has indicated that performing a task with another biological co-actor uniquely  
influences one’s performance on the task (e.g., Atmaca et al., 2008; Atmaca, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Liepelt, Stenzel & Lappe, 2012; Sebanz et al., 2003, 
2006; Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2005, etc.) and that only human movement 
kinematics are discrete enough to be mapped onto the observer’s motor system 
(e.g., Kilner et al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008; Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005).  
Furthermore, according to many action co-representation proponents (e.g., 
Atmaca et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2012), even simply 
believing that another individual is also participating in the task, is sufficient to 
induce task co-representation (i.e., participants are likely to represent and 
integrate the other’s action plans even though there is no visible co-actor present). 
For instance, in one such study a single co-actor participated in a SSE paradigm 
while they either believed that they were performing the task with the computer or 
with another biological co-actor, placed in a different room (Tsai et al., 2008). 
However, in both cases, the partner’s responses were randomly generated by the 
computer program. Still, both neuropsychological and behavioural data revealed 
that when participants believed that a biological co-actor was operating the 
responses, this modulated their action planning, resulting in a significant SSE. 
Moreover, Tsai et al. (2008) concluded that ‘the co-representation of human action 
may be an evolved biologically tuned default of the human motor system’ (p. 2015) 
and that ‘the lack of compatibility with inanimate co-actors may result in failure to 
submit their motor behavior to mapping from our experiential motor repertoire, as 
reflected in brain activity’ (p. 2023). Thus, according to the action co-
representation account, joint-action effects are inherently social. As a consequence, 
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these should not occur if no biological movement is present nor has the observed 
action been perceived as stemming from the intentionality of another’s actions 
(Kilner et al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008; Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005). Finally, the extent to which co-actors integrate and represent each other’s 
actions seems to be sensitive to social factors, such as the co-actors’ affect and 
type of affiliation during the interaction (e.g., Kuhbandner et al., 2010; Hommel et 
al., 2009).  
At the same time recent findings into the socialness of joint-action effects 
have emerged to suggest that the SSE might in fact not be as ‘social’ in nature as 
predicted by the action co-representation account. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile 
how the effect emerges even when no online visual or auditory feedback about the 
partner has been made available (e.g., Vlainic et al., 2010). Furthermore, Dolk and 
colleagues showed that no partner was required for a SSE-like effect to occur (i.e., 
Dolk et al., 2011, 2013). In a modified version of the task, involving the rubber 
hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), Dolk et al. (2011) demonstrated that the 
SSE increased when there was a greater difference between the actions of the two 
co-actors. However, the opposite would be expected if automatic action co-
representation was driving the phenomenon, as suggested by Sebanz et al. (2003, 
2005). In addition, the SSE was found even when the partner was not actively 
involved in the task and most importantly – when there was no partner at all, only 
the stroking device, used for the rubber hand illusion, was in operation. In a follow-
up paper, Dolk and collaborators (2013) again demonstrated that the presence of a 
social co-actor might not in fact be necessary for the effect to occur. In a series of 
experiments, a SSE was still observed when different attention-capturing events 
replaced the co-actor. For instance, in one experiment participants performed the 
task alongside objects which possessed no biological features, such as a clock or a 
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metronome. Dolk et al. (2011, 2013) explained the results with a more bottom-up 
approach, known as the referential coding account (Hommel, 1993). According to 
it, as stimuli are spatially coded in reference to other events that are either 
voluntarily attended to or salient enough to attract attention, the alternative 
response location in the SSE condition is likely to have been coded in reference to 
the person, but also any salient object or event that occurs there.  
This line of research leaves open the possibility that other joint-action effects 
might also be less social than previously thought. As explained in detail in the 
previous chapters, the present social IOR task is identical to the joint-action 
paradigm, employed by Ondobaka et al. (2012) who explains the effect with 
movement congruency. Although the findings of Chapters 1 and 2 have already 
suggested that the effect of interest is more likely to stem from bottom-up 
processes, rather than motor facilitation/interference, as submitted by Ondobaka et 
al. (2012), examining its socialness will provide further support for one of the 
accounts. Thus, if the observed effect does not stem from action co-representation, 
it is possible that it still occurs irrespective of whether a co-actor performs the task 
with a biological partner or simply another salient event shifts the co-actor’s focus. 
This is in fact the prediction of the attentional shift hypothesis (Cole et al.) which is 
one of the accounts aiming to explain the phenomenon. As outlined in detail in 
Chapter 3, according to this account, social IOR is subserved by a perceptuo-
attentional inhibition to return one’s attentional focus and/or respond to an area in 
the visual scene to which another individual has previously responded to. However, 
as Cole et al. have proposed that the effect is similar to IOR, social IOR is still 
expected to occur even if another event (as long as it is salient enough) replaces 
the biological co-actor. Indeed, a previous study that has examined the latter in an 
identical paradigm found a significant effect when participants alternated responses 
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with an animated co-actor, although Skarratt et al. (2010) gave a different 
interpretation of the found effect13.  
The aim of Chapter 4 was to investigate the socialness of the present effect by 
assessing how the partner’s presence and behaviour impact its magnitude. For this 
purpose, the standard social IOR/movement-congruency paradigm, commonly 
employed in research was used (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2012; 
Hayes et al., 2010; Ondobaka et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2013; Skarratt et al., 2010; 
Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009b). As explained previously, in the basic procedure, 
two participants sit opposite each other across a table (that incorporates a flat 
touch screen monitor) and take turns to reach out and touch one of two targets 
that appear on either the left or right hand side of the workspace (as shown on Fig 
4.1). As mentioned in the General Introduction (Section 1.2.4) and Chapters 1 and 
2, typically RTs are longer when participants have to repeat the location that their 
partner went to on a previous trial as compared to responding to a novel location. 
These findings, however, also concur with the movement-congruency explanation, 
according to which RTs are actually longer when a participant’s target position 
requires them to make the same reaching action as the one their co-actor just 
performed. Thus, for instance, if Participant A reaches to their right, Participant B 
will be slower to reach to their own left (See Chapter 3 for more detail on the three 
competing accounts of the effect). Importantly, for the purposes of clarity, the 
observed effect was referred to as a social IOR effect throughout the chapter. A 
total of three experiments evaluated the importance of a biological co-actor to the 
effect. First, in two variants, Experiment 7 tested whether the valence of the 
relationship between the two co-actors modulated the magnitude of the social IOR 
                                                          
13 As participants had a full view of the animated co-actor, Skarratt et al. (2010) interpreted 
the findings as indicative of classic IOR only (that latter interpretation has been discussed in 
detail in the General Discussion section).  
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effect. Finally, Experiments 8 and 9 tested its socialness by examining whether the 
presence of another person was even necessary to induce it.  
4.1 Experiment 7 
 
Experiment 7 examined whether the effect is modulated by higher level 
mechanisms that represent relations between co-actors. As discussed in the 
Introduction, SSE research has suggested that higher-order factors such as the 
personal relationship between the two co-actors have been found to affect the 
extent to which each represents the other’s task rules. For instance, Hommel et al. 
(2009) found that a SSE was present only when there was a positive relationship 
between the two partners and disappeared when participants were partnered with a 
negative confederate. Furthermore, a similar study indicated that the SSE was also 
influenced by one’s mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010) such that it was present when 
a positive mood had been induced in participants but disappeared if the task 
followed negative affect induction. Indeed, early social psychology research has 
indicated that individuals are less likely to integrate the perspective and ideas of a 
person they dislike (Heider, 1958) and that liking another person decreases the 
self-other distinction (Aron et al., 1991). Experiment 7 aimed to test whether the 
present effect is also sensitive to social factors. First, in Experiment 7a, social IOR 
was compared between participants who either completed the task with their 
romantic partner or with a stranger. Second, based on Hommel et al. (2009), 
participants in Experiment 7b alternated responses with a co-actor who either acted 
in a positive or a negative manner towards them. 
Experiment 7a 
 
In Experiment 7a half of the participants performed the task with their 
romantic partner whilst the other half did so with a stranger. 
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Method 
Ethics Statement 
Ethical approval from the ethics committee of the University of Essex was 
obtained prior to commencement of all experiments. All participants gave their 
written informed consent to take part in this research. 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 24 (12 male; 12 female) participants aged between 18 
and 32 (M = 21.46 years, SD = 2.87 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Essex who participated in exchange for 
£3. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli in Experiment 7a and 7b were identical. These were displayed on a 
19.5-inch LCD touch-screen monitor built flat into a table, raised 74 cm from the 
floor. They were presented against a uniform white background (74.6 cd/m2). The 
two participants sat facing one another such that the distance between their chests 
and their ‘home buttons’ was approximately 160 mm (See Fig 4.1). The four 
stimulus locations were denoted by 4 black squares (19.6 mm2 each) which acted 
as placeholders, and remained present for the entire trial duration. Two 
placeholders (1 to the left, 1 to the right), located at a distance of 160 mm from 
the black fixation cross and protruding 50 mm to the left and to the right of the 
screen midline were displayed in front of each participant. The distance between 
the left and the right placeholder was 320 mm. The squares were placed within a 
light-grey area, covering 200 mm2 of the screen. On each trial, one of them 
illuminated by turning white (74.6 cd/m2). Participants made their responses by 
releasing the ‘home’ button and touching the square that had illuminated. A RM 
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Pentium PC custom software was used for the stimulus generation and the 
recording of the responses.  
 
Fig 4.1 An illustration of the standard condition in the social IOR/movement 
congruency paradigm used in Experiments 7, 8 and 9. Each person takes turns to 
reach out and touch one of two targets presented on the left or right. In the figure 
shown, one person is reaching to their right where the target has illuminated. 
 
Design  
The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 (partner: 
romantic partner, stranger) mixed participants design. The dependent variable in all 
experiments was the time that elapsed between target presentation and the screen 
touch (response time, RT).  
Procedure 
The standard social IOR/movement congruency procedure, described 
previously was followed. As explained earlier in this experiment, half of the 
participants carried out the task with their romantic partner, while the other half 
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performed with a stranger as in the standard procedure. All participant pairs were 
tested individually in a quiet cubicle with no external windows. 
One participant’s initial response triggered the target sequence in which each 
participant pair alternated single responses. Participants were instructed to keep 
the home buttons pressed until a response was needed, while at the same time 
fixating at the cross in the centre of the screen. Then they were required to reach 
out with their right hand and touch the target location which illuminated for 100 
ms. All trials had an inter-trial interval of 350 ms and a stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) of approximately 1200 ms. Participants performed two experimental blocks 
of 209 trials (i.e., 104 per participant plus the first trial which was not analysed 
since no response preceded it). They always used their right hand to make the 
responses. The first trial of each block was not analysed since no response 
preceded it. Participants undertook one practice session consisting of 21 trials 
which had the same SOA as the first experimental condition they completed. They 
were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. The task was 
completed under full viewing conditions so that participants could fully see their 
partner’s flashing targets and reaching responses.  
Results and Discussion 
 
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis. The data was entered into a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with target 
location (same, different) as a within-participants factor and partner type 
(romantic, stranger) as a between-participants factor (See Fig 4.2). The main effect 
of target location was significant (F (1, 22) = 37.23, p < .001, partial eta sq = 
.629), confirming the presence of social IOR. Additionally, there was a significant 
main effect of partner type (F (1, 22) = 14.54, p < .001, partial eta sq = .398), 
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such that participants performing the task with a romantic partner were faster 
compared to those performing with a stranger. Although the partner type x target 
location interaction did not reach statistical significance (ps > .273), follow-up 
analysis of the simple effect of social IOR at each level of partner type were carried 
out for maximum transparency. These indicated a significant social IOR effect both 
when participants alternated responses with their romantic partner (t (11) = 5.63, 
p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) and when with a stranger (t (11) = 
4.03, p < .002, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025).  
 
 
Fig 4.2 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of partner type and target 
location. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
The results of Experiment 7a revealed that social IOR emerged in both 
conditions, suggesting that the presence of a romantic partner made no difference 
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to the effect. These results are in line with the findings of the present Chapters 2 
and 3, demonstrating once again the robustness of the effect. Moreover, these 
indicate that the present phenomenon does not seem to be influenced by higher-
order factors such as the social affiliation between the two co-actors. This in turn 
suggests that the present effect is probably not subserved by shared task co-
representations like other joint-action effects have been reported to be (e.g., 
Hommel et al., 2009). 
At the same time, the present experiment revealed that partner type affected 
participants’ general RT performance – those paired with their romantic partner 
were significantly quicker than those performing with a stranger. To speculate, this 
significant main effect could be due to the fact that participants acting with their 
romantic partner experienced an elevated positive affect during the task. This is 
likely to have been the case not only because they felt more comfortable with the 
partner but also because their romantic partner was more likely to engage in a 
behaviour, known to induce positive emotion (e.g., smiling; Kraut & Johnston, 
1979, giving supportive comments; Lambert et al., 2013; etc.) as compared to a 
stranger. Positive affect, in turn is known to trigger an increased release of 
dopamine in the brain which beneficially affects a number of cognitive functions 
(e.g., Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999). Thus, people generally perform better when in 
a positive mood.  
Experiment 7b 
 
Experiment 7b aimed to further test how the valence of the relationship 
between the two co-actors influences the social IOR effect. Taking into account that 
participants in the standard procedure are usually strangers, Experiment 7b aimed 
to provide a more robust measure of whether the affiliation between the two 
partners modulates the effect. This study was a direct replication of Hommel et al. 
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(2009)14 in which half of the participants were involved in a positive relationship 
with their co-actor during the task, while the other half – in a negative relationship.  
Moreover, to evaluate whether type of viewing condition makes any difference to 
the social IOR effect, this second experiment was performed under partial viewing 
conditions (a physical barrier was placed between the two co-actors), as 
recommended by earlier research (e.g., Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2007).   
Method 
Participants 
 
A volunteer sample of 24 (9 male; 15 female) participants aged between 18 
and 28 (M = 20.38 years, SD = 3.87 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Essex who participated in exchange for 
£3. 
Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment had a 2 (target location: same, different) x 2 (partner: 
positive, negative) mixed participants design. Participants completed 2 blocks of 
209 trials. All other aspects were as described previously. Based on Hommel et al. 
(2009), half of the participants were confronted with an exceptionally nice 
confederate (positive condition) whereas the other half with a more distant and 
critical one (negative condition)15. The author acted as the confederate in both 
valence conditions. This began at the start of the experimental session, with the 
‘positive’ confederate greeting the participant and initiating a friendly conversation, 
and smiling throughout the experiment. At the same points in the negative 
                                                          
14 With the only difference that performance on the social IOR effect, instead of the SSE was 
tested. 
15 There is clearly an inherent difficulty in manipulating and operationalising (i.e., acting out) 
what is essentially a personality variable. We therefore based this aspect of our procedure 
on Hommel et al. (2009) who partly manipulated positive/negative interaction via a number 
of set phrases. 
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condition, the confederate was more distant, indifferent yet still polite. She also 
greeted the participant, yet did not smile at them, or initiate an informal 
conversation before the start of the experiment. Regardless of confederate type, a 
set of fixed phrases were used as feedback to the participant during the 
experiment. The confederate gave feedback to the participant on only two 
occasions – once they had completed the practice session and after the first 
experimental block. The wording of the phrases used in the positive and negative 
condition was very similar and the feedback was delivered only while the 
confederate was looking at the participant’s data. Thus, in the positive condition 
after the practice block, the confederate used the phrases: ‘You were very quick’ 
and ‘You didn’t make any mistakes’ and confirmed this after the first experimental 
block by saying: ‘You were again very quick’ and ‘You didn’t make any mistakes’. 
By contrast, in the negative condition the confederate used: ‘I’m afraid you were 
not quick enough’ and ‘You made several mistakes’ and confirmed this with the 
statements: ‘You were still not very quick’ and ‘You again made some mistakes’ 
after the end of the first experimental block. Although it was not expected that the 
negative condition would cause emotional discomfort in participants, their 
emotional reactions were monitored, so that the experiment could be stopped 
immediately if any signs of significant  distress were noticed. 
 Based on Hommel et al. (2009), participants’ subjective feelings of happiness, 
anxiety, nervousness, irritation and insecurity were informally assessed. 
Participants were also orally debriefed. A physical barrier was placed between the 
two co-actors, allowing only a central strip of their partners’ eyes and hand when it 
was resting on the ‘home’ button (See the Method sections of the experiments in 
Chapter 2). 
122 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As previously described, outliers (2SDs) were removed. The data were entered 
into a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with target location (same, different) as a within-
participants factor and partner type (positive, negative) as a between-participants 
factor (See Fig 4.2). The main effect of target location was significant, (F (1, 22) = 
5.28, p < .031, partial eta sq = .19), confirming the presence of social IOR. 
However, neither the effect of partner, nor the partner x target location interaction 
were significant (ps > 0.74). Still, to be more stringent, planned follow-up 
comparisons were performed to examine whether social IOR emerged in the two 
partner conditions. Interestingly, these revealed a significant effect in the negative 
partner condition (t (11) = 2.74, p < .02, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) but 
not in the positive partner condition (t (11) = 0.41, p < .687, Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha = .025). 
 
Fig 4.3 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of partner type and target 
location. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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The results of Experiment 7b replicated those of Experiment 7a by revealing 
that social IOR occurred irrespective of co-actor condition (i.e., a significant main 
social IOR effect emerged). Indeed, statistically, the effect was comparable in both 
partner conditions as the target location by partner type interaction did not reach 
significance. However, even a more conservative interpretation of the results (i.e., 
exploring the simple main effects) yields the opposite of what would be expected if 
action co-representation subserved the present effect – social IOR should have 
emerged in the positive, rather than the negative partner condition, as individuals 
are known to normally integrate the perspective of people they like (Heider, 1958; 
Hommel et al., 2009). Thus, these findings suggest that unlike the SSE, social IOR 
is not influenced by higher-order factors such as the social affiliation between the 
two co-actors or the participant’s affect during the task.  
Finally, in Experiment 7b type of partner did not significantly affect 
participants’ general response speed as in Experiment 7a. However, this might be 
due to both the positive and the negative condition producing comparable effects 
on general RT performance through different routes. Thus, while participants in the 
positive partner condition performed well because they presumably experienced 
increased levels of positive affect (Andersen & Chen, 2002), those in the negative 
condition probably wanted to improve their performance as they were receiving 
negative feedback (‘participants took the speed-related comments of the 
confederate to heart’, Hommel et al., 2009, p.797). In support, the tendency in 
general RTs was similar to that reported by Hommel et al. (2009) who found that 
individuals in the negative condition responded more quickly. Finally, we consider 
the present partner type manipulation successful since virtually all participants in 
the negative condition reported feelings of irritation in the post-experimental 
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interviews. In contrast, participants in the positive condition reported feelings of 
happiness, security and satisfaction. 
4.2 Experiment 8 
 
The results of Experiment 7 suggested that the valence of the relationship 
between the two co-actors does not modulate social IOR. To assess whether the 
presence of a co-actor is even necessary for the effect to occur, Experiment 8 
directly tested the socialness of the present social IOR/movement congruency effect 
by incorporating a condition where participants performed the task, alone, with no 
co-actor present, as in Dolk et al. (2013). 
Method 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 26 (9 male; 17 female) participants aged between 19 
and 35 (M = 22.16 years, SD = 3.91 years) took part in the study. All were 
undergraduates at the University of Essex, were right-handed, and naïve to the 
purposes of the study. They received £4 for their participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 The apparatus and stimuli were identical to the ones used in Experiments 7a 
and 7b. 
Design and Procedure 
     The design was a 2 x 2 fully within-participants design. The two factors that 
were manipulated were target location (same, different) and co-actor’s presence 
(present, absent).  
The procedure in the co-actor-present condition was identical to one of the 
standard social IOR procedure where two naïve participants were tested 
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simultaneously (as in the stranger condition of Experiment 7a). In the co-actor-
absent condition, however, only one of the participants was tested at a time, while 
the other was waiting with the experimenter. The participant’s initial response 
triggered the target sequence in which the participant reached out and touched the 
target location, as in the co-actor-present condition; however, on the partner’s trial 
they only saw a target illumination for 100 ms, appearing either in the left or the 
right response location. Each participant took part in two experimental blocks, i.e., 
the co-actor-present and absent conditions (209 trials in a block, 104 per person 
plus the first trial which was not analysed). The presentation order of the two 
blocks was counterbalanced. Similarly to Experiment 7a, participants had a full view 
of their partner and targets. Participants first watched a demonstration by the 
experimenter and completed a 21-trial practice session. They were instructed to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.  
Results and Discussion 
 
As before, RT outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were 
removed prior to the analyses. Mean RTs were computed as a function of target 
location (same, different) and partner (present, absent) and entered into a 2 x 2 
fully-within participants ANOVA (See Fig 4.4). The main effect of co-actor was 
significant (F (1, 25) = 7.89, p < .01, partial eta sq = .240). Thus, RTs were 
shorter when the participant performed with a co-actor than when they were 
responding alone. The main effect of social IOR was also significant (F (1, 25) = 
14.70, p < .001, partial eta sq = .370). Finally, the interaction between target 
location and partner just missed statistical significance (F (1, 25) = 3.91, p < .059, 
partial eta sq = .135). Still, to be more stringent, planned follow-up comparisons 
were performed to examine whether the effect was present in both partner 
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conditions. These revealed a significant effect in the co-actor-present condition (t 
(25) = 5.24, p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) but not in the co-actor-
absent one (t (25) = 1.53, p < .138, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025). Finally, 
there was a significant positive correlation between participants’ performance when 
acting alone and when with a partner (r (24) = .60, p < .001). 
 
Fig 4.4 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of partner and target location in 
Experiment 8. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
The main findings of Experiment 8 are consistent with previous studies on the 
social IOR/the movement congruency effect as they indicated that co-actors were 
significantly quicker to initiate an action to the different location (i.e., initiating a 
movement congruent action). Moreover, the significant main effect of partner 
condition on participants’ general RT is in line with previous work suggesting that 
observing a biological movement biases one’s timing of movement execution (e.g., 
Kaneko & Murakami, 2009; Watanabe, 2008). Furthermore, the partner by social 
IOR interaction just missed statistical significance, meaning that statistically there 
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was no difference in social IOR between the partner-present and the partner-absent 
condition. However, for maximum transparency, further analyses were carried out 
which revealed that the effect disappeared in the partner-absent condition. 
 There are two possible explanations for the latter. One is that an internal 
replica of the action could not have been generated in the observer’s motor system 
because there was no biological action present (Buccino et al., 2001; Sebanz et al., 
2003, 2005). However, alternatively, the target illuminations in Experiment 8 might 
have not been salient enough to attract attention and induce social IOR in the 
partner-absent condition. In support, a recent selective attention study showed that 
‘the probability of a planned saccade being inhibited increases logarithmically with 
the size of the distractor’ and that the effect is larger when distractors appear at a 
different hand-side from an egocentric perspective (Buonocore & McIntosh, 2012, 
p.32). In sum, strictly speaking, in the present Experiment 8 no social IOR effect 
emerged in response to the sole observation of target illuminations in the absence 
of a partner.   
Therefore, in Experiment 9 more salient attention-capturing transients were 
introduced in the partner-absent condition.  
 
4.3 Experiment 9 
 
The purpose of Experiment 9 was similar to that of Experiment 8 since it also 
assessed the socialness of the effect. However, this time a more abrupt attention-
capturing event was presented to test whether attentional capture was sufficient to 
induce the present effect. Thus, in Experiment 9, where the partner would normally 
respond, attention-capturing cues, mimicking a hand movement, moved across the 
display to the target (see Fig 4.5).  
128 
 
 
 
Fig 4.5 Trial sequence in Experiment 9. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 20 (7 male; 13 female) participants aged between 19 
and 32 (M = 22.50 years, SD = 3.17 years) took part in the study. All were 
undergraduates at the University of Essex, were right-handed, and naïve to the 
purposes of the study. They received £4 for their participation. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The apparatus was as reported previously. The black rectangular transients in 
the partner-absent condition had an area of 270 mm2. They were either displayed 
40 mm to the left or 40 mm to the right of the screen midline, depending on which 
target location had illuminated on the partner’s side of the table. 
Design and Procedure 
     The experiment employed a 2 x 2 fully within-participants design. As in 
Experiment 8 the two factors manipulated were the presence of a partner (present, 
absent) and target location (same, different). A ‘same location’ of response in the 
partner-absent condition referred to a situation in which, the participant acted on a 
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location to which the attention-capturing cues had also just ‘moved’, while a 
‘different location’ was a condition where the participant responded to the opposite 
location to which the attention-capturing cues moved on a previous trial. 
The procedure of the partner-present condition was identical to the one of the 
partner-present condition in Experiment 8. Similarly, in the partner-absent 
condition, only one of the participants in a pair was tested at a time, while the 
other was waiting with the experimenter. However, rather than only observing the 
partner’s target illuminations as in Experiment 8, participants in this condition also 
saw a sequence of 4 black rectangular transients moving towards and covering the 
target (See Fig 4.5). The first transient was displayed 100 ms after one of the 
target locations had illuminated. Every new transient appeared for 75 ms and then 
once the fourth transient reached and covered the target location, they began 
disappearing at 75 ms-intervals following a backward sequence. As in Experiment 
8, each participant took part in two experimental blocks, i.e., the partner-present 
and absent conditions (209 trials in a block, 104 per person plus the first trial which 
was not analysed). They always had a full view of their partner/rectangular 
transients, their targets and their responses. Participants first watched a 
demonstration by the experimenter and completed a 21-trial practice session. They 
were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.  
Results and Discussion 
 
Any RT outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed 
prior to the analyses. As in Experiment 8, mean RTs were computed as a function 
of target location (same, different) and partner condition (present, absent) and 
entered into a 2 x 2 fully-within participants ANOVA (See Fig 4.6). The main effect 
of partner was significant (F (1, 19) = 5.65, p < .03, partial eta sq = .229). Thus, 
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RTs were shorter when the participant performed with a co-actor than when they 
were responding alone. The main effect of target location was also significant (F (1, 
19) = 36.44, p < .001, partial eta sq = .657) confirming the presence of social IOR. 
Finally, there was a significant target location x partner interaction (F (1, 19) = 
7.89, p < .01, partial eta sq = .293). Planned follow-up comparisons revealed that 
this time the social IOR effect was present in both the co-actor-present (t (19) = 
4.66, p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) and the co-actor-absent 
conditions (t (19) = 4.67, p < .001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025). Thus, 
essentially the interaction was driven by the significant difference in making a 
response to the same location when alone and when with a partner (t (19) = 3.00, 
p < .007, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025; See Fig 4.6). There was no such 
difference between the two partner conditions when targets appeared in different 
locations (p > .115). Additionally, there was no significant difference in within-
participants’ variability in RT as a function of condition (Fs (1, 19) > 0.03, ps > 
.722). Moreover, although this analysis also revealed a significant target location by 
partner interaction (F (1, 19) = 10.29, p < .005, partial eta sq = .351), none of the 
simple main effects was significant.  
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Fig 4.6 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of target location and partner 
condition in Experiment 9. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
The results of Experiment 9 confirmed the presence of social IOR even in the 
absence of a biological partner. The only difference with the previous Experiment 8 
was the introduction of more salient attention-capturing transients which resulted in 
a significant social IOR effect even in the partner-absent condition. Thus, it seems 
that these transients had a similar effect to the arm/hand movement in the 
standard social IOR procedure. Presumably, their abrupt onset induced visuomotor 
inhibition (in participants) to the target location where the transients have occurred 
(Cole et al.). Indeed, it has been previously reported that transients of a bigger size 
as well as stimuli with abrupt visual onsets capture attention more easily (e.g., 
Buonocore & McIntosh, 2012 and Cole & Kuhn, 2009; Cole & Kuhn, 2010; Ruz & 
Lupianez, 2002 and Yantis & Jonides, 1984, respectively). Finally, the partner 
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condition influenced general RT speed in a similar fashion as reported in Experiment 
8.  
Taking together the present findings with those of Experiment 8, there are 
grounds to assume that the present effect is fairly robust and can occur in the 
complete absence of a biological partner, as long as a salient event such as 
abruptly moving exogenous cues has been introduced in the paradigm.  
4.4 General Discussion 
 
Recent body of work has started to challenge the socialness of some joint-
action effects. For example, as mentioned in the Introduction, Dolk et al. (2011, 
2013) showed that the SSE can be generated with no partner present. Chapter 4 
aimed to assess the impact and importance of a biological partner in the social IOR 
paradigm, which has also been used to test a variant of the movement congruency 
effect. First, the two versions of Experiment 7 indicated that a significant effect 
emerged, irrespective of the relationship between the two co-actors, regardless of 
whether the task was performed under full or partial viewing conditions.  Moreover, 
although the findings of Experiment 8 were ambiguous, Experiment 9 confirmed the 
notion that the presence of a biological partner is not necessary for the effect to 
emerge. Taken together, the present results suggest that the effect of interest is 
not likely to be social in nature. Moreover, these fit well with what was found in the 
previous two chapters as the present findings also suggest that the phenomenon is 
more likely to stem from inhibition of return processes, rather than from direct 
matching between the observed and the required actions.  
These findings clearly do not support an explanation of the present 
phenomenon based on action co-representation as previous research has suggested 
that social factors modulate joint-action effects in a top-down manner. Thus, for 
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example, in contrast to what was found in Experiment 7, the congruency effect has 
been reported to increase when participants have been primed with pro-social cues 
(Leighton, Bird, Orsini & Heyes, 2010) and that on the other hand, behavioural 
mimicry enhances the affiliation and rapport between co-actors (e.g., Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). Furthermore, under different experimental settings, both 
Hommel et al. (2009) and Iani et al. (2011)16 demonstrated that the SSE was 
sensitive to the relationship between the two task-partners as the effect was 
abolished when there was a negative interdependence between them. Finally, some 
have even reported that when two individuals share a task, the joint-action effect 
disappears when the visual access to the other’s stimuli has been disrupted 
(Böckler et al., 2012, Experiment 3). The latter is clearly in a stark contrast to what 
was found in the present Experiments 8 and 9 where the effect of interest occurred 
even in the absence of a biological co-actor.  
 In this line, the present findings can be placed within the context of other 
work challenging the notion that action co-representation, via the observer’s motor 
system, drives joint-action phenomena. For instance, Vlainic et al. (2010) showed 
that neither visual nor auditory information about the partner’s actions was 
required for the SSE to occur while Dolk et al. (2011, 2013) obtained the effect 
even in the absence of a biological partner. Moreover, directly relevant to the 
present study, in a recent motor priming paradigm, Liepelt and Brass (2010) found 
that when participants observed either a human or wooden hand executing an 
action, a significant congruency effect occurred in both the animate and the 
inanimate agent conditions17. Consequently, newer theories, challenging the action 
co-representation account have started to emerge. For example, advocates of the 
                                                          
16 Iani, Anelli, Nicoletti, Arcuri and Rubichi (2011). 
17 Liepelt and Brass (2010) reported a significant SSE in both conditions, even though it was 
of a smaller magnitude in the wooden hand condition. 
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referential coding account have recently argued that the perception of the other’s 
agency (identifying the causal source of an action), rather than intentionality (the 
attribution of agency) drives joint action (Stenzel et al., 2014). Thus, as long as the 
causal source of the action has been identified (being it a biological co-actor, an 
event or an object), a joint-action effect should occur. Furthermore, another 
alternative theory to the action co-representation account is the Coordination 
Dynamics Approach. According to it, the vital component for such effects is the 
emergent interpersonal motor coordination rather than the mental simulation of the 
observed action (Fine & Amazeen, 2011; Fine et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2009; 
Romero, Coey, Schmidt & Richardson, 2012). Moreover, when considering the 
interference in movement congruency paradigms, the proponents of this account 
suggest that rather than being indicative of ‘error’ the motor system represents the 
necessary compensatory changes to ensure coordination across unequal kinematic 
requirements (Richardson et al., 2009). In support, Fine et al. (2013) manipulated 
the spatial congruence between the participant and the confederate (i.e., whether 
they made horizontal or vertical movements) and the anatomical congruence (i.e., 
whether they were facing one another or the confederate was rotated at 90o). The 
results showed that anatomical incongruence did not create interference, 
suggesting that coordinating actions with the actor did not depend on the 
simulation of postural-based motor representations.  
Therefore, rather than action co-representation, the results of the present 
Chapter 4 seem to better fit with the alternative, social IOR explanation of the 
effect (Cole et al., 2012). As explained in the previous chapters, according to this 
attentional shift hypothesis, a partner’s reaching action shifts the observer’s 
attention to the location of the response. Then, when the partner returns their 
hand, the observer’s attention is shifted back to the centre of the display. 
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Consequently, when a target appears at the responded-to location, participants 
inhibit the stimulus and/or response to that position. In line with this account, the 
personal relationship between the two co-actors should not influence the effect, as 
found in Experiments 7a and 7b. Moreover, this ‘social IOR’ account predicts that 
any transient event that shifts the observer’s attention will generate visuomotor 
inhibition at that location, including for instance, flashing transients as in the 
current Experiments 8 and 9. Along the same lines, the visual transients in 
Experiment 9 are likely to have attracted the observer’s attention more easily than 
the ones in Experiment 8 because of their size and abrupt motion (Buonocore & 
McIntosh, 2012 and Cole & Kuhn, 2009; Cole & Kuhn, 2010; Ruz & Lupianez, 2002 
and Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Thus, although moving transients replaced the 
biological partner in Experiment 9, what may be important is the introduction of an 
event that is salient enough to produce an attentional shift to that location. This 
explains why the effect occurs even when the partner’s targets and final part of the 
response (i.e., arm reach) are occluded from view – the actor’s hand movement 
and gaze shift are enough to direct the observer’s attention to that direction 
(Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2007).  
However, still, not all aspects of the present findings agree with previous 
social IOR research. For example, one of the first papers on social IOR examined 
the socialness of the effect by either making participants alternate responses with a 
real or an animated co-actor (Skarratt et al., 2010). It was found that when 
performing with a biological partner, the effect occurred both during the full and the 
restricted viewing conditions. However, social IOR only emerged during unrestricted 
viewing conditions (i.e., no barrier present) when participants performed the task 
with an animated partner. Importantly, although these results fit with the ones 
reported in the present Experiments 8 and 9 (as no barrier was employed in these 
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present studies, either), Skarratt et al.’s (2010) interpretation differs from the 
present as they concluded that the observed effect was classic IOR, rather than 
social IOR (i.e., ‘only IOR was observed’, p.50). This proposition was based on the 
idea that when participants could fully see their partner’s target flash and arm 
movement, this inevitably generated IOR as IOR is activated in a response to 
sensory stimulation. Thus, Skarratt et al. (2010) submitted that ‘IOR is not usually 
obtained […] under impoverished viewing conditions’ and ‘the strictest test of 
socially-induced IOR, then, would be its emergence in a task performed in 
conjunction with a real, rather than animated, partner and under impoverished 
viewing conditions’ (p. 49). However, this early interpretation of the effect excludes 
any necessity to test its socialness, as it intrinsically assumes that social IOR is 
social and that it is triggered by different factors as compared to basic IOR. 
Moreover, it seems that the mentioned above ‘strictest test’ of social IOR is simply 
based on one of the possible explanations of why the effect occurs but does not 
necessarily represent a robust measure of social IOR. Indeed, Skarratt et al.’s 
(2010) interpretation simply seems to be more in line with the action-location 
hypothesis submitted by Welsh et al. than Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis 
(e.g., ‘any resulting inhibition must instead be generated through inference of a 
real person’s response behaviour’, Skarratt et al., 2010; See Chapter 3 for more 
detail on both theories). However, as explained in detail in the previous chapters, 
later work has challenged this early explanation of the effect involving the MNS 
(e.g., Cole et al., 2012; See Chapter 3 for more detail). As a consequence, in all 
recent papers the effect emerging in the social IOR paradigm (where the RT of one 
co-actor is examined as a function of the responses made by another co-
actor/event) under full viewing conditions is interpreted as indicative of social IOR 
(e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2013; Welsh et al., 
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2014). Finally, Skarratt et al. (2010)’s proposition that ‘IOR is not usually obtained 
[…] under impoverished viewing conditions’ has been challenged in a very similar 
set-up to the one used in the present Experiment 9. For instance, instead of a co-
actor, in their last experiment, Welsh et al. (2007) introduced a moving rectangle, 
mimicking hand movements while at the same time restricting participants’ vision 
and even preventing auditory cues as white noise masked any response-related 
noise. In discrepancy with Skarratt et al.’s (2010) proposition about classic IOR, 
despite the lack of any visual or auditory cues, a significant within-participants IOR 
effect emerged. Thus, in unison with Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis and 
the most recent work on social IOR, it seems that a more accurate measure of the 
social IOR effect is the difference in RT of co-actor A as a function of whether they 
repeated or not the location of co-actor B, regardless of viewing condition.  
In sum, Chapter 4 demonstrated that the effect in the present paradigm is not 
modulated by the valence of the relationship between the two co-actors and it can 
occur even in the absence of a biological co-actor. While in some previous research 
it has been interpreted as stemming from action co-representation (Ondobaka et 
al., 2012), the present findings indicated that although the results fit with the 
general findings of what would be expected from a movement congruency effect, 
the current phenomenon does not rely on the socialness of the co-actor. Indeed,  
naming the phenomenon, emerging from the present paradigm as a ‘movement-
congruency effect’ (Ondobaka et al., 2012)  appears to be a mislabel since the 
results seem to better fit with the attentional shift hypothesis, referring to it as 
‘social IOR’. Thus, as before, the observed effect will continue to be named ‘social 
IOR’ in the following Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 DECISION MAKING AND SOCIAL IOR 
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The previous three empirical chapters have revealed that social IOR is most 
likely to result from inhibitory processes to return attention to a previously cued 
location (triggered either by an event or a biological partner); its properties are 
more consistent with basic IOR than an effect, stemming from action co-
representation; and it does not seem to be as ‘social’ as its name suggests. Thus, it 
could be concluded that the effect ‘behaves’ more like an attentional phenomenon 
rather than a joint-action effect.  
As explained in the General Introduction, the abundance and complexity of the 
environment tax highly the human visual attentional system. Moreover, because of 
the individuals’ limited processing resources (Lavie et al., 2004) the selection and 
interpretation of information are not only imperfect but also often constructed in 
accordance to its behavioural relevance to the individual, rather than reflecting  an 
accurate representation of the world (Treue, 2001). This is apparent from 
participants’ subsequent behaviour after the presentation of stimuli in standard 
visual attention paradigms where a forced choice is required (e.g., press either the 
left or the right button).  
However, recently the latter has also been discovered for paradigms where 
participants freely choose how to respond (e.g., Kiesel, 2006; Klapp & Hinkley, 
2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000; Wilson & Pratt, 2007). One such example are 
priming paradigms where participants’ decisions are shown to be greatly influenced 
by the presentation of a stimulus (i.e., ‘a prime’) that is still at the subliminal or 
preconscious stages of processing18 (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur & 
Sergent, 2006). For example, in their last experiment Klapp and Hinkley (2002) 
                                                          
18 Subliminal (attended) and preconscious processing both occur prior to conscious 
perceptual processing. It has been suggested that priming takes place in those two stages. 
According to Dehaene et al. (2006) these differ in neural activation between one another 
and as compared to conscious processing.  
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demonstrated that the direction of a masked prime (‘<’ or ‘>’) presented prior to an 
ambiguous target (< >) predetermined the participants’ response on 60.5% of the 
trials. As the used prime-target SOAs were above 100 ms, the well-known negative 
compatibility effect (NCE)19, found in forced-choice priming, occurred with 
participants being quicker to respond to stimuli incongruent with the prime. 
Moreover, facilitation from congruent primes has also been demonstrated in a free 
choice priming task. For example, Kiesel et al. (2006) found that when shorter 
SOAs than 100ms were used, participants were more likely to make a response, 
congruent with the direction of the prime. Furthermore, these responses were also 
faster than those to non-primed stimuli.    
As explained in the General Introduction, according to the two social IOR 
accounts of the present effect, social IOR is subserved by similar mechanisms to 
basic IOR (See Sections 1.1.2 & 1.1.3). Thus, the observed inhibitory effect is 
thought to be triggered either by the saliency of the partner’s location per se (Cole 
et al., 2012; Skarratt et al., 2011, 2012) or the partner’s action towards that 
location, which is interpreted as if one performed the action themselves (Welsh et 
al., 2005, 2007, 2009, 2014). There is evidence that similarly to priming, IOR is 
another attentional effect which influences free choice decisions. For example, some 
early IOR studies examined the preferred direction to which participants freely 
moved their head or eyes, following the presentation of a peripheral cue. They 
found that participants’ head orientation/eye gaze were directed more often than 
chance towards the uncued side than the cued one (Clohessy, Posner, Rothbart & 
Vecera, 1991; Posner et al., 1985, respectively).  Moreover, Wilson and Pratt 
(2007) have more recently demonstrated that basic IOR can also bias participants’ 
                                                          
19 NCE occurs when responses are faster after incongruent primes than after congruent 
primes (this is when the prime-target SOA is greater than 100 ms). In contrast, facilitation 
from congruent primes (i.e., a positive compatibility effect; PCE) usually occurs at shorter 
prime-target SOAs (Kiesel et al., 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000). 
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response selection.  In this task participants freely chose whether to press a right 
or a left button after hearing a tone. However, in this ‘choice task’ a peripheral cue 
appearing either 200ms or 800ms before the tone was presented. Results revealed 
that participants tended to avoid selecting the button that corresponded to the 
previously cued location at the long SOA and were more likely to choose the cued 
location at the short SOA (Wilson & Pratt, 2007). Such results are consistent with 
the notion that IOR is a visual search facilitator as it biases attention away from 
previously examined locations and directs it, instead, to new areas in the visual 
scene (Klein & MacInnes, 1999). Thus, it is interesting to examine whether social 
IOR has also evolved to maximise search behaviour (as proposed by Welsh et al.) 
by directing individuals to novel locations even when they freely select their 
response.   
The present Chapter 5 examined whether social IOR could influence free 
choice.  Up to date, there has been only a single study examining the latter (Reid et 
al., 2013). This study employed the standard social IOR paradigm (as described in 
Section 1.1.3; See Fig 1.1 or Fig 4.1 in Chapter 4) where participants freely chose 
whether to respond to the right or the left target location after hearing a ‘go’ tone. 
Consistent with the social IOR effect in forced-choice studies, the results revealed a 
significant social IOR bias, so that participants generally avoided the location to 
which their task-partner had previously responded (Reid et al., 2013). The present 
investigation aimed to expand this study by testing both whether social IOR could 
influence simple decisions such as choosing between two target locations and 
whether it could bias more complex judgements that one makes about a stimulus. 
All experiments in Chapter 5 incorporated the standard social IOR procedure in 
which two individuals sitting opposite one another alternated responses to stimuli 
appearing either to the left or the right of the screen. In Experiment 10 participants 
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were asked to freely select and reach to either of two occupant squares. In 
Experiment 11 they had to make a decision about which of the two consumer 
products they preferred and indicate their choice by reaching to the product. In 
Experiment 12 they were presented with pairs of human faces and asked to decide 
which of the two would be considered the most (or least) physically attractive by 
the majority of people. In the last Experiment 13 each participant judged the 
attractiveness of human faces with a confederate. Thus, over the course of these 
experiments, participants were required to make a range of free choice decisions, 
varying from simple (‘select a location’) to more complex (‘which face is more/less 
attractive?’). In each case, participants were instructed that the presence of their 
partner, as well as the choices they make, should have no bearing on their own 
task.  
5.1 Experiment 10 
 
Method 
Ethics Statement 
All four experiments reported in the present chapter have been approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the University of Essex. All participants gave their written 
informed consent to take part in this research. 
Participants  
16 participants (10 females) aged between 18 and 25 took part in exchange 
for course credits. 
Stimuli and Apparatus  
The stimuli were displayed on a 22-inch flat touch-screen monitor mounted on 
a table, raised 740 mm from the floor. Participants sat with their chest 
approximately 240 mm from a ‘home’ button positioned directly in front of them. 
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The stimulus positions were denoted by squares (14 mm along each side) located 
310 mm from each other. The squares were black (0.4 cd/m2) and acted as 
‘placeholders’ in that they were present for the entire duration of a condition block. 
They illuminated briefly (100 ms) by turning white (76.2 cd/m2), thus rendering 
them invisible momentarily. The fixation cross was a black cross, presented in the 
middle of the screen. All stimuli appeared on a uniform white background (76.2 
cd/m2). Participants made their responses by releasing a home button and touching 
one of the two squares. A RM Pentium PC custom software was used for the 
stimulus generation and the recording of the responses.  
Design and Procedure  
Participants used their right hand to hold the home button and make 
responses. The first response of Participant A activated the stimulus sequence after 
which the two participants alternated single responses for the duration of the 
experiment. Thus, a response on one trial by, say, Participant A also acted as the 
inducing stimulus for the next trial of Participant B. Each response was prompted by 
a cue, marked by the simultaneous illumination of both stimulus squares. Upon 
seeing this, participants had to decide to which of the two positions to make a 
response. They were told that while the speed of decision was not important they 
should aim to respond within a ‘second or so’ of the cue. This was stated to 
discourage participants from taking time to think over their decision. Once a 
response was completed, 350 ms elapsed until the next target occurred. They were 
also asked to fixate centrally at all times until they were required to make their 
response, during which they were instructed to fixate the response position. 
Furthermore, participants were told that they could ignore their partner’s response 
since it was not relevant to their decision. Participants always had a full vision of 
the apparatus and their co-actor. They completed two blocks, each consisting of 
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209 trials. Data from the first trial was always omitted as no response preceded it. 
Thus, in total, data from 208 trials was used for each participant. The experiment 
measured the proportion of responses each participant made to the same location 
as their partner’s previous response compared to chance level (50%). 
Results and Discussion 
 
Each participant’s response was coded as being the ‘same’ or ‘different’ in 
relation to their partner’s previous response. On occasions when a response was 
too light to be registered by the touchscreen (and its location could not be 
established) the response was omitted from the analysis along with the next 
response of the other participant. Approximately 13% of data were omitted this 
way. The percentage of the remaining same responses was then compared to 
chance level. Results showed that overall, participants responded to the same 
location on 40.6% (SD = 7.41) of trials compared to 59.3% made to the different 
location (see Fig 5.1 for all ‘same’ responses in Experiment 10). Each person’s 
percentage score was entered into a one-sample t-test with 50 being the test value. 
This analysis showed that participants were less likely to respond to the same 
location than chance would allow, t(15) = 5.1, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.3, (95% 
confidence interval: lower = 37.0%, upper = 44.2%). Additionally, although 
participants were informed that response speed was not important, RTs were also 
analysed. Results showed that the effect reported above did not manifest in terms 
of shorter RTs to reach to a different location; same RT = 537 (SD = 178), different 
RT = 552 (SD = 195), t(15) =. 88, p >. 39, Cohen’s d =. 08. Finally, the within-
person IOR effect was also analysed (whether participants avoided their own 
previous response location). Results revealed that such basic IOR effect was 
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present: same location = 41.7%; SD = 10.6, t (15) = 3.1, p <. 01, Cohen’s d =. 
78. 
Finally, one further analysis was conducted to examine whether a response 
strategy or bias might account for the effect (i.e., a general tendency to respond to 
one location more than the other). For this test, the data of participants who had 
not performed the task together was randomly paired. Thus, for instance, the 
response from Participant number 4 on trial number 156 was followed by the 
response from Participant number 15 on trial number 157. This was then followed 
by the response from Participant number 4 on trial number 158, and so on. Results 
showed that responses to the same position did not differ from chance, 50.5% (SD 
= 6.6), t(15) =. 27, p > 0.79, Cohen’s d = 0.08. Overall, these data show that 
participants tended to choose a location different from the one their partner chose 
on a previous trial and this decision is not likely to be due to a response bias or 
strategy.  
5.2 Experiment 11 
 
The decisions participants had to make in Experiment 10 were tied to the two 
spatial locations. Moreover, in the previous experiment the task did not differ much 
from the basic Social IOR paradigm; it was also fairly simple and required little 
deliberation. Thus, Experiment 11 examined whether social IOR would have an 
effect on more complex decisions, hence, whether the partner’s choice of location 
could influence one’s preference for consumer products. Thus, where normally the 
two squares would occur, images of two similar consumer products were presented. 
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Method 
 
All aspects of the method were as reported previously with the following 
exceptions. 26 new and naive participants (16 females) aged between 18 and 27 
took part in exchange for £6. 52 pairs of familiar everyday products were 
generated. Examples included clothing, watches, furniture, music and gardening 
equipment, kettles, cars, cycles, and kitchen appliances. The pairs were randomly 
selected from the same category, e.g., two watches, two kettles, etc., and 
presented on screen in the locations occupied by the two square cues in Experiment 
10. That is, each was centred 155 mm to the left or right of a centrally positioned 
cross. The images of the products were all scaled to fit within an imaginary square 
measuring approximately 65 mm along each side, and were presented in their 
natural colours. 
The trial types were presented in a random order with the stipulation that the 
same pair could not occur on the following trial. Thus participants were never 
presented with the same two items that their co-actor had just made a judgement 
on. Participants  were instructed to  ‘scan both products and decide which of the 
two they prefer’. In a second block of trials participants were asked to decide which 
of the two was least preferred. The presentation order of the two blocks was 
counterbalanced. Each participant was presented with the same pairs of products 
four times over the course of the experiment, twice when judging which was the 
most preferred, and twice when judging which was the least preferred. As 
previously, participants had a full vision of the apparatus and their co-actor. They 
were also told to firmly press the touchscreen in an attempt to ensure all touch 
responses were recorded. As in the previous experiment, there were 209 trials in 
each block generating 418 trials for the entire experiment from which 416 were 
analysed (See the Method section of Experiment 10). 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Of all responses only 2 were not registered by the touch-screen. As with 
Experiment 10 we compared the proportion of responses made to the same location 
as a partner’s previous response with the chance value of 50%. Results showed 
that, overall, participants responded to the same location on 47.6% (SD = 4.1) of 
the trials (see Fig 5.1  for all ‘same’ responses in Experiment 11). A one-sample t-
test revealed this to represent significantly fewer responses than chance would 
allow, t(25) = 3.0, p <. 006, Cohen’s d =. 58, (95% confidence interval: lower = 
46.0%, upper = 49.2%). A further analysis revealed that there was no difference in 
this effect as a consequence of making a preferred or non-preferred decision 
(preferred = 47.2%, non-preferred = 48.0%), t(25) =. 54, p >. 59, Cohen’s d = 
0.14. Furthermore, similarly to Experiment 10, the decision effect did not manifest 
in terms of RT; same RT = 1323 (SD = 238), different RT = 1305 (SD = 251); 
t(25) = 1.4, p >. 17, Cohen’s d =. 07. However, no within-person IOR effect was 
present in this experiment: same location = 50.6%; SD = 7.7, t(25) =. 43, p >. 
67, Cohen’s d =. 08. 
As in Experiment 10, data from different combinations of participants was 
randomly paired together to test response bias. Again, responses to the same 
position did not differ from chance, 50.4% (SD = 6.6), t(25) =. 45, p > 0.66, 
Cohen’s d = 0.1. Overall, these data show that, in addition to the simple location 
choices that were measured in the previous experiment, social IOR can also 
influence more complex subjective choices; namely, preference for consumer 
products. 
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Fig 5.1 Percentage of  ‘same’ responses for each participant in all four 
experiments. 
5.3 Experiment 12 
 
Experiments 9 and 10 represented two kinds of free choice decisions that 
ranged from simple (‘select a location’) to more considered (‘select your most/least 
preferred product’). Both types of decision were therefore based on personal 
preference. In Experiment 12 we explored the generality of this effect by examining 
whether seeing a response could influence a relative judgement20 concerning 
physical attractiveness. Using the same paradigm, participants were presented with 
pairs of faces and asked to decide which of the two would be considered the most 
(or least) physically attractive by the majority of people. As before, they indicated 
their decision with a reaching response. 
                                                          
20 A judgement based on the participant’s comparison of the stimulus to an internal 
psychological standard or referent. 
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Method 
 
All aspects of the method were as reported in Experiment 11 with the 
following exceptions: 16 of the 28 participants, aged between 21 and 26 years were 
female, and none had taken part in Experiments 9 or 10. The stimuli were colour 
photographs of male or female faces taken from a library of images held at the 
University of Essex. The images were cropped to show the face with only a minimal 
amount of hair. Half the faces were male and half female but the pairs always 
comprised faces of the same sex. Prior to the experiment, an observer who was 
naive to the rationale and aims of the experiment was asked to sort the faces into 
pairs that were of similar attractiveness until 52 face pairs were generated. Thus, 
each participant was presented with the same pairs of faces four times over the 
course of the experiment, twice when judging which was the most attractive, and 
twice when judging which was the least attractive. Participants were asked to ‘scan 
both faces and decide which one they thought most people would consider more 
physically attractive’. In a second block participants were asked to decide which of 
the two they thought  would be considered as less attractive. Participants always 
had a full vision of the apparatus and their co-actor. 
Results and Discussion 
 
All reaching responses were registered by the touch-screen. Again, we 
compared the proportion of responses to the same location as a partner’s previous 
response with the chance value of 50%. This analysis showed that participants 
responded to the same location on 46.6% (SD = 5.1) of trials (see Fig 5.1 for all 
‘same’ responses in Experiment 12). A one sample t-test revealed this to be 
significant, t(27) = 3.5, p <. 002, Cohen’s d =. 66, (95% confidence interval: lower 
= 44.7%, upper = 48.9%). Moreover, the within-person IOR effect was significant 
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(t (27) = 2.6, p <. 05, Cohen’s d =. 49). However, this effect went in the opposite 
direction to what is expected for IOR, so that participants significantly preferred 
going to the same location relative to their own previous response (M = 53.4%; SD 
= 7.0). 
Responses with respect to the specific judgement (i.e., most attractive, least 
attractive) were also analysed. This again showed no reliable effect of decision 
type, with ‘most attractive’ accounting for 45.1% of same responses, and ‘least 
attractive’ accounting for 48.1%, t(27) = 2.0, p >.05, Cohen’s d =. 46. There was 
also no RT effect; same RT = 1300 (SD = 494), different RT = 1294 (SD = 528), 
t(27) =. 37, p >. 71, Cohen’s d =. 01. Finally, the random-pairs analysis we 
performed in Experiments 10 and 11 again showed that same responses did not 
differ from chance, 49.3% (SD = 3.1), t(27) =. 27, p > 0.27, Cohen’s d = 0.23. In 
sum, these results reveal that social IOR can influence relative judgements, 
concerning facial attractiveness. These data thus concur with those from 
Experiments 10 and 11. 
5.3 Experiment 13 
 
The results of Experiments 10–12 suggested that participants tended to avoid 
selecting stimuli occupying the same location as their partner’s previous choice. The 
final Experiment 13 examined the possibility that instead of social IOR, a response 
strategy or bias underlies the effect. It is of particular importance to examine this 
issue in the present context because certain biases, for example a tendency to 
respond to one side of the display, could generate a pattern of data that resembles 
the observed phenomenon. For instance, if both participants happen to have a 
response bias to their right (or both to their left), this would appear as if they are 
avoiding each other’s previous location. Indeed, although no significant laterality 
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bias was present in Experiments 10 and 12, there was such in Experiment 11 
(Experiment 10: 49.9% of responses to the left, t (15) = 0.04, p > 0.96; 
Experiment 11: 53.4% of responses to the right, t(25) = 4.6, p < 0.01; Experiment 
12: 51.9% of responses to the right, t(27) = 1.0, p > 0.32).  
This issue is currently addressed in each experiment by analysing the data of 
the randomly combined participant pairs. Although the results suggest the bias 
account does not explain the effect, the present experiment offered a direct test of 
this possibility. Experiment 13 was a close replication of the method employed in 
Experiment 12 with the exception that one of the co-actors was the author who 
acted as a confederate. Her responses were predetermined such that she made an 
equal number of left and right responses. This approach is analogous to a standard 
visual attention experiment in which ‘cues’ are equally distributed between left and 
right, a design that controls for any issues associated with response bias. Thus, if 
participants were simply biased to go to a particular side, then no social IOR effect 
in responses should occur, as the confederate’s choice was equally balanced 
between left and right and consequently, the same and different locations.  
Method 
 
All aspects of the method were as reported in Experiment 12 with the 
exceptions that 21 participants (16 females) aged between 20 and 27 years 
performed with a confederate who is also the author. All participants were right-
handed.  
A small grey dot appeared at the far bottom corner of the display, under the 
face to which the confederate had to respond (See Fig 5.2). When asked after the 
experiment, none of the participants stated that they saw the dot. Because the 
basic effect in Experiments 11 and 12 did not differ according to type of decision 
152 
 
 
(e.g., preferred or non-preferred), participants in Experiment 13 only performed 
one block of trials in which they were required to reach to the face that would be 
considered more attractive by most people. As in all other experiments in Chapter 
5, the task was performed under a full vision condition.  
 
Fig 5.2 The stimuli in Experiment 13. The figure illustrates a trial where the 
confederate is meant to respond according to the location of the small grey dot, 
appearing at the far bottom corner of the screen. Note that an arrow has been 
placed here for illustration purposes only and one did not appear in the actual 
experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
 
Only one response was not registered by the touch-screen. Results showed 
that participants were less likely than chance to choose the face located in the 
position where the confederate had just responded to (47.7%; SD = 4.8; see Fig 
5.1 for all ‘same’ responses in Experiment 13). A one sample t-test revealed this to 
be significant, t(20) = 2.2, p <. 038, Cohen’s d =. 49, (95% confidence interval: 
lower = 45.7%, upper = 49.8%). Again, there was no effect of RT; same RT = 
1054 (SD = 212), different RT = 1053 (SD = 232); t(20) =. 13, p >. 89, Cohen’s d 
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<. 01. Moreover, as in Experiments 11 and 12, no within-person IOR effect was 
found: same response = 51.5%; SD = 7.1, t(20) =. 97, p >.35, Cohen’s d =. 21. 
There was however a bias towards reaching to the right (67.3% of responses 
were executed to the right, t(25) = 6.0, p < 0.01). It should be emphasized that 
even though such a right-ward bias emerged,  this does not have any bearing to 
the proportion of responses to the same and different locations. 
 In sum, these findings replicate the effect that emerged in Experiment 12 
concerning facial attraction and more generally the results of Experiments 10 and 
11.  
5.4 General Discussion 
 
This last empirical chapter examined whether similarly to IOR, social IOR could 
influence decision making. Moreover, while Experiments 10 and 11 tested personal 
preference, Experiments 12 and 13 tested relative judgement. Results revealed that 
participants tended to choose the item that appeared in the different location in 
respect to where their partner responded on a previous trial. This was regardless of 
whether they were selecting between two identical squares, commercial products or 
faces. The present findings also indicated that the partner’s choices influenced one’s 
decisions.  
These results are in line with those from previous studies examining free 
choice in both basic IOR (e.g., Wilson & Pratt, 2007) and social IOR (Reid et al., 
2013). For instance, in their IOR free choice task, Wilson and Pratt (2007) found 
that when the SOA between a peripherally-presented cue and a ‘go’ tone was long 
(800 ms), participants were more likely to choose the uncued location. Moreover, in 
almost identical to the present task, Reid et al. (2013) found that participants were 
significantly less likely to select the ‘same’ location (44%) as compared to the 
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‘different’ location (which was chosen on the remaining 56% of the trials). The 
same was found in all of the present four experiments – participants demonstrated 
a preference for the location, opposite to the one their partner went to on a 
previous trial. Moreover, this was found not only when participants had to make a 
relatively simple choice where no strong personal preference was likely to be 
present (Experiment 10) but also in situations where the observed effect 
presumably competed with such a preference as in Experiments 11-13 where a 
more considered decision was required. However, although participants exhibited a 
much stronger preference for the ‘different location’ as they chose the ‘same’ on 
only 40.6% of the trials in Experiment 10 and this difference was less apparent in 
the other three experiments (47.6%, 46.6% and 47.7%, respectively), participants’ 
choice still significantly differed from chance, suggesting that the observed effect is 
rather robust and can override presumably higher-order personal preferences.  
The results of Chapter 5 are generally consistent with the two social IOR 
accounts of the observed effect (both with Cole et al.’s and Welsh et al.’s, explained 
in Section 1.1.3), according to which inhibitory processes are involved in biasing 
attention and consequently, action away from previously examined locations. As 
mentioned previously, the social IOR procedure is very similar to the basic (within-
participant) IOR one. Thus, in the present context, the observation of the partner’s 
target and/or arm reach together with the relatively long interval between this ‘cue’ 
and the participant’s target (See Method) possibly resulted in an inhibition of 
subsequent attentional shifts and/or motor programming to that location. The 
present results do not provide greater support for one of the two social IOR 
accounts over the other (i.e., whether what is inhibited is the response codes, 
generated by the observation of the partner’s action (Welsh et al.) or the physical 
location that has been previously cued; Cole et al.). Neither do they go against the 
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action co-representation account of the effect  according to which the bias to 
choose the ‘different’ location stems from a response facilitation to repeat an 
observed movement (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013; explained in detail in Sections 
1.2.1 & 1.2.4 and Chapter 3). Thus, instead of avoiding the partner’s location, 
participants might have been choosing the ‘different’ location as it requires a 
movement congruent action to the one just observed. However, in light of the 
findings of Chapters 2-4, the present results are more likely to be due to social IOR 
than action co-representation. As proposed by Welsh et al. (2007, 2009) it must be 
equally uneconomical from an evolutionary perspective to reexamine an already 
familiar area, regardless of whether it has been investigated by the individual 
himself or by someone else. Such strategy is likely to have evolved to promote 
novelty and optimize search behaviour to ensure the adequate provision of food, 
shelter and avoidance of predators.  
Still, it should be noted that some aspects of the present results do not 
entirely concur with the standard findings of forced-choice IOR and social IOR 
studies. There could be several explanations for the latter. First, a social IOR bias 
only emerged in terms of the response location participants went to but not in 
terms of an actual slowing of RTs when going to the ‘same’ location, as usually 
found in IOR and social IOR paradigms (Cole et al. 2012; Hayes et al., 2010; 
Skarratt et al. 2010; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Weger et al., 2008; Welsh et al., 
2005, 2007, 2009; etc.). Although one could argue that the inhibitory effects in free 
choice tasks do not reveal in RT, significant RT differences were found in the free 
choice IOR task by Wilson and Pratt (2007) and the only other free choice task on 
social IOR (Reid et al., 2013). However, it is likely that such slowing down was not 
present in the current studies, due to participants not being instructed to respond 
as quickly as possible but rather to aim to make a response ‘within a second or so 
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of the cue’ (See the Methods sections). However, alternatively, the present 
measure of temporal difference might not have been optimal as some have argued 
that IOR reveals itself only in the ‘initial RT’ component which is the time to orient 
attention to the inhibited stimulus (e.g., Howard & Lupianez, 1999). No such 
measure was obtained in the present studies; however, this would have 
corresponded to the interval between the appearance of one’s target to the release 
of the home button. Still, Reid et al. (2013) found social IOR only in their Total 
Time (TT) measure (which is equivalent to the present RT measure) but failed to 
find such a difference in initial RTs. The second aspect of the data which differs 
from the standard findings of forced-choice IOR paradigms is that a significant 
within-participant IOR in response location occurred only in Experiment 10 but not 
in any of the other experiments (See the Results sections). However, as mentioned 
earlier, as the last three experiments presumably involved the activation of higher-
order processes, it is possible that these interfered with the inhibitory bias in 
Experiments 11-13. Thus, the more considered decision in these last studies, as 
opposed to when participants had to choose between one of two identical locations, 
could have resulted in the previously-reported reduction in social IOR and a lack of 
within-participant IOR effect. 
Finally, the present results have theoretical implications as they undermine the 
possibility that the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Croson & Sundali, 2005) could be responsible 
for social IOR effects in general. The gambler’s fallacy could be characterised as an 
illusion that patterns exist in random events or expressed in another way, it is one’s 
tendency to believe that a repeat is less likely to occur when according to 
probability theory both a new and a repeated event have an equal chance (Wilke, 
Scheibehenne, Gaissmaier, McCanney & Barrett, 2014). Thus, it is possible that 
instead of being the result of inhibitory effects, social IOR is driven by the gambler’s 
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fallacy where co-actors implicitly assume that the upcoming target is less likely to 
occur at the same location relative to the different location. Thus, because they are 
anticipating the target to appear at the different location, they are less prepared to 
act to the same location, resulting in longer RTs. However, the present findings 
indicate that this is not the case as social IOR still occurred even when participants 
freely chose where to respond. Still, although less likely in light with what has been 
demonstrated about social IOR in Chapters 2-4, there is a possibility that to some 
extent participants tried to evenly distribute their responses21 so that when they 
observed a response to one location, then on their turn, they went to the opposite 
one.  
In the course of four experiments, ranging from making a simple to a more 
considered choice, the present chapter revealed that social IOR can bias decision 
making when one needs to make a speeded decision. The present effect, however, 
revealed itself in the percentage of responses to the same and different locations 
only, but it did not result in RT difference as in the previous chapters. Although the 
present results do not undermine the action co-representation account of the effect, 
they have theoretical implications for the understanding of social IOR and free 
choice in general.  
  
                                                          
21 Participants could have done this only to some extent as they consistently demonstrated 
a bias to avoid the ‘same’ location across all four experiments.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The present thesis explored an effect bridging the gap between two different 
branches of literature. On one hand, previous work has suggested that this so 
called ‘social IOR’ resembles a classic visual orienting phenomenon, often reported 
in the attentional literature (Inhibition of Return; Posner & Cohen, 1984). On the 
other hand, the interactive set-up of the paradigm reminds of an effect, arising 
from the co-representation of observed action (a movement-congruency effect), 
examined in the increasingly growing joint-action research (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 
2013). Alternatively, however, the phenomenon could be the result of a 
combination of the two – it might stem from visuomotor inhibition, triggered by the 
stimulation of witnessed motor action (Welsh et al.’s account). In a series of four 
empirical chapters, the present work examined various characteristics of social IOR 
by making a reference to the predictions of both the bottom-up and top-down 
accounts of the phenomenon. Moreover, through manipulations of the standard 
paradigm, the current thesis also directly evaluated the plausibility of the three 
competing accounts, and thus researched the causes of the effect. Finally, Chapter 
5 tested a novel, ‘side property’ of the effect – i.e., whether it expands to free 
choice decisions. Thus, by exploring the phenomenon from different angles, the 
present work firstly aimed to test (and possibly expand) what is known about this 
particular effect, standing at the borders of attentional and joint-action research. 
However, more generally, both through empirical investigation in Chapters 2-5 and 
a careful review of the joint-action literature, the present work also evaluated the 
contribution of low-level attentional processes to effects, considered to involve 
higher-order mental simulation of movement and/or action goals. Organised in four 
separate sections below, the General Discussion first provides a summary of the 
findings of each chapter, followed by the implications and limitations of the present 
research, and finally presents some ideas for future research on social IOR. 
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6.1 Summary of the Present Findings 
 
First, Chapter 2 assessed whether social IOR possessed properties, 
characteristic of an attentional effect, and more specifically, classic IOR. By testing 
the standard social IOR effect under four different SOA conditions, Experiment 1 
examined the temporal interval of the effect. The results revealed that it occurred 
only during the shortest SOA which agreed with what is already known about 
classic IOR (e.g., Castel et al., 2003, 2005; Samuel & Kat, 2003). Moreover, 
perceptual load modulated the effect so that it appeared only during low perceptual 
load and disappeared when the number of stimuli in the visual scene increased. 
These results are in line with what would be expected for classic IOR (Liu et al., 
2014) and could be explained with the load theory of selective attention and 
cognitive control (Lavie et al., 2004). Finally, when the performance of low- and 
high-trait anxious individuals on the social IOR task was compared, Experiment 3 
indicated that trait anxiety had no effect on the magnitude of the phenomenon. The 
same has been reported for classic IOR when neutral cues are used (Fox et al., 
2002; Pérez Dueñas et al., 2009). Thus, in sum, social IOR was found to be a 
short-lived effect modulated by one of the mechanisms of selective attention 
(perceptual load) but not influenced by trait anxiety. These findings are in line with 
an attentional explanation of the effect, according to which social IOR is based on 
inhibition of return processes. However, Chapter 2 did not challenge the two 
alternative explanations of the effect which advocate either a partial or full reliance 
on action co-representation.    
The aim of Chapter 3 was to disentangle the effects of ‘response location’ and 
‘action type’ to the observed phenomenon. As outlined previously, the general 
findings of the paradigm fit three alternative explanations so that the slower 
responses to the ‘same’ location, typical of social IOR, could either stem from 
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movement congruency effects (Ondobaka et al.), from an IOR-like inhibition (Cole 
et al.) or from a combination between the two (Welsh et al.). Therefore, when type 
of action is manipulated in the paradigm, each theory makes a different prediction 
about what should happen to the effect. First, in contrast with findings that 
similarity promotes action co-representation (Avenanti et al., 2010; Loula, Prasad, 
Harber & Shiffrar, 2005) and that the representation of the movement of different 
body parts is somatotopically-represented in the motor cortex (Buccino et al., 
2001), a significant social IOR effect occurred in Experiment 4 even when there was 
a kinematic mismatch between the observed and the required-to-perform actions. 
Furthermore, Experiment 5 demonstrated that social IOR was not affected even 
when the co-actor’s action was fully occluded from view, as long as participant’s 
attention was directed to the target location via an attentional cue. Finally, in 
contrast to Ondobaka et al. (2012) when the effects of action type and location 
type were disentangled in Experiment 6, again a significant social IOR effect was 
observed but no movement congruency effect emerged. Overall, these findings 
challenged an account of the phenomenon based on action co-representation and 
do not fit with Ondobaka et al.’s and Welsh et al.’s theories. Rather, the present 
findings suggested that the effect is more likely to be due to IOR, induced by an 
attentional shift (Cole et al.). 
The following Chapter 4 provided a logical continuation of the theme 
concerning the role of action co-representation in the social IOR effect. It assessed 
the impact and importance of a biological co-actor to the effect. First, Experiment 7 
presented contrary findings to previous research, which demonstrated that joint-
action effects  can be modulated by social cues (Leighton et al., 2010), as well as 
by the valence of the relationship between the two co-actors (Hommel et al., 2009; 
Iani et al., 2011). Nonetheless, in two separate manipulations, Experiments 7a and 
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7b indicated that social IOR did not manifest in a greater magnitude when 
participants acted with a person they presumably felt more confident with and that 
a significant effect emerged irrespective of the relationship between the two co-
actors. Moreover, Experiments 8 and 9 further examined the socialness of the 
effect by testing whether social IOR would still occur if respectively, no partner was 
present during the task or instead of a biological co-actor, attention-capturing 
transients moved to the target on the partner’s trial. Although the findings of 
Experiment 8 did not provide a definite answer, Experiment 9 showed that the 
presence of a biological partner is not necessary for the effect to emerge. The 
opposite is predicted if the present effect relied on action co-representation as 
clearly no simulation/mental integration of represented action (Sebanz et al., 2003, 
2006; Tsai et al., 2008) was possible in these last two experiments. Chapter 4 thus 
suggested that the effect of interest is not likely to be social in nature. These 
findings also fit with Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis that the phenomenon 
stems from inhibition of return processes, rather than from direct matching 
between observed and required actions. 
Finally, having examined the causes of the effect and some of its basic 
characteristics, Chapter 5 went on to explore a further property, reported for some 
perceptuo-attentional effects (e.g., Kiesel, 2006; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002), among 
which classic IOR (Posner et al., 1985; Wilson & Pratt, 2007). Thus, the last 
Chapter 5 assessed whether social IOR could influence speedy, free choice 
decisions. Using the standard social IOR paradigm, over the course of four 
experiments, participants either freely chose one of the locations where the usual 
target appeared (Experiment 10), made a decision about their preference for a 
commercial product (Experiment 11) or the relative attractiveness of two presented 
human faces (Experiments 12 and 13).  Thus, the participants’ choice varied from 
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simple (‘select a location’) to more complex (‘which face is more/less attractive?’) 
and from personal to relative, respectively. A significant social IOR effect emerged 
in all four experiments, indicating that one’s decisions were influenced by the 
partner’s choices, irrespective of what type of decision was required. Despite not in 
contrast with the action co-representation account, these results support previous 
studies examining free choice in both basic IOR (e.g., Wilson & Pratt, 2007) and 
social IOR (Reid et al., 2013). 
6.2 Implications and Contributions to the Literature 
 
The present work has several theoretical implications both to the visual 
attention and the joint-action literature. On first place, it replicated previous 
findings concerning the social IOR effect. For example, in line with prior research, 
the present experiments always revealed significant social IOR when the task was 
performed with a biological co-actor and within the standard trial time course, used 
in previous research (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2010; Skarratt et al., 
2010; Welsh et al., 2005). Moreover, an effect emerged both when barriers were 
employed in the paradigm, as in earlier studies (Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 
2007, 2009) and when the two co-actors had a full vision of the apparatus and the 
partner’s actions, as reported in more recent papers (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; 
Cole et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2013; Welsh et al., 2014). In this vain, these studies 
also supported the general movement congruency effect, as another way to 
interpret the difference in RT in the standard social IOR procedure (where 
participants sit opposite) is that movement-congruent responses are executed more 
swiftly than movement-incongruent ones (e.g., Brass et al., 2000; Liepelt et al., 
2008; Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013). Moreover, the findings of the present thesis 
are also in line with other research and well-established theories, such as the load 
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theory of selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie et al., 2004), Eysenck et 
al.’s (2007) attentional control theory, the referential coding account (Dolk et al., 
2011, 2013; Guagnano et al., 2010), the coordination dynamics approach (Fine & 
Amazeen, 2011; Fineet al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2009), etc. 
The present research, however, also made several novel contributions to the 
literature. On first place, it researched the basis of the effect from several different 
angles by addressing four original research questions. These were: What 
characteristics does social IOR share with IOR? (Chapter 2); What role does action 
play in the effect? (Chapter 3); What is the importance of the relationship between 
the two co-actors and the co-actor’s intentionality to social IOR (Chapter 4) and 
Can the phenomenon influence other processes, such as decision making? (Chapter 
5). This involved conceiving and utilizing an original modification of the paradigm 
(Experiment 6) to neatly distinguish between the two potential factors, contributing 
to the effect – ‘location type’ and ‘action type’. By examining these in isolation, the 
present work provided convincing evidence that the effect is driven by IOR 
processes. This is a particularly important methodological implication as previous 
research has confounded the effects of these two factors both when using the 
standard social IOR paradigm (Atkinson et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2012; Hayes et 
al., 2010; Ondobaka et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2013; Skarratt et al., 2010; Skarratt 
et al., 2012; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009b, 2014) and to some extent, even 
when attempting to distinguish between the two (Welsh et al., 2009a). This is so as 
when two co-actors sit next to each other, as in Welsh et al. (2009a), still different 
actions are executed to the shared target location, placed in the middle and to the 
two outer locations, which does not provide as neat comparison as the one in the 
present Experiment 6. Furthermore, Experiment 6 is the only study up to date that 
investigated hemifield inhibition (as opposed to location-based inhibition) in the 
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social IOR effect. The latter revealed a significant RT advantage when the cue and 
target appeared at different hemifields as opposed to the same hemifield which is 
consistent with studies demonstrating hemifield inhibition in classic IOR (e.g., 
Tassinari et al., 1987, 1994; Berlucchi et al., 1989). However, although the findings 
of Experiment 6 made a contribution to the literature on social IOR, these still need 
to be interpreted with caution before they have been replicated by a further 
investigation. Moreover, the present investigation into the socialness of the effect 
also had important theoretical and methodological implications. More specifically, 
while a previous study had researched the effect of the co-actor’s animacy on social 
IOR (Skarratt et al., 2010), the impact of the personal relationship between the two 
co-actors, examined in Experiment 7, has never been explored before. The latter 
results not only provided further support to the theory that the present effect is 
similar to IOR but also had another valuable theoretical implication. By 
demonstrating that an effect termed ‘social IOR’ is not modulated by social factors, 
this chapter also questioned the appropriateness of the term ‘social IOR’ and invited 
a discussion onto what other term could be more suitable (one option is 
substituting the term ‘social’ for ‘joint’, similarly to Dolk et al. who refer to the SSE 
as the Joint Simon effect). Finally, the findings of Chapter 5 provided both 
important insights from a theoretical perspective as well as novel information of 
how the present effect could spread to and influence higher-order processes. Thus, 
on first place they confirmed that social IOR is a robust, stable phenomenon which 
cannot be accounted for by an implicit assumption that the target is less likely to 
appear at a repeated location (the effect is not driven by the gambler’s fallacy; 
Croson & Sundali, 2005). This was particularly important to examine as the results 
of the standard forced-choice social IOR task are indeed consistent with such an 
assumption. However, the results of Chapter 5 convincingly demonstrated that the 
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effect occurs even when the co-actors freely chose where to respond. Moreover, 
these findings expanded the single previous study on social IOR and free choice 
(Reid et al., 2013) by demonstrating that social IOR biased not only simple choices 
(i.e., location preference) but also more complex preferences (i.e., choosing 
between two commercial products), as well as relative judgements about facial 
attractiveness. However, such a bias was only studied as long as social IOR lasts, 
meaning that Chapter 5 explored how it affects speedy decisions in particular. 
Studying the after-effects of this bias was beyond the scope of the present 
research. However, it seems an interesting idea for a future exploration.  
Finally, in more general terms, the present work has potential implications to 
joint-action research as it evaluated the importance of low-level attentional 
processes to one particular joint-action phenomenon. The latter effect has been 
largely neglected in the action observation and joint-action literature, especially 
after the quick advance of mirror neuron research. In contrast, the present thesis 
provided research evidence that a phenomenon, interpreted by some  as stemming 
from the imitation/co-representation of action (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013) is in 
fact more likely to be based on low-level inhibitory processes. Thus, the current 
work contributed to the quickly growing literature advocating an alternative 
explanation to some joint-action effects. One such account is the referential coding 
account of the SSE in which actions are coded with respect to their relative location 
and in this vain the co-actor’s agency (rather than intentionality) triggers the 
formation of a spatial reference frame (Dolk et al., 2011, 2013, 2014). Moreover, 
as mentioned in the General Introduction, Liepelt et al. (2011, 2013) proposed a 
somewhat similar alternative to the action co-representation account – that the SSE 
depends on low level feature integration based on the requirements of the previous 
trials. Finally, even more closely related to the present paradigm, the Coordination 
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Dynamics Approach argues against the involvement of action co-representation in 
the movement congruency effect. Within this account, the effect is driven by the 
anatomical congruence of the two co-actors’ actions, rather than the mental 
simulation of action (e.g., Fine & Amazeen, 2011). Thus, the present work might 
facilitate a more considerate examination of low-level attentional processes in 
future joint-action studies.  
6.3 Limitations of the Present Work 
 
There are two main limitations of the present work – one is focusing solely on 
visually-induced social IOR, while neglecting how (and whether) other types of 
sensory cues could influence the effect; the other concerns the inconsistent use of 
barriers during the different experiments.   
First, a somewhat minor limitation of the present work is that all reported 
experiments in the current thesis explored only the effect of visual cues in the 
paradigm but not how auditory cues influence it. While there is evidence that classic 
IOR could occur in response to auditory stimuli (Schmidt, 1996), a very recent 
social IOR study reported the opposite for the present effect (Welsh et al., 2014). It 
was found that when access to any other visual cues was restricted and participants 
could only hear their partner’s response – no significant social IOR effect emerged. 
Thus, incorporating an auditory condition in the present Experiments 8 and 9, for 
instance, would have provided a more complete insight into what type of sensory 
cues drive the phenomenon (i.e., Is it just visually-induced?). 
Second, the present thesis incorporated experiments, some of which done 
under partial viewing conditions (a barrier was introduced), and some – under full 
viewing conditions. While the first method has been recommended by earlier papers 
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(Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2007, 2009), in the Discussion section of 
Chapter 4, the present author argues that the latter is not necessarily ‘the strictest 
test of socially-induced IOR’ (as submitted by Skarratt et al., 2010, p. 49) as it is 
essentially based on Welsh et al.’s (2007) explanation of the effect. According to it, 
social IOR occurs because of a combination between the generation of response-
evoked motor codes and IOR processes. Essentially, this method excludes an 
alternative explanation of the effect, such as Cole et al.’s attentional shift 
hypothesis as it assumes that the effect is inherently social. However, although the 
latter interpretation provided a reasonable rationale why not to incorporate a 
barrier, the impact of visual condition on the magnitude of social IOR was examined 
only in a couple of experiments in the present thesis (Experiments 3 & 5). It should 
be noted that indeed, a barrier was not used in many of the other experiments as 
the effect of the partner’s transients was exactly the one being assessed as capable 
to produce a significant social IOR (e.g., Experiments 8 & 9). Nevertheless, a 
better, more robust measure of the impact of viewing condition on the effect would 
have been the incorporation of a barrier in all experiments where this was possible.  
6.4 The Future of Social IOR Research  
 
Until recently, social IOR research was still in its ‘infancy’, as until 2013, only a 
handful of papers, calling the effect social IOR/between-participants IOR were 
published. As described earlier, the very recent years have seen a growth in 
research, exploring the suspected bottom-up basis of some joint-action effects, 
which in turn, also resulted in a greater interest in the present phenomenon. 
However, being a relatively unexplored effect, social IOR still provides a lot of room 
for novel research ideas.  
169 
 
 
Future research should on first place examine the neural correlates of the 
observed slowing down of responses, characteristic of the effect. This will by far 
provide the strictest test of the plausibility of each theory on social IOR. Therefore, 
a research into the ERP components, associated with the effect, could lead to 
invaluable insights into the basis of the phenomenon as a lot is known about the 
ERP markers of both IOR and motor action. Indeed, up to date only behavioural 
work on social IOR has been conducted, which makes such an investigation not 
only desirable but also necessary. As outlined in Section 1.1.2.1 of the General 
Introduction, while traditional IOR is associated with a peak in the early P1 and/or 
N1 ERP components, it does not have an effect on the LRP, which is a marker of 
motor selection and preparation (Prime & Ward, 2004, 2006). At the same time, 
LRP is known to rise during action observation and when the observed action is 
predictable, to even occur prior to its onset (e.g., Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, 
& Sirigu, 2004). Data collection on such an ERP study on social IOR is currently 
conducted by the author. 
Moreover, as a continuation of Chapter 5, one could also examine the effect of 
social IOR on other behaviours and processes. For example, one could explore 
whether the social IOR bias overrides the objective perceptual processing of the 
characteristics of presented objects. Similarly to Experiments 10-13, in the two 
possible target locations, instead of pictures, two vertical lines, could be 
simultaneously presented. So that while on some trials one is slightly longer than 
the other, on other trials – the two lines will be of a similar length. Then, 
participants would have to make a speedy decision about which line was the 
longer/shorter one, by responding to it. Thus, it would be interesting to examine 
whether participants will be able to make a correct perceptual judgement about the 
length of the lines or similarly to Experiments 10-13, their decisions will be 
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compromised depending on the location their partner selected on a previous trial. 
The same could be done with various other perceptual characteristics, such as 
judging the brightness of two objects of a similar colour (i.e., reach for the 
brighter/less bright object).  
Finally, the proposition that social IOR might be a visual search facilitator, like 
classic IOR (Klein & MacInnes, 1999) could also be explored. One way in which this 
could be done is testing participants in a search-letter paradigm where among 
several letter distractors, displayed on both sides of the screen, a target letter is 
presented. Consistent with the standard social IOR procedure, on half of the trials, 
this target should appear on the right handside of the screen, while on the other 
half – on the left handside. If social IOR is indeed essentially an IOR effect, 
participants should identify the target letter more quickly when it is presented at a 
novel location, compared to their partner’s previous response.  Consequently, they 
should inhibit the processing of the letter if it appears at the ‘same’ location and 
thus be slower to identify it among the distractors.        
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The present work examined the causes and properties of the social IOR effect, 
defined by the slowing down of RT whenever a participant, sitting opposite another 
happens to repeat the response location of their co-actor. Thirteen original 
experiments, organised thematically in four empirical chapters investigated the 
effect from various angles. The results of the experiments of each chapter were 
consistent with one another as well as with the findings of the other chapters. 
Moreover, each empirical chapter gradually built on the previous one, aiming to 
present a complete picture of the effect, its basis and properties. Thus, Chapter 2 
indicated that social IOR shared a number of similarities with its within-participants 
171 
 
 
counterpart (classic IOR) such as having a similar time-course, being modulated by 
perceptual load but not by trait anxiety. Further, Chapter 3 directly examined the 
role of action type on the phenomenon. The first two experiments demonstrated 
that the present effect was not influenced by the kinematic match between the 
observed and the required actions or whether the co-actor’s action was visible or 
not. Moreover, importantly the third experiment showed that when the paradigm 
was modified in such a way that the effect of action congruency could be isolated, 
no such effect emerged. Chapter 4 further demonstrated that paradoxically, social 
IOR is not social in nature as it occurred as long as a sufficiently salient event was 
introduced in the task. Thus, the effect did not change as a function of the valence 
of the relationship between the two partners nor depending on whether there was a 
biological partner to take turns with the participant. Finally, the last Chapter 5 
demonstrated an interesting property of the present effect – that the social IOR 
bias was capable of influencing free choice decisions beyond chance level. 
Moreover, this was found to extend to both simple decisions and more complex 
ones as well as to both personal and relative judgements.  
Taken together, the present findings are mostly consistent with Cole et al.’s 
attentional shift hypothesis according to which the effect is triggered by visuomotor 
inhibition, like classic IOR and that contrary to Ondobaka et al.’s prediction, action 
co-representation does not seem to contribute to the effect. Although not without 
limitations, the present thesis has significant implications not only for the better 
understanding of the social IOR effect but also concerning the role of attentional 
orienting in joint-action paradigms in general. 
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